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Abstract 
Surveillance on the Internet is a new battleground which attracts attention 
from all walks of life in our society. Since the 2013 Snowden revelations, the 
practice of Internet surveillance has become common knowledge. This 
research critically examines whether or not Internet privacy is dead, with a 
specific focus on the technical aspects of the Internet in order to express how 
technology is used to enhance and to invade privacy. This sets it apart from 
the existing literature in the field. 
In this research, three jurisdictions are chosen as case studies: the US and 
the UK as western jurisdictions with different legal systems, and China which 
has extensive surveillance and limited Internet privacy. The research explores 
the meaning of privacy in the information society and investigates the ways in 
which Internet privacy is integrated in the three chosen jurisdictions are 
critically analysed and discussed. 
The research findings reveal that Internet privacy is being taken away in both 
the US and the UK and it is hard to be optimistic for the future in the light of 
the 2013 Snowden revelations and ongoing changes to legislation, particularly 
the Investigatory Powers Bill in the UK. Through the examination of the 
evolution of the Internet in China and its nascent and evolving laws relating to 
data protection and privacy, the research findings demonstrate that China 
holds a great deal of control over its Internet and has implemented technical 
measures of surveillance, effectively meaning that Internet privacy in China is 
dead. Most importantly, through the examination of these three jurisdictions, 
there is strong evidence to suggest that these nation states are not so different 
when it comes to the invasion of Internet privacy. Despite these, there is still 
hope and the research concludes by examining possible ways to prevent the 
demise of Internet privacy. 
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ISP Internet Service Provider. This may be an access 
provider, or a provider of services such as web hosting, 
or a combination 
IXP Internet eXchange Point 
M2M Machine to Machine communication 
MAC Media Access Control 
MEI The Ministry of Electricity Industry 
Metadata Communications data, data about a communication but 
not including content 
MITM Man In The Middle attack 
MOTS Man On The Side attack 
MP Member of Parliament 
MPT The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 
NAACP The National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People 
NAT Network Address Translation 
NIST The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NPC The National People’s Congress 
NSA The National Security Agency 
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NSL The National Security Letter 
OCCSSA Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act  
OSI Open Systems Interconnection 
OSX Macintosh Operating System X 
OTA The Office of Technology Assessment 
PAA The Protect America Act of 2007 
PCLOB The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
PECR The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2003 
Pen Register A device which logs all number dialled by a phone being 
monitored. In modern terms, such a device would 
monitor all IP addresses connected to by a system being 
monitored 
PET Privacy Enhancing Technology 
PGP Pretty Good Privacy – encryption software 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
PRISM US mass Internet collection programme 
PSB The Public Security Bureau 
PSP The President’s Surveillance Program 
RFID Radio-Frequency IDentification 
RIPA The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
RSA RSA has multiple related meanings. RSA is formed from 
the initials of Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard 
Adelman who pioneered public key cryptography; as a 
company, RSA Security produce cryptographic libraries 
Router A device which interconnects network segments and 
determines what data needs to go where by examining 
the destination IP address 
RUSI The Royal United Services Institute 
SCA The Stored Communications Act 
SLAC Stanford Linear Accelerator Center 
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SMS Short Message Service 
SNI Server Name Indication 
SPI Shallow Packet Inspection 
TCP  Transmission Control Protocol (as in TCP/IP) 
Tempora UK mass Internet collection programme 
Tor ‘The Onion Router” 
traceroute A command which uses Internet control packets to 
estimate the route those packets are taking 
Trap and Trace 
Device 
A device which records all numbers calling the 
monitored phone. In modern terms, this would record all 
IP addresses connecting to a monitored system 
TSP The Terrorist Surveillance Program 
UDHR The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
Upstream US mass Internet collection programme 
URL Uniform Resource Locator, a web address 
USC United States Code 
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol 
Web Short for World Wide Web 
Web2.0 The second generation Web 
whois A database containing registrant information for Internet 
domain names 
Wi-Fi Wi-Fi is the name adopted by the Wi-Fi Alliance to 
describe the common Wireless LAN (WLAN) technology 
working to IEEE Standard 802.11 
VoIP Voice over IP 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In 2016, it was reported that the Internet is used by almost half the population 
of the world.1 Electronic mail (E-mail) allows us to communicate without the 
need to write and then post a physical letter. The invention of the World Wide 
Web (Web)2 enabled people to access and use resources scattered about the 
Internet. We have come to rely on it for personal banking, business and 
personal communications, news, television and entertainment. The Web also 
gave rise to social media websites such as Facebook.3 Social media websites 
allow us to connect with people and form groups, or just to tell everyone what 
we are doing or how we feel. The mobile phone became the smartphone, a 
device which retains the utility of a telephone while being a mobile 
communications device capable of a wide variety of tasks, which allows us to 
be connected all the time and wherever we are. We are increasingly living our 
lives in public. 
However, because of its nature, the Internet is also a rich ground for those 
who wish to surveil an individual and/or a population. Communications 
technologies have always been subjected to targeted surveillance, for 
example, a telephone tap. The Internet enables mass surveillance, where 
                                            
1 International Telecommunications Union, ‘ICT Facts and Figures 2016’ 
<https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2016.pdf> accessed 26 
December 2016 
2 The World Wide Web was invented at CERN by Tim Berners-Lee in 1989. 
See <http://webfoundation.org/about/vision/history-of-the-web/> 
accessed 16 October 2016 
3 Facebook is a popular social media site. Founded in 2004 it reportedly had 
1.79 billion active users as of 30 September 2016; see 
<http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/> accessed 13 November 2016 
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information being shared not just between targeted individuals, but also 
between all people can be acquired. 
Today, the Internet has over 3.4 billion users.4 In 2015, there were 59.3 million 
Internet users in the UK (64.7 million population),5 280.7 million in the US 
(321.3 million population),6 and 721.4 million Internet users in the People’s 
Republic of China (China) (1.37 billion population).7 As can be seen from 
these statistics, China has more Internet users than the number of people in 
the UK and US combined.8 
Unlike the US and the UK, the ease of access to news and information 
presented an issue for China. Since the Internet began in China, the 
government has sought to control it, primarily because the Internet offers 
information that may lead to social instability. If the Chinese government is to 
maintain control it needs to keep a grip on the flow of information into China. 
                                            
4 International Telecommunications Union, ‘Key ICT indicators for developed 
and developing countries and the world (totals and penetration rates)’ 
<http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Statistics/Documents/statistics/2016/ITU_Key_2005-
2016_ICT_data.xls> accessed 26 December 2012 
5 Miniwatts Marketing Group, ‘Internet in Europe Stats’ 
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm#europe> accessed 1 
October 2016 
6 Miniwatts Marketing Group, ‘Internet Usage and 2015 Population in North 
America’ <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm#north> 
accessed 1 October 2016 
7 Miniwatts Marketing Group, ‘Internet Usage in Asia’ 
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm#asia> accessed 1 
October 2016. Note these figures do not include Hong Kong (5.7 million 
Internet users, 7.1 million population) 
8 The Office for National Statistics in the UK estimated there were 56.1 
million people resident in the UK on 27 March 2011, see 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-
local-authorities-in-england-and-wales/stb-2011-census-key-statistics-
for-england-and-wales.html> accessed 24 March 2013. The US Census 
Bureau projection for 30/06/15 was over 316 million, see 
<http://www.census.gov/population/www/popclockus.html> accessed 27 
December 2012. 
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China has the benefit of owning the Communications Service Providers 
(CSPs) responsible for international connections and was able to build a 
sophisticated firewall to control the flow of information. Additionally, there is 
an army of censors who can watch what people are accessing and it gives 
China the level of control it desires.9  
The Chinese level of control is at odds with the apparent freedom offered in 
the US and the UK. However, the Internet has changed privacy. Where one 
might talk quietly to someone, one now uses e-mail or messengers. When 
talking face to face, you are able to avoid being overheard, perhaps, by 
standing in a secluded area. When using the Internet, one may feel the same 
level of privacy but in reality, one’s communication is mixed with everyone 
else’s and transmitted across common cables. Where surveillance is 
concerned, this is more like shouting your conversation across a crowded 
room. 
In the post-9/1110 world, terrorism is seen as a very real threat to society and 
the Internet is seen as a mechanism that enables terrorists to spread their 
ideology, to raise funds, and to communicate plans. It is this which is the driver 
of new and often secret programmes, Internet laws and regulations in the US 
and the UK. Whereas China uses its desire to control the population as a 
reason to control the Internet, the US and UK see the openness and freedom 
of the Internet as an enabler of crime and terrorism. 
The Snowden revelations of 2013 showed the world exactly how far nation 
states can and will go in order to mount mass surveillance operations to gather 
Internet communications. These revelations are ongoing but have already 
indicated that the US Government allegedly taps into social media providers, 
and the US and UK Governments tap into oceanic cables which interconnect 
                                            
9 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy & Human Rights: an 
international survey of privacy laws and developments (Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, 2003), 205 
10 11 September, 2001 was the date of the terrorist attack on the twin towers 
of the US World Trade Center and Pentagon. It became known as ‘9/11’. 
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countries and continents in order to extract and analyse all data flowing across 
them. 
The structure of the Internet makes it the ideal surveillance platform. If data 
can be read in transit and if the sender and recipient of messages can be 
discovered, then no-one is safe from the prying eye of the State. The fact that 
our mobile devices allow us to live our lives in public is a great aid to the 
States’ desire to surveil its populous. 
From the above, it has shown the relationship between Internet privacy, 
Internet technologies and surveillance legislations are complex. Hence, this 
research aims to increase the understanding of the effects of surveillance 
legislation versus technological possibilities governed by the functioning of the 
Internet in order to address a frequently asked question ‘is Internet privacy 
dead?’. 
1.2 Research scope, aim and objectives 
Surveillance has always been with us. Any form of census is a form of 
surveillance. On one hand, surveillance has benefits for society from the 
detection and prevention of crime to the detection and early diagnosis of 
disease.11 For instance, systems and processes which check on our health 
are clear benefits. On the other hand, surveillance can have a chilling effect 
on our lives, especially if we are members of certain groups.12 Taken to 
extreme it can prevent us from pursuing the freedoms we have become 
accustomed to. 
                                            
11 See for example J S Brownstein and others, ‘Surveillance Sans 
Frontières: Internet-Based Emerging Infectious Disease Intelligence and 
the HealthMap Project’ 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0050
151> accessed 19 January 2011 
12 Dawinder S Sidhu, ‘The chilling effect of government surveillance 
programs on the use of the Internet by Muslim-Americans’ [2007] 7 U 
Maryland Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class, 375 
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It would seem that some level of surveillance is essential in our society. 
However, responses to new threats may become increasingly invasive. 
Fighting against terrorism and serious crime are often used to justify the 
erosion of privacy in general and increasingly Internet privacy. 
Surveillance on the Internet is a new battleground which attracts much 
attention from all walks of life in our society. Since the 2013 Snowden 
revelations, the practice of Internet surveillance has become common 
knowledge. 
Nevertheless, there is a lack of existing literature directly addressing the 
following questions 
1. Is Internet privacy dead? 
2. Have the US and the UK reached the level of China with regard to the 
invasion of Internet privacy?  
3. What measures can be taken to prevent mass Internet surveillance 
from destroying Internet privacy? 
Hence, the above become the research questions of this research and the 
aim is to fill these intellectual gaps. 
This research aims to examine the extent to which Internet privacy is 
preserved or violated via an examination of a set of jurisdictions; namely, the 
US, UK and China. In this research the focus is specifically geared to the 
technical aspect of the Internet in order to express how technology is used to 
enhance and invade privacy. The rationales of choosing these three 
jurisdictions for use in this research are given in the next section.  
To achieve the research aim, a set of research objectives were set out and 
they are depicted as follows. 
1. Analyse the meaning of privacy generally, and Internet privacy 
specifically 
2. Examine the development of communications surveillance and 
legislation in the three chosen jurisdictions 
- 6 - 
3. Examine the technical measures which both enhance and invade 
Internet privacy, in particular in the light of the 2013 Snowden 
revelations 
4. Evaluate the fate of Internet privacy and provide recommendations 
It is important to note that the scope of this research is confined to Internet 
privacy with regard to surveillance as opposed to surveillance in the wider 
sense. 
1.3 Justification of the chosen jurisdictions 
In 2007, Privacy International and the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC) published a world map of surveillance societies. In this, eight 
jurisdictions were listed as having endemic surveillance. These were China, 
Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the US and the UK.13 After 
the 2013 Snowden revelations the US and the UK were shown to be engaged 
in mass Internet surveillance on a global scale. 
Three jurisdictions have been chosen for use in this research and they are: 
the US, the UK and China.  
US 
The US - the ‘land of the free’14 - is chosen as it has some level of 
constitutional protection, and has developed privacy protection further than 
the UK. 
The US has, however, introduced a number of laws explicitly allowing its 
agencies to spy on its population and, moreover, to spy on anyone else it 
                                            
13 Zetter, K., ‘World’s Top Surveillance Societies’ 
<https://www.wired.com/2007/12/worlds-top-surv/> accessed 8 January 
2017) 
14 The Star Spangled Banner 
<http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/images/uc05112x.jpg> accessed  
24 January 2009 
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wants. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)15 was originally put 
into place to govern surveillance of foreign powers and agents but it has been 
modified in the wake of 9/11 by the USA PATRIOT Act16 to more specifically 
deal with terrorism anywhere. The Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (CALEA)17 ensures the US Government has access to 
telecommunications networks for surveillance purposes. Over many years, 
evidence has come to light of the US Governments 'illegal wiretapping' 
activities, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)'s Carnivore18 project 
to AT&T's 'room 641A'.19 The US Government’s reaction has been to attempt 
to enact laws to legitimise such actions. 
UK 
The UK is chosen because it has not developed any actual privacy laws, 
favouring extending existing laws instead. The UK has enacted a number of 
privacy-invasive laws since before 9/11 and has been criticised by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The Human Rights Act 1998 gave 
further effect to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)20 within 
UK law. In addition to the ECtHR decisions, these have resulted in the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). 
                                            
15 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, enacted 25 Oct 1978, 50 UCS Ch. 36. 
16 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-56 
17 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Pub. L. 
No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279), codified at 47 USC 1001-1010 
18 Carnivore was an Internet packet sniffer capable of recording Internet 
traffic for analysis. 
19 AT&T's Room 641A is a room where, allegedly, major Internet links were 
paired so that all traffic passing along them could be recorded and fed to 
the NSA 
20 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No. 11 and 14, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 
signed on 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953; 
Protocol 14 was incorporated on 1st June 2010 (ECHR) 
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While purporting to rationalise surveillance and subject it to the courts, RIPA 
also opened up surveillance to a large number of agencies. As a result of this, 
it has been used to permit surveillance of minor infringements such as dog 
fouling21 and domestic waste infringements; while these are likely to be 
disproportionate, it may well be beneficial to report on dog fouling in children's 
playgrounds due to health risks22. Terrorism legislation has been used to 
freeze non-terrorism related assets during the credit crunch23. Examples such 
as these must push the test ‘necessary in a democratic society’24 to the limit. 
It is also clear that the ECtHR will readily criticise UK laws; for example, with 
it finding against the UK plans to store DNA data,25 and finding that the power 
to stop and search vehicles and people granted under s.44 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000 is not in accordance with the law and therefore violates ECHR 
Art.8.26 
China 
Unlike the US and the UK, China is historically not a democratic regime. 
Historically, the social unit in China was the family, not the individual,27 the 
                                            
21 ‘Spy law used in dog fouling war’ (BBC News, 27 April 2008) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7369543.stm> accessed 19 January 2011 
22 Office of the Surveillance Commissioners Annual Report for 2009-2010, 
s5.20 
23 The Landsbanki Freezing Order 2008 (SI2008/2668) was created under 
s.10(2) of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 in order to 
deal with the effects on the UK of the collapse of the Icelandic bank. 
24 ECHR (n 20) Art 8(2) 
25 S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom, Application nos. 30562/04 and 
30566/04 (ECtHR, 4 December 2008) 
26 Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 4158/05 
(ECtHR, 12 January 2010) 
27 Edward Williams, China yesterday and to-day (5th edn. Revised) (Harrap, 
London,  1932) p54 
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family having no privacy away from each other.28 China's laws were biased 
towards duty and against rights.29 The concept of a ‘private realm free from 
external interference’30 does not fall within Chinese culture of old and remains 
‘underdeveloped’.31 The concept of freedom in China was generally taken to 
be freedom to serve the state and society, with the needs of the collective 
always put before the needs of the individual,32 this collectivism that making it 
impossible to consider individual rights.33 Unlike the Western liberal view that 
the individual is an autonomous component and society only a group of 
individuals voluntarily committed to cooperate together for a common goal, 
the Chinese view is that individuals are born into families within a society, and 
are not autonomous, being bound to their communities.34 
China is thus chosen to give an opposing view to those of the US ad UK. 
Furthermore, China is chosen in this research because of its efforts to control 
the flow of information into the country via the Internet. It has established a 
system of firewalls and human operatives who monitor Internet access and 
content. 
                                            
28 Shin-Yi Peng, ‘Privacy and the construction of legal meaning in Taiwan’, 
37 Int’l L. 1037 2003, p1039 
29 Jingchun Cao, 'Protecting the right to privacy in China', 36 Victoria U. 
Wellington L. Rev. 645 at 646 
30 Edmund S K Fung, 'The idea of freedom in modern China revisited: plural 
conceptions and dual responsibilities', Modern China, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Oct 
2006) 453 at 468 
31 Ibid., 470 
32 Ibid., 454 
33 Guo Liang and Chang Huili, Surveillance and privacy in urban China, the 
Globalization of Personal Data project, Queen's University, 2006, p1 
34 George F Ling, China developing: cultural identity of emerging societies 
(World Scientific, Singapore, 2008), 21 
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1.4 Research methodology 
This research uses a doctrinal method in order to achieve the research aim 
and objectives and address the research questions. The doctrinal method 
used draws from a wide range of sources across the three selected 
jurisdictions, namely the US, the UK and China. It examines primary sources 
from each jurisdiction in the form of cases, legislation and treaties, as well as 
supranational and regional cases and legislation specifically regarding the UK. 
Additionally, a wide range of secondary sources including journal papers and 
books have been examined. The doctrinal method is ‘rarely discussed’35 in 
methodology sections of research publications and such a statement would 
seem out of place in a doctrinal thesis.36 Nevertheless, a brief explanation of 
the method and why it is relevant to this research cannot be ignored. 
Doctrinal research, also known as library-based or theoretical research is the 
most common methodology used by researchers in the field of law.37 Using 
the method the researcher compiles and then analyses primary sources, for 
example case law and relevant legislation and regulations, and secondary 
sources such as journals. This is often done from a historical perspective and 
the primary aim is to describe the law and how it applies to the research 
topics.38 The methodology is a qualitative form of legal research which allows 
the legal researcher to choose both depth and breadth of study.39 The reason 
for using doctrinal methodology in this research is because it fits the need to 
determine what laws have enabled surveillance from a historic perspective as 
                                            
35 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We 
Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’, 17 Deakin L. Rev. 83 (2012), 100 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ashish Kumar Singhal and Ikramuddin Malik, ‘Doctrinal and socio-legal 
methods of research: merits and demerits’, 2(7) Educational Research 
Journal 252-256, 2012, 252 
38 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in Mike 
McConville and Wing Hong Chiu (Eds.) Research Methods for Law 
(Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2007), 19 
39 Hutchinson and Duncan (n 35) 107 
- 11 - 
well as analyse the effect of these on Internet privacy. The research analyses 
the legal rules in the three jurisdictions in order to investigate the research 
questions. The focus is on laws from early communications surveillance, for 
example telephone tapping, up to the interception of Internet communications 
in order to determine how laws have been shaped through time.  
The research also adopts a descriptive method in parts, in particular when 
discussing the technology of the Internet and technical methods of invading 
and maintaining Internet privacy. This is necessary in order to provide an 
understanding of the Internet from a technical perspective in order to illustrate 
the risks to privacy from mass Internet surveillance.  
It is also important to note that legislation and case law used in this research 
is correct up to 31 December, 2016. 
1.5 Research limitations 
The primary limitations in this research of China are the language barrier and 
access to materials. Publications tend to add no new information of relevance 
to this research.40 Official translations of legislation are not regularly updated, 
and unofficial translations often contradict each other and so cannot be used. 
In addition to this, China has a relatively new legal system dating from 1978 
after the end of the Mao era. What literature exists which may be of use is 
generally written by Western academics based outside China and while much 
has been written there is little specific to this research other than those quoted 
in Chapter 5. 
Additionally,  it is extremely difficult to tap into the Chinese networks. It 
requires a substantial time to get to know the ‘right’ people who can provide 
sources of information required by this research. Even then, and being 
                                            
40 Examples include: Hao Wang, Protecting Privacy in China: A Research on 
China’s Privacy Standards and the Possibility of Establishing the Right 
of Privacy and the Information Privacy Protection Legislation in Modern 
China (Springer, Berlin, 2011); Guosong Shao, Internet law in China 
(Chandos, Oxford, 2012) 
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introduced via Chinese friends, when academics found that the research was 
about human rights and privacy they refused to help and communication 
ground to a halt. 
Furthermore, challenging personal circumstances have emerged during the 
course of the research which caused an interruption to the research and 
lengthened the time for completion.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is presented in seven chapters including this introductory chapter. 
Chapter 2 investigates the meaning of privacy in general and focuses on 
privacy as an enabler of autonomy and liberty. Focus then moves to an 
examination of sources of privacy in the three chosen jurisdictions. It then 
examines the Internet from a technical perspective in order to provide an 
understanding of the risks posed to privacy by technology. 
Chapter 3 investigates the development of communications surveillance in the 
US using an analysis of key cases. It examines key legislation. 
Chapter 4 investigates the development of data protection in the UK as this is 
considerably different from the limited protection in the US. Focus then moves 
to an analysis of communications surveillance in the UK using key cases and 
examination of key legislation. 
Chapter 5 investigates the development of the Internet in China and the desire 
to control the flow of information into China. It examines key legislation which 
affects the Internet.  
Chapter 6 provides a much greater technical analysis of the functioning of the 
Internet in order to then examine the issues surfaced by the 2013 Snowden 
revelations.  
Chapter 7 provides potential solutions along with an answer to the research 
questions. 
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Chapter 2: Privacy and the Internet 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to understand Internet privacy and how this may be lost or protected, 
it is first necessary to examine the two key elements: privacy; and the Internet. 
The word 'privacy' is simple in that it is a widely recognised concept. Everyone 
has something they would not wish to be made public, perhaps simply details 
of intimacy that has no place in the public domain. Feldman states that privacy 
is a ‘necessary condition for human flourishing’.41 Westin takes this a step 
further, indicating that even in the animal kingdom the desire for ‘individual 
seclusion or small-group intimacy’42 exists. Although Mead’s study of the 
Samoan people found little recognisable privacy, for example there being no 
privacy within houses and it being common for all the members of a village to 
know about all the actions of every other village member,43 even here there is 
a sense of what should be private, with public signs of affection being 
considered shameful and commenting on sex or evacuation in public not being 
good taste.44 
However, although it can be argued that awareness of privacy is universal 
regardless of one’s ability to say the word,45 even a simple definition of the 
word is problematic. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, privacy can 
mean ‘to seclude’46 or refer to something which is ‘[r]estricted to one person 
                                            
41 David Feldman, Civil liberties and human rights in England and Wales, 
(2nd edn) (OUP, Oxford, 2002), 512 
42 Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Athenum, New York, 1970), 8 
43 Margaret Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa (Penguin, Middlesex, 1943), 
104 
44 Ibid., 112-113 
45 Bonnie S McDougall, 'Particulars and universals: studies on Chinese 
privacy' in Bonnie McDougal and Anders Hansson (eds) Chinese 
Concepts of privacy (Brill, The Netherlands, 2002), 7 
46 OED Online available online via the University of Leeds Library 
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or a few persons as opposed to the wider community’.47 It can mean a place 
‘unfrequented [or] secluded’,48 or a person ‘retiring, reclusive; ... reserved, 
unsociable’,49 or, perhaps a couple ‘undisturbed by others’.50 The Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary defines privacy as ‘being apart from the 
company or observation of others’,51 while the Oxford American Dictionary of 
Current English defines it as ‘the state of being private and undisturbed’,52 or, 
simply the ‘right to be left alone’.53 In Chinese, privacy (yǐnsī - 隱私) is made 
up of two words, 隱 (yǐn) meaning to hide, and 私(sī) meaning private.54 It was 
common for the Chinese people to interpret privacy as being a ‘shameful 
secret’55 or an indication of selfishness, secrecy and underhandedness56 as 
well as a ‘state of seclusion’.57 
Privacy as a concept may be easy to understand. Closing a door to have a 
conversation while not being overheard by others indicates one’s desire for 
privacy. However, privacy has bounds and it is important to understand where 
and how one may expect privacy, and where one may not. 
Privacy can be given away, intentionally or otherwise. For example, two 
people arguing and shouting at each other in a room with the windows open 
                                            
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 
(Bell, 1961) 
52 Oxford American Dictionary of Current English (OUP, Oxford, 1999) 
53 Oxford Dictionary of Law, (OUP, Oxford, 2006, 6th edn) 
54 Cao (n 29), 646 
55 Ibid. 
56 McDougall (n 45) p6 
57 Ibid. 
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and thus easily heard from the street may still have an expectation of privacy; 
for example they may not expect their argument to appear in the newspapers, 
but they are making it hard for their privacy to be maintained.58 
Privacy can be invaded as it can be taken from us. Invasion of privacy is a 
one-way street. If private information is published or heard, it cannot be un-
published or un-heard. Once made public, ‘private information cannot be 
made private again’.59 This is particularly true on the Internet where 
information can easily be copied or re-purposed by just about anyone; the 
effect being that, unlike a magazine where technically one could stop 
production and acquire any distributed copies, once on the Internet, 
information has a tendency to spread, either posted verbatim for example on 
numerous blogs, or modified and posted out of context. It is then impossible 
to control or retract.  
The Internet complicates the concept of a private space. Communicating over 
the Internet may give an appearance of privacy in that only two people may 
be communicating. However, the Internet is a complex technology which 
makes the communications path between people appear simple. There is a 
danger in ignoring, or simply being ignorant, of the fact that one’s Internet 
communications traverse the Internet via service providers, each of which 
technically has access to the communications path and everything passing 
across it. Therefore, in order to discuss Internet privacy one must understand 
the basics of how the Internet itself functions. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the meaning of the word privacy and set 
it in an Internet context (Section 2.2). The objectives are to show how privacy 
is defined in International law as well as in each of the three selected 
jurisdictions, and then look more specifically at Internet privacy both from a 
technical perspective (Section 2.3) and also in daily life (Sections 2.4 and 2.5). 
                                            
58 Judith Jarvis Thompson, 'The Right to Privacy', Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, Vol 4, No 4 (Summer, 1975), p296 
59  Doug D Tygar, 'Technological dimensions of privacy in Asia', 10 Asia-
Pacific Review 2, 124 
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This is because it is necessary to understand the technology behind the 
Internet in order to understand the risks it poses to one’s Internet privacy. The 
Internet is very different from a simple telephone line connecting two people. 
It consists of a plethora of interconnected technologies and communications 
protocols which both ensure that communications are possible but also 
provide an ease of interception of communications. Most importantly, these 
are typically not understood well by law and policy makers. 
2.2 Privacy defined 
Privacy has roots in both ancient Chinese and Greek philosophy. Wang 
suggests that the sayings of Confucius include an indication that one should 
not ‘invade other people's private lives’.60 Cao agrees, considering that 
Confucian philosophy includes the prohibition of ‘invasion of a person’s private 
life’61 and in particular the disclosure of ‘intimate relationships’.62 Moore finds 
that Aristotle recognised the distinction between public and private spheres, 
specifically as the difference between the state and the household, life not 
necessarily being ‘tied to public activity’.63 
Privacy was defined by Cooley as simply the right ‘to be let alone’.64 Warren 
and Brandeis used this as the starting point to their article in the Harvard Law 
Review in 1890.65 However, this right 'to be let alone' is extremely broad and 
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all encompassing. If privacy is simply this, then the concept is too broad to be 
the basis of a legal rule. That is to say pretty much any action of any kind 
against a person would not let him alone. 
Of the influential writers on the subject, Westin approaches privacy from 
practical realities. He defines privacy as: 
the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from the general 
society through physical or psychological means, either in a state of 
solitude or small-group intimacy or, when among larger groups, in a 
condition of anonymity or reserve.66 
This withdrawal has the effect of giving a person or group of people the 
freedom to determine what information about themselves they share, and with 
whom and when they share it.67 However, privacy is never absolute due to the 
needs of the individual to participate in society. The individual ‘balances’68 
privacy and disclosure in the face of the ‘curiosity of others’69 and the 
‘processes of surveillance that every society sets in order to enforce its social 
norms.’70 In fact, privacy encompasses a number of values including 
anonymity,71 autonomy,72 liberty, intimacy,73 dignity,74 solitude75 and the 
control of personal information.76 Kupfer states that privacy is ‘a necessary 
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condition for something of basic value – the development of an autonomous 
self.’77 By enabling personal autonomy, the ‘bedrock value’78 of classical 
liberalism, privacy can enable freedom of choice and promotes our very 
individuality.79 Kupfer continues that privacy aids the formation of individual 
autonomy by allowing people to decide ‘whether or not their physical and 
psychological existence becomes part of another's experience’80 and gives us 
the ‘choice and control over [the] disclosure of information’81 about ourselves. 
Wacks states that removing a person's autonomy removes their freedom to 
choose to be private.82  
Having the autonomy to make independent choices leads to trust.83 Where an 
individual or group is not subjected to the ‘meddling of outsiders’,84 they can 
make choices without external interference.85 Additionally, being able to 
decide when to disseminate personal information increases our feeling that 
we are autonomous.86 Where an individual is left to make choices, with the 
opportunity to make mistakes or do wrong, the responsible individual gains 
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the trust of society.87 Equally, a loss of privacy threatens the individual's ‘sense 
of trustworthiness’.88 
Privacy is also a ‘major contribution to an individual's dignity’.89 In some cases, 
a lack of privacy has a detrimental effect on one's dignity; for example, when 
one's efforts in the gym are recorded and made public for the amusement of 
others.90 It is also instrumental to liberty which is a fundamental value of the 
US Constitution. It can be difficult for a person to exercise the various 
freedoms that form liberty if there is no respect of a person's privacy. For 
example, religious freedom requires privacy for prayer. Freedom of 
association can be hard under scrutiny. Privacy is a ‘precondition to freedom 
of expression’;91 for example, by enabling people to consult and draft items 
before publication. 
According to Westin, solitude is the ‘most complete state of privacy’92 one can 
achieve. It can be defined as the state where an individual is separated from 
and not observed by anyone. In a state of solitude, privacy can also include 
the ‘absence of … disturbing noises’.93 Thus, if someone answers the phone 
only to hear a recorded message advertising some product no information is 
lost; however, the person may consider it an invasion of their privacy.94  
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However, solitude could be compared to ‘alienation, loneliness, ostracism, 
and isolation’.95 All are conditions of being alone. However, whereas privacy 
is sought, the other conditions may be feared.96 One may want to be private 
but may not wish to be lonely. Furthermore, solitude cannot be considered a 
core value of privacy. It is not the norm as people tend to live together in 
communities of all sizes. A community would not work if all its people were 
completely isolated from one another and did not share information with 
others. To some greater or lesser extent, we all ‘lead lives exposed to the 
public gaze or to public inquiry’97 as we exist in a society with others. 
Having the autonomy to determine what information is known about us by a 
small group (e.g. spouse, family or friends) enables intimacy. Intimacy is 
created in part by ‘giving away some of our privacy freely to those we regard 
as close to us.’98 Privacy thus becomes shared. However, we still exercise 
control over our personal information – we ‘reveal and share of ourselves as 
we choose’.99 Intimacy is crucial to the ‘basic need of human contact’,100 and 
without privacy, intimacy cannot be achieved. 
Anonymity can be described as the ability of a person to find ‘freedom from 
identification and surveillance’101 in the public arena. It is to be ‘unnamed, 
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unnoticed, part of a crowd.’102 Westin finds that a ‘major aspect of privacy for 
individuals … is the ability to move about anonymously from time to time’.103 
As demonstrated from above, an invasion or loss of privacy not only results in 
the difficulty of a person to enjoy an area protected by privacy but also results 
in some piece of information about a person being known to others. This 
information might be the person's location, their (dis-)likes, who they are 
corresponding with, or who they are in a relationship with. Westin defines 
informational privacy as: 
the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others.104 
Wacks identifies three problematic areas of privacy, namely: activities which 
‘intrude, physically or electronically, into home of office’,105 ‘publicity given 
to’106 and 'potential misuse of “personal information” '.107 Therefore, rather 
than a wide protection of privacy, Wacks proposes the term 'protection of 
“personal information” '108 with personal information being defined as: 
facts, communications or opinions which relate to the individual and 
which it would be reasonable to expect him to regard as intimate or 
confidential and therefore to want to withhold or at least to restrict their 
circulation.109 
Here, Wacks defines what personal information is and Westin defines how it 
should be controlled. Informational privacy is discussed further below. 
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However, it is first necessary to determine what protections for privacy exist 
at an international and, in particular in the case of the UK at a regional level. 
2.2.1 Privacy and international human rights 
Internationally, human rights laws with specific protections of privacy were not 
formed until after WWII. Rights are defined in three key articles: the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR);110 the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR);111 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).112 These are known collectively as the 
International Bill of Human Rights. The first two have relevance for any 
discussion on privacy and are described below.  
In 1948, the publication of the UDHR set out what aimed to be a ‘common 
standard of achievement’113 whereby everyone in the world can work towards 
the goal of universal acceptance. States must both protect individuals from 
abuses of their human rights, while at the same time refrain from interfering 
with those rights themselves. Individuals must respect the rights of others.114 
Art. 12 provides a right to privacy: 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
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reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks.115 
This establishes a generic right to privacy at an international level. However, 
privacy cannot be absolute and Art.29 states that limits to privacy should be 
determined by law to ensure the protection of the rights of others, and those 
required to ensure ‘morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society.’116 
Although non-binding the UDHR paved the way for two covenants - the 
ICESCR and the ICCPR. The covenants gave States both a legal and a moral 
obligation to both promote and protect human rights.117 It is the ICCPR, which 
entered into force on 23 March 1976, that provides a legal right to privacy. 
Although there is no requirement to directly incorporate the Covenant into 
domestic legislation,118 States are to adopt laws as necessary to ensure the 
protections in the Covenant are recognised in their legal systems.119  
Art. 17 of the ICCPR expands on the right to privacy as defined in the UDHR: 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.120 
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The definition adds the word ‘unlawful’, meaning that interference must be 
neither arbitrary nor unlawful. Thus, privacy is not an absolute right. Whereas 
everyone may have the right to the protection of their privacy by law, equally 
governments are free to legislate privacy-invasive laws. The law can protect 
privacy, and the law can take privacy away. Where lawfully carried out, 
surveillance can be a legitimate invader of privacy. Nevertheless, it does serve 
to strengthen the right in that interference with privacy must be both purposeful 
and lawful. 
The ICCPR represents a clear statement of human rights and includes the 
right to privacy. However, it has not gained universal acceptance, enjoying  
only a ‘tenuous foothold’121 in US law and not yet incorporated into federal 
law. China claims to be ‘paving the way’122 towards ratification but the process 
is very slow. The ICCPR will be revisited in Chapter 7. 
2.2.2 The European Convention on Human Rights 
As well as the International Bill of Human Rights, as a member of the Council 
of Europe (CoE) and signatory to the ECHR, this regional instrument takes 
effect in the UK. The ECHR came into effect on 3 September 1953. It consists 
of 59 articles, of which 13 define rights and freedoms. All member states of 
the CoE have signed and ratified the ECHR.123 
Similar to the division between the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the ECHR 
protects mainly civil and political rights, leaving economic and social rights to 
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the European Social Charter.124 States are required to ‘secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms’125 defined within the ECHR. 
The ECHR allows applications from individuals, but only after all domestic 
remedies have been exhausted.126 
Art.19 of the ECHR established the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
to ‘ensure the observance’127 of the Convention by states. States must 
undertake to ‘abide by’128 the final judgement of the ECtHR. 
Privacy is protected by Art. 8 of the ECHR which states: 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.129 
The wording of Art. 8 differs from the terms used in the international 
instruments. The ECHR uses the term ‘private and family life’130 as opposed 
to the word ‘privacy’131 used in the UDHR, and later ICCPR. The term 'private 
life' is broad and the ECHR has not considered it possible or even necessary 
to exhaustively define it.132 It did, however, find it too restrictive to limit 'private 
life' to one's '”inner circle”'133 - to some degree, it must also include: 
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the right to establish and to develop relationships with other human 
beings, especially in the emotional field for the development and 
fulfilment of one's own personality134 
This suggests that where one has the liberty to develop intimate relationships 
in private one has the autonomy to develop oneself as a person. However, the 
right is not absolute. A wide set of criteria was specified whereby a public 
authority can interfere with this right:  
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others135 
So, privacy is protected regionally, but such protection is limited in way which 
can be difficult to define. While the essence of the limitations may make sense, 
for example, to enable crime fighting, the areas are very broad. National 
security is perhaps the hardest to define in terms of limitation of privacy. In 
Esbester v United Kingdom136, the court found the definition to be ‘not 
amenable to exhaustive definition’.137 Economic well-being is also hard to 
scope, given it can include diverse matters such as oil supply or espionage.138 
However, despite the limitations set out in Art.8(2), the ECtHR applies tests to 
determine the legality, necessity and proportionality of any interference. The 
test of legality includes the need for the interference to be founded in the laws 
of the state concerned and that those laws must be clear and accessible to 
the people so they can know when their rights have been infringed.139 The test 
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of necessity checks that any interference was a ‘response to a pressing social 
need’140 to take action for the given purpose, for example, national security. 
States have some degree of discretion when making judgements about the 
social need and their response – this ‘'margin of appreciation'‘141 is allowed 
because state governments are better placed than the ECHR at evaluating 
local conditions. Proportionality balances the ‘nature and extent of the 
interference against the reasons for interfering’142, taking into account, for 
example, whether a less intrusive method could have had the same effect. 
In its resolution of 1970, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE stated that 
there can be a conflict between the freedoms of information and expression 
and the right to privacy, and that the exercise of those rights ‘must not be 
allowed to destroy the existence of’143 privacy. It further defined the right to 
privacy as being the ‘right to live one's own life with a minimum of 
interference’,144 and also set out the protections of the right as concerning: 
private, family and home life, physical and moral integrity, honour and 
reputation, avoidance of being placed in a false light, non-revelation of 
irrelevant and embarrassing facts, unauthorised publication of private 
photographs, protection against misuse of private communications, 
protection from disclosure of information given or received by the 
individual confidentially.145 
In specifically stating that privacy concerns each of these elements, it 
indicates that privacy is an enabler for them. In addition, it warned of the 
dangers ‘computer-data banks’146 and that a person must not become 
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‘completely exposed and transparent’147 due to the accumulation of data. It 
also stated that ECHR Art.8 should provide protection from interference not 
only by public bodies but also other people or private institutions, including the 
media. 
In the next sections, a review of the source of privacy in the three chosen 
jurisdictions is made, starting with the US. 
2.2.3 Sources of privacy in the US 
It may be considered surprising that there is not a single reference to a general 
right of privacy anywhere in the US Constitution, especially as freedoms such 
as speech, assembly and the press are protected.148 However, it is consistent 
with the view that society is a ‘collection of citizens, and not a conglomerate 
of private individuals’.149 Yet, the US courts have extrapolated some level of 
privacy protection from the various Amendments in the Bill of Rights, in 
particular the Fourth Amendment: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.150 
Protection of privacy in the US has come from a variety of sources. Warren 
and Brandeis discussed the protection of people ‘in person and in property’,151 
and the way the common law had incorporated protections to ‘meet the new 
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demands of society’152 as changes in society and the economy and 
technology progressed. Taking Cooley's immunity from assault and battery 
and noting that ‘[t]houghts, emotions, and sensations’153 demanded equal 
protection in law, they considered that the right to be let alone should protect 
against ‘the evil of the invasion of privacy’154 by the Press, where 
‘[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the 
sacred precincts of private and domestic life’.155 Their work, described as the 
‘outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals upon the American 
law’,156 became one of the cornerstones of US privacy protection. 
The case of Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co.157 dealt with the use of a 
photograph of a girl in advertising. The judges ruled 4 to 3 that the right of 
privacy had ‘not as yet found an abiding place in [US] jurisprudence’.158 The 
principal objection to accepting the right was that to apply it fully would result 
in a ‘vast amount of litigation’,159 suggesting that even the spoken word would 
invade a person's ‘right to be absolutely let alone.’160 However, the resultant 
public outcry161 resulted in the State of New York enacting a statute to make 
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it illegal to use the ‘name, portrait or picture of any living person’162 in 
advertising or by way of trade without permission. 
A later case Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co.163 dealt with a similar 
issue of the publication of a person's likeness. Here, the court rejected the 
findings in Roberson, accepting the view of Warren and Brandeis. The court 
found that the right of privacy is ‘embraced within the absolute rights of 
personal security and personal liberty’164 and has its basis in natural law.165 It 
continued that freedom of speech and of the press can limit privacy but must 
not be allowed to destroy, or to be destroyed by privacy. 
In NAACP v Alabama,166 the Supreme Court arrived at a ‘landmark 
associational privacy decision’.167 The courts in Alabama had demanded the 
membership list from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) who refused. It claimed it was ‘constitutionally entitled to 
resist official enquiries into its membership lists’.168 The court recognised the 
‘vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's 
associations’.169 The court found that the rights of NAACP members ‘to pursue 
their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so 
doing’170 came under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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In the landmark case of Griswold v Connecticut,171 the court determined that 
‘specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance’.172 
These guarantees create ‘zones of privacy’.173 The court found that the case 
involved ‘a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several 
fundamental constitutional guarantees.’174 The Fourth Amendment explicitly 
provides the right of people ‘to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures’.175 The Fifth 
Amendment's self-incrimination clause ‘enables the citizen to create a zone of 
privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.’176 
The Ninth Amendment prevents constitutional rights from being ‘construed to 
deny or disparage [other rights] retained by the people’.177 
This constitutionally protected zone of privacy in Griswold has been enlarged 
to cover ‘to a considerable extent’178 personal autonomy. In Whalen v Roe,179 
the court recognised that privacy interests cover not only the avoidance of 
‘disclosure of personal matters’,180 but also enable people to independently 
make important decisions.181 The former is a form of informational privacy182 
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while the latter is a provider of personal autonomy, which as Westin states is 
‘vital to the development of individuality and consciousness of individual 
choice in life’.183 The Whalen judgement also presented a warning that 
although the court was not deciding on such matters, it was aware of the 
‘threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal 
information in computerized data banks or other massive government files’.184 
The situation in the US specifically regarding privacy and communications 
surveillance is given in detail in Chapter 3. The next section gives an overview 
of privacy within the context of the UK. 
2.2.4 Sources of privacy in the UK 
Unlike the US, the UK does not have a written constitution. Any protection of 
privacy that the law provides is ‘scattered throughout civil and criminal law, 
both common and statute.’185 An early example is the offence of 
eavesdropping - ‘standing outside the walls of a house to listen to what was 
being said within’.186 This defined in the Justices of the Peace Act 1361 and 
cases have been recorded at least as far back as the fifteenth century.187 It 
has been described as conduct ‘regarded as socially harmful or disruptive’.188  
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Trespass laws can protect privacy. In Entick v Carrington189, the court found 
that every invasion of one’s private property was trespass and removal of 
papers aggravated this. In 1931, Winfield questioned whether there should be 
a tort of infringement of privacy. In Tolley v J.S. Fry & Sons Ltd,190 the court 
‘exercised their imaginations’191 and devised a remedy under defamation law 
where an amateur golfer had been falsely portrayed endorsing a chocolate 
product, thus endangering his amateur status. Winfield defined privacy as the: 
infringement of privacy is unauthorized interference with a person's 
seclusion of himself or of his property from the public192 
This differs from defamation as there is not necessarily damage to a person's 
reputation, nor is there necessarily any written statement. 
The tort of breach of confidence protects unauthorised disclosure of 
information where there was a duty of confidence. In the leading case of 
Prince Albert v Strange,193 the case was decided in terms of breach of 
confidence as well as property rights.194 However, not all personal information 
is confidential. For example, a person's political beliefs may be private to them 
but are ‘not normally considered confidential.’195 
There had been increasing concerns in the UK of the adequacy of the law to 
protect privacy. In 1976, Justice set up a committee to investigate privacy 
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which developed a common law tort to cover privacy.196 It prepared a draft 
bill197 which led to the establishment of the Committee on Privacy, the 
Younger Committee. The Committee reviewed privacy issues and determined 
that from the evidence it received, the main concern of privacy invasion 
involves the ‘treatment of personal information’198 as opposed to confidential 
information. Among the committee's recommendations were that there should 
be a tort to cover the unlawful use of surveillance devices,199 legislation to 
cover the computer processing of personal information,200 clarification of the 
law relating to breach of confidence,201 and a tort of ‘disclosure or other use 
of information unlawfully acquired’.202 Subsequently, the government set up a 
committee to further discuss privacy issues. In its report of 1990,203 the Calcutt 
Committee determined simply that there was no need for a tort of infringement 
of privacy to be introduced.204 It did, however, make recommendations that it 
be illegal to enter onto or place a surveillance device on private property 
without consent and with the intent property, to obtain personal information, 
or to photograph or record anyone on private with the aim to publish the 
information.205 
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Although the UK was among the first countries to sign the ECHR, it was 
among the last to give effect to the provisions in domestic law.206 The Human 
Rights Act (HRA) took effect on 2 October 2000 and gave ‘further effect to 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the [ECHR]’.207 In particular, the Act 
made it ‘unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible 
with a Convention right’.208 However, this does not apply if the authority ‘could 
not have acted differently’209 due to primary legislation; or, if that legislation 
could not be ‘read or given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights’.210 
Privacy gained further protection from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union211 in December 2000. Art. 7 of the Charter gives the ‘right 
to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.’212 
Limits to the right are provided in Art. 52 which stresses that limitations must 
be lawful, proportional and necessary.213 
A clear early example of the effect of the HRA is found in Douglas and Others 
v Hello! Ltd.214 Sedley LJ stated that the UK had ‘reached a point at which it 
can be said with confidence that the law recognises and will appropriately 
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protect a right of personal privacy.’215 In reaching this conclusion, he stated 
that the law recognises that ‘everybody has a right to some private space’216 
and that the Human Rights Act ‘requires the courts … to give appropriate 
effect to the right to respect for private and family life’217 as set out in ECHR 
Art. 8. The law can protect people who ‘simply find themselves subjected to 
an unwanted intrusion into their personal lives.’218 Privacy can be seen as a 
‘legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of personal autonomy.’219 
This case shows how there was an infringement of the claimants autonomy to 
determine how their personal information, in this case in the form of 
photographs were used. It can thus be construed that a person has the 
autonomy to decide how his personal information is used, and that autonomy 
is one of the core values that privacy protects. 
2.2.5 Sources of privacy in China 
China’s current legal system only developed from 1978, China passing from 
an essentially lawless state under the control of a supreme leader to a state 
with a great many laws and regulations. Some of these laws and regulations 
were inconsistent, some only short-term, but they met the urgent need for 
reform and development.220 
Several human rights are guaranteed, as set out in the 2009-2010 human 
rights action plan221 but there is no explicit mention of privacy, nor is privacy 
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mentioned in the 2012-2015 National Human Rights Action Plan.222 Some 
limited rights to privacy can be found in the Constitution of the PRC. It is 
prohibited to make an ‘unlawful search of the person of [a] citizen’223 and an  
‘[u]nlawful search of, or intrusion into, a citizen's home’.224 Such unlawful 
searches are a criminal offence.225 However, Ong finds that privacy protection 
in China is ‘not comparable’226 to that in the West; it lacks a ‘comprehensive 
and coherent system’227 for the protection of privacy. Wang finds China to be 
‘at least 30 years’228 behind the West with regard to privacy. 
Correspondence gains more attention, with ‘freedom and privacy of 
correspondence’229 being protected except where necessary for the purposes 
of state security or criminal investigation. The available action is censorship, 
though to enable this the correspondence must be examined. The unlawful 
opening of letters is a criminal offence.230 This postal definition of 
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correspondence is similar to the way the law in the US and UK developed pre-
Internet and is far from a general protection of privacy.231 
The Constitution also offers protection of personal dignity,232 specifically from 
wrongs such as libel and false accusation. As was discussed above, a 
person's dignity is one area protected in general by that person’s privacy. This 
has been described as the ‘ultimate source’233 of the protection of personal 
rights. Yet, for all the protections in the Constitution, it clearly sets the State 
above the person, as people ‘may not infringe upon the interests of the State, 
of society or of the collective’234 while exercising their rights and freedoms. In 
China, the rights of the government always take precedence over the rights of 
the individual.235 
Civil law includes protection for people's name,236 portrait,237 reputation238 and 
honour,239 and has recourse in law against infringement of these.240 These 
are restated as ‘personal and property rights and interests’241 in the Tort 
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Liability Law of the PRC, which came into force on 1 July 2010. In addition, 
the Tort Liability Law specifically includes the ‘right to privacy’.242 The 
remedies provided by this Law include ‘[c]ompensation for loss’,243 ‘formal 
apology’244 and the ‘elimination of ill effects and the restoration of 
reputation’.245 The Law does not expand on what privacy may mean but 
Greenleaf states that this will most likely cover ‘violations of personal 
information or data privacy’.246 
2.2.6 Summary 
Privacy, up until now, has been discussed primarily from a theoretical 
standpoint. The research findings show that it enables personal autonomy and 
helps to maintain a person's dignity and liberty. It enables us to be who we 
are. It is not only spatial but also concerns personal information. It can be lost, 
given away or taken. Once gone, it cannot be recovered.  
As a concept, however, as shown in this research privacy is ‘not universally 
regarded as fundamentally important.’247 Some of the aspects of privacy 
described above are not compatible with some forms of government or 
society;248 thus, privacy would not simply happen unaided. 
Also, the research findings show that there are diverse meanings of privacy 
as well as different levels of protection both nationally and internationally. 
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Although privacy can be invaded by the prying eye of one’s neighbour or the 
thirst of the media for a story, government Internet surveillance is put forward 
as the greatest threat to informational privacy. 
Furthermore, surveillance, or more specifically government surveillance is an 
article of control. It has been described as the ‘antithesis of privacy’249 and the 
‘polar opposite of democracy’.250 Describing the struggle against surveillance 
Westin wrote: 
[t]he effort to limit official surveillance over man’s thoughts, speech, 
private acts, confidential communications, and group participation has 
for centuries been a central part of the struggle for liberty in Western 
society. This search for personal and group privacy has been waged 
against kings and legislatures; churches, guilds, manor lords, and 
corporations; sheriffs, welfare investigators, and political police.251 
Surveillance affects autonomy and liberty as defined above. It affects one’s 
ability to be anonymous, and where one lives in fear of surveillance one may 
lessen one’s interactions with others. In this way it affects our liberty. 
Surveillance can be used to acquire our personal information and it is this 
which is transmitted in so many ways and for so many purposes when we 
make use of the Internet. 
The next section begins to examine the Internet from a functional perspective 
in order to aid the understanding of how and where privacy may be invaded. 
This provides a background to enable discussions provided and depicted in 
Chapter 6. 
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2.3 The Internet and privacy risks 
The previous sections of this chapter have discussed the definition of privacy 
itself, as a concept and also in the context of international law. This section 
now focuses on the Internet from a technical perspective in order to help 
understand the various ways that privacy can be invaded or indeed protected. 
Personal information is often exposed when privacy is invaded or discarded. 
For any investigation into Internet privacy to have context, it is important to 
first examine how data flows within the Internet and for this it is first necessary 
to understand in simple terms how the Internet functions. Technical issues 
and possibilities are often overlooked by lawmakers drafting legislation which 
is written in terms which are either too broad or too specific as will be seen in 
the following chapters. The basic technical knowledge set out below will help 
to understand these issues. It will be expanded upon in Chapter 6. 
2.3.1 Privacy and the Information Society 
Lessig defines privacy as that part of one’s life which can be neither monitored 
or searched. Monitoring, in a social setting is simply being watched as one 
goes about one’s business. A person may be noticed but unless their 
behaviour is not normal that notice will be transient. What constitutes normal 
behaviour is defined by the society itself to become social norms.252 These 
social norms will be revisited in Chapter 7. The part of one’s life which can be 
searched basically includes anything which is written down or recorded in 
some way. Private material held in the home is protected by trespass laws 
and those laws which limit searches by the state.253 However, where the 
Internet is concerned we see monitoring and searching come closer together. 
Lessig uses the term ‘architecture’254 to indicate the structures and 
technologies in place, be it those of a small town where monitoring is personal 
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and transient to that of the Internet where it becomes a permanent record 
which can then be searched. The architecture of a discussion between two 
people in a private room is very different from that of a discussion between 
those same people in separate private rooms using the Internet as a 
communications channel. Whereas the communicating parties may consider 
themselves secluded by virtue of them using computers located in private 
spaces, the walls of the private room have gone and the architecture now 
permits monitoring and subsequent recording. That recording creates a ‘digital 
footprint’255 which can be searched. 
Control over our personal information gives us informational privacy. 
According to DeCew this includes information about a person’s ‘daily 
activities, personal lifestyle, finances, medical history, and academic 
achievement’.256  DeCew’s view of informational privacy is in line with the 
definition of personal information proposed by Wacks (as discussed in Section 
2.2, page 21). All are examples of information which that person need not 
divulge or expect to be divulged by others. Tavani adds that informational 
privacy is the control over and/or limiting of access to any personal information 
that is stored or communicated electronically.257 Echoing Westin’s definition 
of informational privacy (as discussed in Section 2.2, page 21) it includes 
information communicated across the Internet. 
Even before the Internet became widespread there were concerns about 
informational privacy. In the US people were becoming concerned with data 
processing. Social scientists had recommended the development of a national 
computer centre to hold data collected by government agencies including the 
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census. This resulted in public outcry and congressional scrutiny.258 With the 
additional catalyst of the Watergate scandal the Privacy Act of 1974259 was 
passed. However, the Act only regulated information held by the federal 
government and its agencies. This Act then has no great effect on the 
protection of informational privacy in general. 
Discussion on data protection in the UK can be traced to the 1978 Lindop 
committee which proposed a framework within which to find a balance 
between the protection of and use of personal information.260 Put simply, data 
needs to be used in order to be of use. The committee established a forward-
looking definition of personal data as ‘any data which relate, or which can be 
related, to an identified or identifiable individual, including the data whereby 
he can be identified’.261  Were this put into a modern Internet context, it would 
protect not only personal information but also communications metadata as 
this can be used to identify an individual. As a result, the UK government 
passed the Data Protection Act 1984 (DPA84), 9 years after the US Privacy 
Act became law. However, personal information gained no protection by the 
Act if access were required to safeguard national security.262 
2.3.1.1 EU Data Protection 
One benefit of the Internet, in particular since the invention of the Web coupled 
with advances in communications technology and availability, is that it created 
a global space for everything from the sale of goods and services, to access 
to government, news and information services. Through this, the world 
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entered the ‘age of the Information Society.’263 The free flow of data, including 
personal information within the Information Society is vital for its operation and 
this was hampered by different data protection laws within the members of the 
EU. This was addressed by the Data Protection Directive on 24 October 
1995264 which created a formal regime with no barriers to the free flow of 
personal information between member states. The right to the protection of 
personal information was also incorporated into Art. 8 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.265 The UK incorporated the 
Directive via the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) which repealed DPA84, 
coming into force on 1 March 2000.266 Again, the DPA provides no protection 
in cases of national security.267 
Harmonised data protection across the EU now meant data could be 
transferred freely and yet, a provision had to be made to cater for the transfer 
of data to non-EU countries and that was done by Art. 25. This required that 
the country where the data was to be transferred to had adequate data 
protection.268 This presented a problem where the US was concerned. The 
US approach to data protection regulates government intrusion whereas the 
EU approach covers the protection of personal data in general and business 
use in particular. While protections in the US may be considered adequate in 
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some areas, it is, in general, inadequate.269 To cater for this the Safe Harbor 
Agreement was put into place in July, 2000 enabling personal information to 
be transferred to the US.270 This agreement will be revisited in Chapter 7. 
2.3.1.2 Evolving EU data protection law 
The Directive had been debated during the period when the Internet was 
moving from a little known to a widely accepted and used resource. The 
introduction of new digital technologies for the development of the information 
society resulted in the Directive 97/66/EC271 which added new requirements 
to the Data Protection Directive. However, with technology changing fast the 
EU carried out a major review of the legislation.272 During both the discussion 
and implementation phases of the Directive the World Wide Web was created 
and expanded rapidly. Uses of personal data were to expand and continued 
to do so, and legislation drafted while the Web was in its infancy simply could 
not predict how things would change. The Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications273 was the outcome of the review. It repealed 97/66/EC 
because of the need to provide protection across all electronic 
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communications services regardless of the technology.274 Art. 5 of the 
Directive addresses confidentiality of communications, prohibiting 
unconsented surveillance,275 except where this is a business need, for 
example, for billing purposes,276 and creates the requirement that users are 
to be informed of and can consent to information being stored on or read from 
their devices unless a service could not be delivered otherwise.277 Art. 15 
permits Member States to retain communications metadata for a limited but 
unspecified time.278  Art. 5(3) was modified by Directive 2009/136/EC279 to 
require prior informed consent before information was written to or read from 
a user’s device.280 This change became known as the cookie law. Cookies 
and other forms of tracking are discussed and presented in Chapter 6. 
2.3.1.3 Updating EU data protection 
In January 2012, the EU published a communication281 discussing the 
challenges to data protection caused by globalisation and rapid technological 
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change. This resulted in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)282 
which will become law across the EU on 25 May, 2018283 and will repeal 
Directive 95/46/EC.284 
Art .17 of the GDPR implements the right for a person to have their personal 
data erased in certain circumstances and is known as the ‘right to be 
forgotten’. This provides the right to have data deleted where it is no longer 
required for the purpose for which it was collected provided that data is not 
required for freedom of expression or for legal obligations. It could not, 
therefore be used to delete data held under data retention legislation.285 The 
right to be forgotten was first defined as a result of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) decision in Google Spain v AEPD286 where the Court 
ruled that Google must remove links to material about the complainant. 
Although the case was specific to search engine indexes Art. 17 is wider in 
that it may target personal data held anywhere. It also imposes the duty on 
the data controller to inform any other controllers to which the relevel personal 
data has been sent of the erasure requirement provided this is both possible 
and the effort is not disproportionate.287 
A person may also object to their data being processed which places the 
burden on the data controller of proving that the legitimacy of the processing 
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overrides the person’s right to object to it.288 Equally, a person may require 
the data controller to restrict processing of their personal data.289 
A further protection in the GDPR is the requirement that data controllers 
implement technical and organisational measures to ensure that data 
protection is fully considered in the design of systems, and that by default only 
necessary data is processed. Art. 25290 points to methods such as data 
minimisation and pseudonymisation. 
As with previous legislation national security purposes still bypass all 
protections.291 However, the GDPR also has significant implications not least 
in the maximum fines available – the higher of €20M or 4% of the controller’s 
total worldwide annual turnover for the previous financial year. Taken 
together, the right to be forgotten, the requirement of data protection by design 
and default, and the large fines has the potential to reduce the amount of 
personal data being held, which itself makes for less data to be made available 
to law enforcement agencies. 
Data protection alone does not offer a viable solution to the loss of 
informational privacy due to mass Internet surveillance. The exclusion of 
protections for national security purposes still means that the government can 
access personal information from company databases and other sources as 
required and the legislation which permits this access sometimes lacks 
sufficient safeguards. This will be examined in later chapters. It is first 
necessary to understand the architecture of the Internet at as basic level. The 
architecture of the Internet is such that it has to know where data comes from 
and where it is going to in order to operate. It is not concerned with what that 
data is, some of which will be our personal information. In order to be able to 
visualise where such information may be at risk while in transit across the 
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Internet or at rest on connected servers, the next section examines the 
Internet from a technical perspective. It is necessary to describe in some depth 
how the Internet functions in order to better understand privacy risks 
associated with its use. This knowledge gap is constantly ignored by 
lawmakers who draft legislation with no real reference to underlying 
technologies and capabilities. Knowledge of the technicalities – or architecture 
of the Internet as a whole will aid the understanding of issues brought into the 
public realm by the 2013 Snowden revelations. One must be conscious that 
the Snowden revelations stem from secret documents, the validity of which 
cannot be ascertained as a result. However, given the understanding of the 
underlying technologies presented in the next section and Chapter 6 one can 
see that the revelations are entirely plausible. 
2.3.2 Internet structure 
In its simplest form, the role of the Internet is to transfer data between 
connected devices, be those personal computers, mobile devices, web 
servers or any other form of device. It has been described as a collection of 
networks and interconnections that functions as a ‘single, cooperative virtual 
network’.292 At its base level, it may simply be considered a mixture of links 
and interconnections which combine together to form a global mesh. Although 
this mesh is complex, Internet users do not see, nor do they need to know this 
complexity. 
A useful analogy is to view the Internet in a similar way to the road network. A 
map of all roads in the UK will indicate a number of possible routes, say, from 
an address in London to one in Glasgow. If each section of road represents a 
link and each intersection a router, one can see two things: one can find a 
route between these two addresses; and that route consists of a series of 
intersections, each one of which requires some direction. By further applying 
this analogy to a courier service, the method of data communication can be 
                                            
292 Douglas E Comer, Interworking with TCP/IP: Volume 1; principles, 
protocols and architecture (Prentice-Hall, US, 1991), 493 
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defined in the same way as a letter being delivered directly.293 A courier needs 
three pieces of information in order to collect and deliver the letter: the 
collection address; the delivery address; and a route. In this analogy, these 
three pieces of information are the address of each house plus the roads to 
take and directions for each intersection. 
Similar to a postal address which defines where a building is and enables one 
to find it, Internet devices also need addresses, and the basic address used 
on the Internet is the Internet Protocol (IP) address.294 It is this address which 
can be thought of as the postal address in the above analogies.295 
The data being passed across the Internet is of no common size. It may be 
just a few characters such as a login name, or a large file such as a movie. In 
order to cater for data of any size, the data is broken down into pieces known 
as packets before it is sent across the Internet. These data packets pass 
across the Internet from origin to destination via routers which determine 
where the data needs to be sent to reach its destination.296 Routers are used 
as intersections on the Internet sending data down the correct path in order to 
continue on its journey. Each data packet contains the IP address of both the 
sender and receiver, and this enables all routers along the path to determine 
where next to send the data, and also where the data came from. Using the 
                                            
293 We imagine a courier service here which takes a letter from A and 
delivers it to B with no stops. The postal service is a poor analogy in this 
case as there are stops, or sorting offices along the way. The postal 
service is, however, a perfect analogy for e-mail and is used below. 
294 There are currently two versions of IP address in use, version 4 (IPv4) 
and version 6 (IPv6). IPv4 addresses are 32 bits long resulting in around 
4.3 billion possible addresses. These are running out. IPv6 addresses 
are 128 bits long, resulting in 340 trillion trillion trillion individual 
addresses. 
295 IP addresses for home users are typically not fixed, but the IP addresses 
concerned must actually relate to the sender and receiver while the 
transmission takes place. 
296 Although technically two communicating systems can be directly 
connected together, without at least a router between the two systems 
they cannot be connected to the Internet. 
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road analogy above, a router can be seen as a road intersection manned by 
someone directing traffic who asks each car where it is headed and directs it 
down the relevant road, and so on. If a road becomes closed, that person can 
direct the car along a different road to bypass the road closure; the Internet is 
resilient in that if a link becomes unavailable it can send the data via a different 
route. However, the road analogy is not entirely correct in one respect. Data 
flowing across the Internet may not take the most direct route. This may be 
because of arrangements between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and their 
own upstream providers. It may be that a provider has spare capacity on one 
route and not another, or that to send data along one route simply costs less. 
The analogy can be brought back into line by considering, for example, a 
situation where a car satellite navigation system suggests an alternate route 
because of traffic conditions or road tolls. Internet routing will be examined 
further in Chapter 6. 
As was outlined above, data is broken into packets before it is sent across the 
Internet. Referring to the courier analogy, ten couriers may be needed to take 
all the letters from the London house to the house in Glasgow. These letters 
are sequential in that they must arrive at their destination in the order in which 
they were sent. The ten couriers may follow in convoy, but this may not be the 
case. At the extreme, each of the ten couriers may be directed along a 
different set of roads but provided each letter is numbered they can be 
assembled in the correct order when they arrive at the destination. This 
analogy highlights two important facts about the Internet: the Internet is 
responsible for routing information between devices connected at its edge, 
and users need not understand the mechanism involved; and someone 
positioned at an intersection intercepting each courier that passes their way 
may not reveal the complete message split across the ten letters if not all of 
them pass the same way. However, if one has access to the ISP via which the 
user connects, then all data sent by or received by that user is accessible. In 
the courier analogy, this would be the same as stopping each courier just after 
the collect each letter but before they reach the first road junction. On the other 
hand, if one controls all the people directing traffic all the intersections, they 
could then examine each letter as it passes along. Although this is far more 
complex it is nonetheless achievable given sufficient resource. It becomes 
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easier if you have the resources of the intelligence agencies, as was indicated 
in the Snowden revelations of 2013. 
One final analogy is required in order to complete our road-based 
understanding of the Internet. The above analogy works well when viewing a 
country-wide Internet, but the Internet mesh alters in structure as it passes 
across national boundaries, and in particular where those boundaries are 
complicated by the intervening geography. An example is data passing 
between the US and the UK which will flow across one of a comparatively 
small number of submarine fibre optic cables connecting the two countries. A 
useful analogy here is a container ship travelling across the Atlantic.297 If our 
couriers are now carrying letters between addresses in London and New York, 
the use of the roads in each country is the same as before until they reach the 
sea. Here, all the couriers must board a ship for the passage across the 
Atlantic. This is, therefore, an ideal place in which the examine all of the letters 
and thus access the full content spread between them. Referring again to the 
Snowden revelations, the ability of intelligence agencies to tap into these 
cables will be examined in detail in Chapter 6.  
These boundaries are also the ideal place to apply filtering and blocking 
technologies and we see this in effect in China. It is clear that the Internet, in 
particular since the advent of the web, gives access to vast amounts of 
information on every subject imaginable and the potential to communicate with 
individuals or groups anywhere. Yet, the free flow of information is ‘politically 
contradictory’298 to communist regimes such as China. The control over what 
information is available to its citizens is of particular importance of these nation 
                                            
297 This analogy is more useful here than air mail as in the latter case there 
are thousands of aircraft carrying air mail, but comparatively few ocean 
freighters. In addition, there are hundreds of airports but only a few sea 
ports. For this reason, the sea freight analogy better matches the 
submarine cable structure. 
298 Richard Cullen and Pinky D W Choy, ‘The Internet in China’, 13 Colum. J. 
Asian L. 99 1999, p109 
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states where a political party desires to maintain its monopoly.299 From the 
time China first became connected to the global Internet, it sought to control 
external connectivity.300 The Internet structure that China formed offers it a 
great deal of latitude for control. The tiered structure, with a small number of 
international gateways connected via Internet Access Providers (IAPs) to ISPs 
and then on to customers imposes points at which control and surveillance 
can easily be implemented. The effect of having all international Internet traffic 
pass through a limited number of gateways in China is that she was then in a 
position to implement a country-wide firewall which is discussed later in 
Chapter 5. 
From the above one can see that one’s data, including personal information 
is transmitted from, say a PC or smartphone to a website across defined links 
and intersections, any one of which can potentially be used as a tapping point 
to access that data for surveillance purposes. The next section looks deeper 
still into the technology and workings of the Internet. This is essential and 
important as it enhances deeper understanding of privacy risks associated 
with the operation of the Internet which cannot be easily evaluated with 
superficial knowledge. 
                                            
299 Tamara Renee Shie, The Tangled Web: does the Internet offer promise 
or peril for the Chinese Communist Party?, J Contemporary China 
(2004) p524; the 1989 Student Democratic Movement protests in 
Tian’anmen Square saw dissidents communicating via fax machine, a 
‘new’ technology at the time that was not State regulated. See Richard 
Cullen and Pinky D W Choy, ‘The Internet in China’, 13 Colum. J. Asian 
L. 99 1999, 109-110 and Trina K Kissel, ‘License to Blog: Internet 
Regulation in the People’s Republic of China’, 17 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 229 2007, p231-232 
300 Greg Walton, China’s golden shield: corporations and the development of 
surveillance technology in the People’s Republic of China,  (International 
centre for human rights and democratic development, Canada, 2001) p9 
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2.3.3 Data network communication 
In order to send data across the Internet, a structure must be imposed. This 
structure is defined by the Internet Protocol (IP).301 The protocol can be 
viewed as having several layers, with data passing through these layers. The 
function of each layer is indicated in the following diagram. 
Figure 2.1: Internet Protocol layers 
 
IP addresses were discussed above. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, these are 
used at the Internet layer.302 Figure 2.1 also shows a device which only 
implements the Internet and Link layers. This is a router. The fact that a router 
only implements the lower two layers of the protocol is key to understanding 
Internet privacy issues. Because content exists at the top layer, a router has 
no access to content at all. All it has access to and indeed all it needs access 
                                            
301 Robert Braden, ‘Requirements for Internet Hosts – Communication 
Layers’, RFC1122, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1122> accessed 18 
January 2017 
302 Note there is another model – the Open Systems Integration (OSI) model 
which defines the protocol in seven layers and these are included for 
reference. It is common for manufacturers to discuss products in terms 
of the 7-layer model but in an Internet Protocol context; thus, a web 
server at the applications layer in IP terms is OSI layer 7. 
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to is the IP address information. Any network device which needs access to 
content must therefore implement the full protocol stack.303 
While an IP address is used to route information across the Internet, there is 
another form of address used by TCP and UDP which exists at the Transport 
layer. This address is referred to as a port. Ports are vital because they permit 
several applications to run on a server or a user’s device at the same time. In 
this way, the IP address defines which server to connect to, and the port 
defines which service on that server is required. Without these ports one could 
only run one Internet application at a time; ports on a client enable any number 
of web browsing sessions, email clients and other applications to run 
concurrently.304 However, these ports play another important role within the 
Internet itself and this is described next. 
2.3.4 Network Address Translation 
Every communicating system on the Internet requires a unique public IP 
address. However, the current addressing scheme, IPv4 is limited and it is 
impractical to allocate a public IP address to every device in the home. IPv4 
addresses take the form of 4 numbers separated by dots; for example, 
129.11.155.71. To cater for this the global IP address space has a series of 
ranges which are classed as private.305 Public IP addresses can be routed 
                                            
303 It should be noted, however, that some network devices do use the upper 
layers. In particular, content switches and web caches which are used to 
speed up or to minimise data flows will use all the layers as they need 
access to the content itself. 
304 Defined port numbers are maintained by IANA and can be found at < 
http://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-
names-port-numbers.xml> accessed 17 February 2013; web servers 
typically use port 80 for plain text (http) and port 443 for encrypted 
(https) communications. 
305 There are several ranges of IPv4 addresses reserved for private use. 
These cannot be routed across the Internet. For example, the private IP 
address 192.168.1.1 may be used in thousands of home broadband 
installations. There can never be a clash as the address can never be 
used in the public Internet itself. See Yakov Rekhter, Robert Moskowitz, 
Daniel Karrenberg and Geert de Groot, Address Allocation for Private 
Internets, RFC1918, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1918> accessed 18 
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across the Internet; private ones cannot. The effect of this is that the same 
private IP address range can be used in every home – there will never be a 
clash because they can never be routed publically. Ports enable this to 
happen. A home broadband router will be allocated a public IP address by the 
ISP. Devices in the home are allocated a private IP address, typically 
dynamically, meaning that any given device may not always have the same 
private IP address.306 When a device in the home starts to communicate with 
an Internet service the router uses Network Address Translation (NAT)307 to 
allocate a distinct port to that communication. In this way, a number of devices 
in the home, each running a number of applications can all communicate with 
Internet services over the single public IP address. The public Internet can be 
thought of as ending at the home router, with a wholly private Internet being 
used within the home. 
NAT is an important aspect of the modern Internet when considering the 
privacy, or otherwise of IP addresses because clearly the IP address seen 
from the outside cannot be used to identify a particular device in the home. 
This is considered further next. 
2.3.5 Privacy implications of an IP address 
Taken alone, an IP address by itself has little privacy implication. When 
combined with other publically available information it can reveal locational 
                                            
January 2017. RCF1918 defines three network address ranges (10.0.0.0 
to 10.255.255.255, 172.16.0.0 to 172.31.255.255 and 192.168.0.0 to 
192.168.255.255) 
306 IP addresses are typically allocated via a protocol called Dynamic Host 
Configuration protocol (DHCP) and in a typical home setup DHCP will be 
running within the broadband router. 
307 NAT as defined by RFC3022 consists of Basic NAT which translates IP 
addresses, and Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT) which 
deals with port mapping. Together these are termed Traditional NAT. 
NAT alone is used here because it is commonly referred to as such. See 
generally Pyda Srisuresh and Kjeld Egevang, RFC3022 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3022 accessed 2 December 2016 
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information and sometimes even a postal address.308 When combined with 
non-public information an IP address can reveal customer information; the 
customer's ISP will record allocated IP addresses against billing and time 
information. However, identifying an actual person from an IP address is 
problematic. 
In the NAT example outlined above the NAT information, that which would 
indicate which device in the home was communicating with what system on 
the Internet is often not available for inspection and even if it were there may 
be no logs to show which device had an IP at any given time.309 Externally, 
regardless of what device within the home is communicating across the 
Internet the only visible IP address will be that of the home broadband router’s 
public interface.310 Given the public IP address of the router the relevant ISP 
will be able to determine the street address, but no more than that. 
Just as knowledge of only a street address cannot reliably be used to identify 
a specific person within a property, nor can the public IP address in a home 
broadband setup identify the person actually using the devices connected 
within. Even if one could identify the device one may still not be able to identify 
who was using that device. This has been tested in the courts. In Media CAT 
v Adams and ors., it was found that although Media CAT were monitoring IP 
addresses accessing material, the IP address only identified the person who 
had a contract with an ISP, not the actual person accessing any material311 
                                            
308 Public sources of information include ‘whois’ which can reveal the postal 
address of the owner of an IP number (the home broadband user is not 
the owner, the ISP is); ‘traceroute’ which can reveal the network path 
between devices and can thus be used to determine the ISPs involved; 
and geolocation websites which attempt to locate an IP address 
geographically. 
309 Some home broadband routers do give this information but rarely keep 
historic logs 
310 Joshua McIntyre, ‘Balancing expectations of online privacy: why Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses should be protected as personally identifiable 
information’, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 895 2010-2011,  p901 
311 [2011] EWPCC 6, at 28 
- 58 - 
who may not have even been at the same premises if the wireless network 
(Wi-Fi) was insecure. 312 This last point is widely acknowledged; for example, 
the issue of use of someone else's Wi-Fi to infringe intellectual property rights 
was raised by TalkTalk in response to an inquiry in 2009;313 T-Mobile stated 
that finding an individual using a public IP address via a mobile network cannot 
be done with any degree of certainty.314 In the US, in K-Beech, Inc. v John 
Does 1-37 it was found that ‘it is no more likely that the subscriber to an IP 
address carried out a particular function … than to say an individual who pays 
the telephone bill made a specific telephone call.’315 In Europe, in Delfi AS v 
Estonia, the court determined that even if it were ‘able to identify the IP 
address of a computer and the address where the computer was located, it 
was extremely difficult to identify the person’316 using that computer. 
The issue of an IP address being combined with other information to identify 
a person was also tested in the CJEU. Here, it was found that a dynamic IP 
address could be regarded as personal information where a provider legally 
had the means to identify a person using additional information provided by 
the relevant ISP.317 
These cases still leave uncertainty. On one hand, courts are denying the use 
solely of an IP address to identify a person. On the other hand, the fact that a 
dynamic IP address may be considered personal information suggests that in 
some cases the courts will accept that an IP address does identify a person 
                                            
312 [2011] EWPCC 6 Media CAT Limited v Adams & Others at 30 
313 All Party Parliamentary Communications Group ' "Can we keep our hands 
off the net?" Report of an Inquiry by the All Party Parliamentary 
Communications Group', October 2009, 34 
314 Ibid., 35 
315 K-Beech, Inc. v John Does 1-17, CV 11-3995 (DRH) (GRB) Document 
39, at p6 
316 Delfi AS v Estonia App no 64569/09 (ECtHR, 10 October 2013) 
317 Case C-582/14 Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutshland (Second 
Chamber, 19 October 2016),  49 
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but does not specify how this may be achieved. Adding to this dilemma there 
are two versions of IP address in use on the Internet today: IPv4 and IPv6, the 
latter using a more complex addressing scheme of 128-bits, for instance, 
2a02:c7d:3c4a:a00:d565:e02:8ef4:c21b. IPv6 has the potential for every 
device to have its own, globally unique IP address. IPv6 is considered an 
enabler of the Internet of Things (IoT).318 This uniqueness causes an issue for 
Internet privacy in that it can be used to show a specific device made a specific 
communication. IPv6 addresses are generated using the Media Access 
Control (MAC) 319 address of the device which is unique to a given device. 
This could be used to identify an actual device as its owner travels across the 
globe, a fact not possible with IPv4. However, the drafters of the IPv6 
specification took this into account. IPv6 has a privacy extension which 
enables the creation of addresses which still have a global scope but which 
change over time and are not related to the hardware address.320 
While IPv6 has the potential to identify every device connected to the Internet 
it is some way from becoming ubiquitous. From a mass Internet surveillance 
perspective provided the privacy extension is enabled the actual 
communicating device cannot be confirmed without physical access to that 
                                            
318 The Internet of Things refers to the increasing number of devices 
connecting to the Internet to serve people. For example, refrigerators 
which can monitor their contents and place orders for supplies without 
human intervention. As such devices become commonplace the rate at 
which the IPv4 address space is running out will accelerate. 
319 Specifically, the MAC address is split and the hexadecimal FE inserted in 
the middle. The local/global bit is set to 1. This is then used to form a 
part of the IPv6 address. Take for example the MAC address 
11:22:33:44:55:66, inserting FE creates 11:22:33:FE:44:55:66 and 
setting the local/global bit to 1 creates 13:22:33:FE:44:55:66. If this is 
used as a part of an IPv6 address it is easy to extract the actual MAC 
address which then identifies a specific device. See 
<http://www.tcpipguide.com/free/t_IPv6InterfaceIdentifiersandPhysicalA
ddressMapping-2.htm> accessed 30 May 2016 
320 Thomas Narten, Richard Draves and Suresh Krishnan, Privacy 
extensions for stateless address autoconfiguration in IPv6, September 
2007, RFC4941 p1 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4941> accessed 21 
January 2017 
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device at the time the communication was made. However, although there 
may be no knowledge of a specific user tracking the device across the Internet 
is made easier with IPv6 even with privacy enabled because the IP address 
of the device itself, not the home router may be recorded by each server or 
application that communication is made with.321 If any personal information in 
addition to the IP address becomes available to an adversary our actions 
across multiple websites can become visible and we cannot choose to keep 
them private. 
2.3.6 Internet infrastructure 
As was described in the previous section, the Internet consists basically of a 
whole series of links and interconnections. However, both geography and 
financial concerns play a large part in defining the overall structure. The 
principal backbone infrastructure of the Internet is provided by large 
companies, primarily the large telephone companies which have used their 
various cable routes to enable large volumes of data to be transmitted. These 
companies form Tier 1 of a tiered system.  
Tier 1 providers, for example AT&T and BT agree to pass Internet data across 
their networks and between each other at no cost. They interlink Internet 
Exchange Points (IXPs), large installations that form major intersections in the 
global Internet. Tier 1 providers also own or lease cables linking countries and 
continents, typically under oceans. Thus, all of the principal backbone 
infrastructure of the Internet is provided by Tier 1 companies. Tier 1 
companies are also ISPs in their own right. Tier 2 consists of ISPs who 
connect to IXPs and who will pay for this service. Tier 3 ISPs tend to be local 
ISPs and in turn get their Internet provision from Tier 2, or in some cases Tier 
1 companies.  
                                            
321 An experiment carried out via Sky broadband showed that three different 
Apple devices shows three different IPv6 addresses in public when 
checked with Google’s ‘what is my IP address’ service. None identified 
the actual device by MAC address suggesting that the privacy extension 
is activated. 
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Customers, depending on size can connect to any tier provider. In addition to 
this are cables held privately by major companies which may also sell Internet 
bandwidth. A typical home broadband user will connect to a provider at Tier 2 
or 3 which in turn will by service from a larger provider. The implications for 
privacy here are that potentially many companies in many jurisdictions 
technically can have access to your data while in transit, putting informational 
privacy at risk. 
2.3.6.1 Carrier Grade Network Address Translation 
Although IPv6 provides an address space large enough for the planned 
expansion of the Internet it’s uptake has been slow. Because there are few 
IPv4 addresses left a means had to be found to address the issue. This came 
in the form of Carrier Grade Network Address Translation (CG-NAT, or CGN). 
As shown above, in a home context, NAT means one cannot readily identify 
the actual person within a property who sent or received a communication. A 
far more major complication comes with CGN. Unlike NAT used to connect a 
home network to the Internet where a small number of systems share a 
common, ISP-allocated public IP address, CGN is implemented within the 
carrier network itself and connects all users to which that ISP provides access 
services. It is one mechanism proposed to aid the rollout of IPv6 while the 
IPv4 addresses are further depleted. Although this breaks the end-to-end 
model from the early days of the Internet, most home users are already behind 
a NAT and until, or, indeed, if IPv6 completely replaces IPv4 these techniques 
are required.322 
However, CGN provides an issue for Internet surveillance. From a 
surveillance perspective, depending where one surveils the data, it can be 
extremely complex to work out the source or destination of a communication 
from the IP addresses alone as a single IP address may well be used by 
thousands of simultaneous individual communications potentially sent or 
                                            
322 Dan Wing, ‘Network address translation: extending the Internet address 
space’, IEEE Internet Computing Vol 14 issue 4, July-August 2010, 70 
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received by thousands of individuals.323 Therefore, a side effect of the 
introduction of CGN is the enhancement of Internet privacy. 
2.3.7 The Domain Name Service (DNS) 
As discussed above, the Internet uses IP addresses to route information 
between communicating devices. However, humans need a more readable 
way of accessing information, or to send emails. Email addresses and website 
addresses share a name component which indicates the resource – be it email 
address or website – which is to be used. This is termed the domain name. 
The domain name forms a part of a URL and email address. For example, the 
URL leeds.ac.uk/news has the domain name leeds.ac.uk, as does the email 
address xyz123@leeds.ac.uk. The Internet uses IP addresses to route 
information and so a mechanism is used to translate between the domain 
name and the IP address which will actually be used. This is known as the 
Domain Name System (DNS). Of note, the DNS gives flexibility to Internet 
addresses in that the IP address need not remain the same. This means that 
domains can be transferred between ISPs, or may lead to multiple IP 
addresses for the purpose of resilience. 
Although the DNS is necessary in order to make Internet addresses humanly 
readable there are risks to privacy even here, not because of the basic 
function of the DNS but by the fact that it can be faked.  For example, a user 
wants to visit a specific website and so they enter the website URL into their 
browser. The browser causes the underlying system to look up the IP address 
associated with the URL via the DNS. If the DNS reply can be faked, the user 
could be diverted to a different website. If that website was convincing enough 
the user would not be aware of the change and may thus reveal personal 
information to a fake, rogue website. 
                                            
323 Chris Donley and others, ‘Assessing the impact of NAT444 on network 
applications, Internet Engineering Task Force’, 25 October 2010 
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-donley-nat444-impacts-01> accessed 16 
February 2013 
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2.3.8 Internet summary 
Several key facts are evident and noteworthy in this research. While the 
Internet appears simple to the user it is a complex construct of devices and 
links, defined in part by geography and cost, and by business decisions. The 
addresses, while unique, cannot indicate who was using any device at any 
given time. It is often not feasible to assume that any given website is even in 
the same country as the company that operates it. 
There are also weaknesses caused by the complexity and the fact that the 
Internet has grown from an early academic beginning where security was not 
a consideration. Weaknesses in the DNS, for example, have been exploited 
by hackers as well as state actors, and have gained the attention of security 
services as revealed by the Snowden revelations. 
2.4 The growth of the web as a social environment 
Two relatively recent phenomena are critical to the modern day use of the 
Internet. The first phenomenon, the second generation Web (Web2.0) 
enabled interaction – it enabled people to put data into the Web, not just read 
information already there. Information input before that time consisted mainly 
of forms on websites which a person would need to fill in in order to order 
goods, for instance. After the Web2.0 revolution, anyone could put any 
information about themselves onto the Web, for example via blogs.324 
The second phenomenon is described as the semantic web.325 The driving 
principle of the semantic web is that data can be accessed not only by humans 
but also by computer. This gives the ability to re-purpose data in any number 
                                            
324 Although technically blogs existed well before Web2.0, the expansion of 
blogging and vastly improved mechanisms to enable blogging became 
established after Web2.0 had become established. 
325 For further information see <http://www.w3.org/standards/semanticweb/> 
accessed 4 December 2010 
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of different ways from any number of different sources. In a sense this has 
echoes of the worries that first brought about data protection legislation. 
There is one important and major development from Web2.0, and this is 
people's interactions via social media networks.326 These aim to mimic social 
structures and can thus import the problems surrounding privacy into 
cyberspace. The use of social media networks to communicate with friends 
and family is no different to discussions in the playground, the office or the 
home. In this respect, the communications channel may be considered similar 
to e-mail. However, where social media differs is in the way people are 
required, or at least persuaded to use their personal information to form a 
profile. This is further examined in Chapter 7. 
The 2007 Pew Digital Footprints survey found that one in three adults who 
publish personal information online in some way have their home address and 
employer details available.327 In particular, it was found that ‘[m]ost internet 
users are not concerned about the amount of information available about them 
online, and most do not take steps to limit that information.’328 
Facebook launched in February 2004 and in September 2016 claimed to have 
an average of 1.18 billion active users per day.329 It modelled itself on existing 
social structures, initially forming groups relating to universities and colleges. 
It went from 400 million to 500 million active users between February and July 
                                            
326 Social media networks are taken to mean websites such as Facebook, 
many of which require the user to lodge personal information before the 
site can be used effectively. 
327 Pew Internet and American Life Project, 'Digital Footprints: online identity 
management and search in the age of transparency', December 2007, 
<http://www.pewinternet.org> accessed 10 January 2011 p16 
328 Ibid., p30 
329 Stats (Facebook) <http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/> accessed 25 
January 2017 
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2010. It knows an ‘immense amount’330 about its subscribers. Where a 
Facebook profile is filled in completely, the software records a ‘reasonably 
comprehensive snapshot’331 of each person and who they know.332 Even 
joining a Facebook group gives information away. For example, becoming a 
member of some action group indicates not only you are a member, but 
indicates to others that you are the kind of person who cares about the action 
in question.333 One cannot use Facebook to find friends if those friends do not 
use publish sufficient information to aid your searches. As stated by Westin 
(Section 2.2 page 21) anonymity is a ‘major aspect of privacy’334 and one can 
see from the above that anonymity and Facebook do not go hand in hand. 
2.5 The evolving Internet - Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud 
based services 
The Internet as existing from its initial conception has always dealt very simply 
with the transfer to data from place to place, typically from edge to edge, where 
client systems and servers are connected at the edge. More lately data may 
be held on machinery which forms a part of the fabric of the Internet. However, 
the actual location of data is becoming increasingly blurred by two 
developments, that of cloud based services, and the Internet of Things. Both 
of these have different issues for privacy. 
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2.5.1 Cloud based services 
As technology changes so do definitions used to describe it. As the Internet 
evolves towards more distributed computing and storage facilities, the term 
‘cloud’ has become widely used, in particular as ‘cloud storage’ and ‘cloud 
computing’. Taken in its simplest form, cloud based services are no different 
from any other Internet service. For example, and email service may be 
described as cloud based, but technically there is still an email server 
somewhere which handles the transfer of the email, and there is still some 
access mechanism used to compose and receive the email. Cloud storage 
simply means that files are stored on a server somewhere on the Internet. 
Technically, then, cloud-based services introduce nothing new as it is simply 
a way to think of the technology involved. However, there is one significant 
difference in that with cloud-based services, one can never be sure where 
one’s data is being held or to where it is being transferred. This has clear 
implications for privacy, and will become especially relevant and will be further 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
2.5.2 The Internet of Things (IoT) 
The Internet of Things (IoT) began life as Machine to Machine (M2M) 
communications. However, IoT can be considered a superset of M2M 
because a user’s PC, like everything else on the Internet which can hold or 
use data can be considered a ‘thing’. IoT is the connection to the Internet of 
everyday items, not just PCs and servers. 
In IoT, household items such as smart TVs, Internet enabled refrigerators and 
washing machines, security systems and cameras and all such devices can 
be connected to the Internet. However, IoT is not simply the means by where 
one can control one’s TV via the Internet; it is about the ability of all these 
devices to communicate with each other, either with or without a human 
communications element. It is technically feasible, for example, to construct a 
refrigerator which uses Radio Frequency ID (RFID) tags on the items inside 
to determine when an item is removed and replaced, to determine how much 
of that item is left and to re-order it automatically. 
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The disadvantage of IoT from a privacy perspective is that one’s data can 
literally be spread anywhere. Unlike cloud services which are typically used 
either intentionally (if not consciously) or automatically but in a limited way 
(e.g. sharing data between Internet connected personal devices, phones, 
tablets, laptops etc.), in IoT, every item of technology one comes across in life 
may be interconnected and may share data. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the meaning of privacy in an Internet context and 
shown how it is defined and protected both internationally and in the three 
chosen jurisdictions. It has shown how privacy is a vital right, enabling 
personal autonomy and liberty and protecting our personal information. From 
this chapter it is clear that although one can recognise privacy and know what 
it means on a personal level, being able to define privacy completely in law is 
impractical. Privacy covers many aspects of our lives yet is not universal. Even 
defining the meaning of privacy is complex, the matter being made worse by 
cultural differences. 
Additionally, this chapter has investigated the Internet from a technical 
perspective and this will be built upon in Chapter 6 when the fact that 
technology can both enhance and invade privacy is discussed. The Internet 
has been described as ‘surveillance-ready’.335 Every router that the data 
passes through could conceivably have access to that data, regardless of 
whether it uses any of it. 
While privacy of communications may be achievable via face to face contacts, 
it is far more difficult to achieve on the Internet. There are two aspects of risk 
to information privacy on the Internet. First, one’s actual communication can 
be intercepted and thus, no longer remain private between sender and 
recipient. Second, the mere fact that a communication took place can be 
recorded. In this respect, the Internet differs dramatically from other forms of 
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communication. Two people meeting face to face to exchange a written 
communication may do so in private and unseen. Two people communicating 
in private across the Internet is closer to two people communicating by 
shouting at each other across a crowded room. 
The next chapter investigates Internet privacy and surveillance from a US 
perspective in order to evaluate whether or not Internet privacy in the US is 
dead. 
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Chapter 3: Internet privacy and communications surveillance 
in the US 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 investigated the meaning of privacy and determined the principal 
values protected by privacy were autonomy and liberty. It also highlighted that 
privacy on the Internet is important to protect our personal information. The 
structure of the Internet was explained in order to provide an understanding 
of how and where privacy can be lost.  
The aim of this chapter is to investigate communications surveillance in the 
US in order to determine whether or not Internet privacy in the US is dead. It 
begins with an examination of a wiretapping case from the prohibition era. 
Wiretapping quickly followed the introduction of the telegraph in the US and 
continued through changes in technology that brought the telephone. The 
term is still used today in an Internet context.336 The technique of wiretapping 
may have changed but the idea behind it – tapping a communication link to 
gain access to the data carried across it – remains the same. Therefore, 
investigating this form of surveillance will form a basis for understanding the 
issues from an historic perspective and leading to the present day. This is 
particularly relevant when taking into account the Snowden revelations of 
2013. 
3.2 Communications surveillance in the USA 
One of the first major privacy cases in the US of relevance to this research 
came about during the Prohibition era and relates to the extensive use of 
wiretapping in order to combat that crime.337 The landmark Olmstead338 case 
                                            
336 Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau, Privacy on the Line: The Politics of 
Wiretapping and Encryption (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998), 154-5 
337 Richard C Donnelly, ‘Electronic Eavesdropping’, 38 Notre Dame L. 667 
1962-1963, 668 
338 Olmstead v. US, 277 US 438 (1928) 
- 70 - 
surrounds the unlawful importation of liquors during the Prohibition. 
Government agents had gathered evidence from wiretaps placed on the 
telephone lines outside the defendant’s property without any need to enter 
onto the property and without obtaining a warrant. The Court determined that, 
as there had been no trespass into the property concerned or seizure of any 
material, the wiretapping did not require a warrant.339 This was in line with the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment which itself aimed to protect people from 
excessive searches by the British in colonial times. However, the case raised 
several key points. Brandeis J. pointed out that tapping a telephone invades 
not only the privacy of the subscriber but also that of ‘every other person’340 
who calls the subscriber or who the subscriber calls. Fisher suggests the Court 
was ‘thrown off balance by a technological development that did not fit 
conventional legal arguments’.341 Holmes J. stated that it was ‘less evil that 
some criminals should escape than that the government should play an 
ignoble part.’342 These points, made over 60 years before the invention of the 
Web still hold true today where an Internet tap even at a small ISP can give 
access to the communications of thousands of people, none of which may be 
under any suspicion. 
Communications privacy received attention six years later. A single section in 
the Communications Act of 1934.343 Section 605344 of the Act made it illegal 
for anyone involved in the carrying of communications to divulge or publish 
the contents or even the existence of those communications. However, the 
Justice Department took the view that s.605 only prevented the divulgence of 
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material gained via wiretapping rather than ruling out wiretapping per se and 
that only when material is passed outside of the government does it then 
become divulgence.345 Because of this loophole, wiretaps continued to be 
used in criminal investigations until important Supreme Court rulings in 
1937.346 These rulings related to an alcohol smuggling case which met the 
appeals court twice. 
Nardone et al had been convicted of smuggling alcohol. In the first Nardone v 
United States,347 the court concluded that s.605 clearly prohibited the use of 
intercept material.348 Convicted again, in the second Nardone v United 
States349 case, the court affirmed that not only was the product of an illegal 
wiretap inadmissible as evidence, any evidence gained by the use of the 
wiretap material could not itself be used.350  In addition, in Weiss v United 
States,351 the court ruled that s.605 applied to intrastate communication as 
well as interstate communications. However, what should have been a 
positive outcome for communications privacy only resulted in wiretap 
evidence not being used in court rather than not being used at all.352  
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The Olmstead ruling regarding physical entry saw the government succeed in 
Goldman v United States where a device had been used to listen through a 
wall adjoining the defendants property with no trespass.353 Access to a 
workplace was not considered trespass in On Lee v United States354 where 
an agent used an electronic bug so that agents outside could hear On Lee 
make self-incriminating statements.355 However, the Court upheld the warrant 
requirement for physical entry when in Silverman v United States,356 a 
microphone had been pushed into the defendant’s house.357 
So far, it is evident that physical intrusion into someone’s privacy was required 
in order for a warrant to be necessary. Had this remained the case, it would 
be clear that surveillance would go unchecked by the courts because the 
necessary infrastructure must pass out of the private space and thus become 
accessible for tapping. Despite this, one key case, Katz v United States.358 
reversed the Olmstead view and brought electronic surveillance firmly within 
the reach of the Fourth Amendment. This is discussed next. 
3.2.1 The introduction of warrant requirements 
The Olmstead doctrine was finally reversed in Katz who had been convicted 
of passing betting information across US state lines, violating 18 USC S1084. 
The FBI had used an electronic recording device outside the telephone booth 
that Katz used for his trade. On appeal, the conviction was upheld, agreeing 
with the Olmstead doctrine that there had been no physical intrusion and 
therefore no Fourth Amendment violation. The case progressed to the 
Supreme Court which reversed Olmstead and found that the Fourth 
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Amendment ‘protects people, not places’359 and that whatever a person ‘seeks 
to preserve as private, even if in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected’.360 The Court found that the Government’s activities 
in this case constituted a search and seizure. In his concurring opinion Harlan 
J. outlined what became a well-established test: a person must have an actual 
expectation of privacy, and society itself must regard that expectation as 
reasonable,361 tying privacy to social norms. If this test is met, a person thus 
has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy’.362 
The Katz judgement ‘represented a paradigm shift in Fourth Amendment 
analysis.’363 The clarification in Katz that electronic eavesdropping constitutes 
a search or seizure and that searches and seizures do not require physical 
trespass or confiscation represented a change in the way courts would view 
the privacy protections offered by the Fourth Amendment.364 However, the 
Katz court carefully avoided the national security question. 
The procession of cases from Olmstead to Katz have evidently shown how 
the law is continually being left behind by advances in technology and how 
agencies will attempt to justify their actions by lose reading of the relevant law. 
However, Congress was by now catching up on the issue of privacy and 
wiretapping was included in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
(OCCSSA) of 1968. Congress recognised that there had been extensive 
illegal wiretapping in the past and they needed to find a way to protect the 
privacy of communications while still permitting law enforcement to carry out 
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interceptions.365 Title III of the Act deals with wiretaps and its major purpose 
was to deal with organised crime, finally requiring the courts to authorise 
wiretapping via warrants. Furthermore, it set surveillance as the exception, not 
the rule - a condition when seeking a warrant was that other investigative 
methods had been attempted.366  
However, once again, the national security question was avoided, the Act 
including a clause stating that neither it nor s.605 of the Communications Act 
of 1934 limited the constitutional power of the President ‘to take such 
measures as he deems necessary’367 in order to protect the US. This included 
that the contents of intercepted communications gathered under the authority 
of the President granted by this section of the Act could be used in evidence. 
This was subsequently relied upon by the Executive as permitting electronic 
surveillance for purposes of national security but would soon be tested in the 
courts and this is examined next. 
3.2.2 Strengthening warrant requirements 
In United States v United States District Court368 (also known as Keith369), a 
warrantless wiretapping case in 1972, the Court held that the constitutional 
power of the President did not extend to the authorisation of warrantless 
electronic surveillance in domestic security cases. Maclin describes the case 
as a ‘more constitutionally robust and stronger version of Katz’.370 The 
Government claimed exemption from the warrant requirements of the Fourth 
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Amendment, claiming it to be a ‘reasonable exercise of presidential power to 
protect the national security.’371 Before the trial, the defendants had attempted 
to obtain the evidence. The Government refused, but the District Court held 
that the wiretaps violated the Fourth Amendment and ordered the evidence to 
be produced. In response to this, the Government appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to set aside the judgment of the District Court. 
The Court of Appeals determined that the District Court had been correct in 
its judgment and the case progressed to the Supreme Court.372 Delivering the 
opinion of the Court, Powell J. stated that the case required ‘sensitivity both 
to the Government’s right to protect itself from unlawful subversion and attack 
and to the citizen’s right to be secure in his privacy against unreasonable 
Government intrusion.’373 
The Government relied on the proviso in Title III regarding the constitutional 
powers of the President374 to determine that this includes warrantless wiretaps 
in domestic security cases. The Court disagreed, arguing that Section 2511(3) 
of Title III does not confer any powers on the President and was written so as 
to not interfere with any powers the President had already as defined in the 
Constitution.375 The requirement for warrants under Title III was clear and the 
Court affirmed the findings of the Court of Appeal. Douglas J. pointed out that 
if warrants were not required, it would mean that the US intelligence agencies 
would ‘literally enjoy unchecked discretion’,376 able to sift through every 
telephone conversation and seize those few words which might ‘add to their 
sense of the pulse of a domestic underground.’377 The 2013 Snowden 
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revelations which are covered in Chapter 6 suggest that this is exactly what 
was put into place with regard to Internet surveillance. 
The Court was careful to state that it was only considering the domestic issue 
and had no opinion with regard to surveillance of the activities of foreign 
agents or powers.378 It did invite Congress to consider the matter of foreign 
intelligence, going as far as to suggest that different protective standards may 
still be acceptable under the Fourth Amendment. After six years of  ‘debate, 
compromise, and negotiation’379 between those agencies who wished to carry 
out surveillance and the legislators who wanted a warrant requirement and 
taking into account the excesses of the Executive in the Watergate scandal380 
Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).381 
3.3 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
FISA was preceded by two Executive Orders which set out to regulate 
surveillance. Executive Order 11905 (EO11905)382 required that surveillance 
should be conducted with due respect to privacy and civil liberties. It also 
banned unlawful interception of communications sent from or to the US or 
destined for a US person located abroad. The order was superseded by 
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Executive Order 12036 (EO12036)383 which required the use of the least 
invasive means possible when gathering intelligence. This order also required 
that there be probable cause to believe a targeted US person located abroad 
was an agent of a foreign power.384 
FISA provides the President with substantial powers to conduct surveillance 
for foreign intelligence purposes. ‘Notwithstanding any other law’,385 electronic 
surveillance can be authorised for up to one year without a court order, 
certified only by the Attorney General that the targets are foreign powers or 
premises thereof,386 that there is ‘no substantial likelihood’387 that the 
surveillance would acquire communications to which a US person is a party, 
and that there is an adequate minimization procedure.388  
FISA also provides for surveillance under court order. Applications for court 
orders under FISA require that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain 
foreign intelligence,389 and that the information cannot be obtained by other 
more normal investigations.390 Such orders are issued by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court391 (FISC) which Robinson states is a secret 
court ‘accountable only to itself’,392 its work hidden from public view and 
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unaccountable, all in the name of national security.393 'Probable cause' is 
handled differently in FISA which does not require ‘individualized suspicion of 
criminal activity’.394 Provided the surveillance target is a ‘foreign power or an 
agent’395 thereof and the place which will be surveilled is being used by or will 
be used by the target,396 an order for surveillance will be granted. A major 
criticism of FISA is that a warrant can be issued ‘without probable cause that 
a crime has been or will be committed’,397 the test in FISA being only that the 
target is believed to be a foreign power or agent thereof, or the premises is 
believed to be used by a foreign power or agent thereof.398 Meason argues 
that FISA ‘came into being as much to facilitate surveillance as it did to prevent 
its abuse’.399 However, Blum argues that the difference in probable cause 
tests indicates the difference between surveillance for preventative 
intelligence gathering under FISA vs surveillance to gather evidence of 
crime.400 
The language of FISA is ‘vague and subject to elastic interpretation.’401 FISAs 
principal target definitions are foreign powers or agents of foreign powers. 
Nevertheless, this research finds that exactly what constitutes each is 
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subjective. A foreign government or part thereof is clearly a foreign power.402 
Less clear is a ‘faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially 
composed of United States persons.’403 For instance, Robinson questions 
how one enumerates the term substantial and suggests that FISC simply 
decides for itself.404 Terrorist groups,405 foreign-based political 
organisations,406 and entities directed and controlled by foreign 
governments407 are also classed as foreign powers. 
FISA contains a primary purpose test to ensure that it is used to acquire 
foreign intelligence. Where any information gained is to be used in a criminal 
prosecution FISA contains the safeguard that any such information must first 
be made available to the person concerned.408 This safeguard permits that 
person to submit motions to suppress the information.409 This primary purpose 
test was established in US v Truong,410 a case involving surveillance in 1977 
before FISA was enacted. The district court had accepted that there was a 
foreign intelligence exception to the requirement for a warrant but that this 
existed only where the investigation was primarily one concerning foreign 
intelligence. The court of appeal agreed that ‘courts are unschooled in 
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diplomacy and military affairs’411 and thus not competent to judge whether or 
not a foreign intelligence warrant request should be granted. However, the 
court stressed that where an investigation becomes primarily a criminal one, 
the courts are ‘entirely competent’412 and therefore a warrant requirement 
exists. 
3.4 Privacy in communications data given voluntarily 
Fourth Amendment protection does not apply where information has been 
given voluntarily to third parties and this was highlighted in Smith v 
Maryland.413 In this particular case, evidence from a pen register which had 
been installed without a warrant was used to gain a search warrant for Smith’s 
residence. Smith argued that, because there was no warrant for the pen 
register any evidence gained as a result should be excluded. However, the 
appeals court determined that there is no expectation of privacy with regard 
to numbers dialled into the telephone system and thus no warrant was 
required.414 Telephone subscribers as a whole must realise the need to send 
numbers to the telephone company in order to make a call. Moreover, 
subscribers must also realise that the telephone company can see these 
numbers should they need to, on one hand for billing purposes, and on the 
other to trace obscene phone calls, a fact highlighted in the customer 
information pages of many telephone directories. Therefore, applying Katz, 
Smith’s expectation of privacy is not reasonable and thus fails.415 In effect it 
means there is no privacy in the specific communications metadata – phone 
numbers – as these are voluntarily turned over to a third party.416 This became 
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known as the Third Party Doctrine and would come to permit the bulk Internet 
metadata collection revealed by Snowden (as discussed in Chapter 6). 
However, the decision was not unanimous. In his dissenting statement, 
Stewart J. considered that dialled numbers should gain Fourth Amendment 
protection because a list of such numbers ‘could reveal the identities of the 
persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a 
person’s life.’417 Although it dealt with telephone numbers, this statement is 
particularly relevant when applied to the Internet privacy and the use of 
metadata as will become evident in Chapter 6. 
3.5 Executive Order 12333: Expanding FISAs reach 
FISA did not govern the surveillance of US persons who were located outside 
of the US. This was addressed in 1981 by Executive Order 12333 
(EO12333)418 which was issued by the President on 4th December 1981 and 
superseded EO12036. This order specified that the ‘least intrusive collection 
techniques feasible’419 be used within the US or targeting a US person abroad, 
echoing the provisions of EO12036. Permission to target a US person either 
in the US or abroad would be granted by the Attorney General with the specific 
requirement that electronic surveillance must be conducted in accordance 
with both FISA and EO12333.420 
Although written in 1981 and amended several times, the sections outlined 
above remain intact and relevant to Internet surveillance.421 EO12333 would 
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become key to the NSA’s activities described in the Snowden revelations of 
2013 and this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
3.6 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
This research also finds that the wording of OCCSSA Title III and therefore 
the privacy protection it offered in a changing technological landscape did not 
stand the test of time. One principal issue was that Title III only considered 
aural communications and therefore, it offered no protection for digital modes. 
Put simply, the application of the Fourth Amendment had not kept up with 
advancing technology.422 
On 21st October 1986, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986423 
(ECPA) was signed into law. Of particular note during discussions at the Bill 
stage, Senator Leahy pointed out that it is not the rules but the technology that 
changes, legislation ensuring that the rules keep pace with the technology.424 
This remains true today and had earlier Acts considered this, there may have 
been fewer issues in the past. 
ECPA amended Title III of OCCSSA to cover intercepts of electronic 
communications.425 It divided electronic communications into three sections, 
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namely the Wiretap Act,426 the Stored Communications Act (SCA)427 and the 
regulation of pen registers and trap and trace devices.428 The warrant 
requirements of Title III remained unaffected. 
ECPA set in place the requirement that communications information could not 
be obtained without the customer's permission unless it was done so via a 
court order or warrant. The exception to this was the National Security Letter 
(NSL).429 The ECPA enabled the FBI issue a NSL to obtain subscriber 
information including metadata. In order to use a NSL the FBI had to certify 
that the information sought was in conjunction with a foreign intelligence 
investigation. Because of this, the authority of a NSL was less than that of a 
subpoena but was ‘perfectly sufficient in situations where state privacy 
legislation presented the only barrier to compliance’.430  
3.6.1 The Stored Communications Act 
Title II of the ECPA is known as the Stored Communications Act (SCA)431. 
Described by Kerr as ‘dense and confusing’,432 its aim is to regulate access to 
both the content of communications in electronic storage and access to 
subscriber information. Unlike wiretaps, which can only give access to 
information passing across the tap from the day the tap was installed going 
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forward, the SCA gives access to data already held on computers and this 
would include e-mails stored at an ISP, for instance. 
Regarding the content of any communication stored by the ISP the SCA sets 
a 180 day limit within which the government can only gain access pursuant to 
a warrant.433 However, where a communication had been stored for more than 
180 days, the government only needs a court order and for this, it only needs 
to show ‘reasonable grounds’434 to believe the material requested is relevant 
to an on-going criminal investigation. This is less than the probable cause 
requirements for a warrant and Cady notes that this falls short of the standard 
required by the Fourth Amendment.435 This issue was dealt with by the Court 
of Appeal and is examined next. 
3.6.2 Warshak, a challenge to the SCA grant of access to e-mails 
Warshak consists of a series of cases surrounding fraud and money 
laundering. It saw the US Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit become the first 
Article III court to address the question of whether someone has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with regard to emails stored on a third-party server.436 
Kerr initially described the first Warshak case437 as ‘a rather odd case 
involving e-mail privacy’438 as he did not believe the court would get involved 
in the technologies. Two months later, he determined that the court had 
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actually reached a ‘blockbuster decision’.439 That decision, and its implications 
are discussed below. 
Warshak was under investigation for fraud and the government used the SCA 
to order his ISP to preserve and then to produce his e-mails. Warshak was 
not made aware of this until over a year after the order had been issued.440 
When he became aware of the action he filed a claim for injunctive relief and 
a judgement against the US, claiming that the compelled warrantless 
disclosure of his e-mails constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment.441 
The District Court found in Warshak’s favour and the government appealed. 
The Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit affirmed the findings of the District 
Court and confirmed that Warshak had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his e-mails stored at his ISPs.442 However, shortly after this decision, the 6th 
Circuit Court en banc vacated its earlier decision, stating that Warshak’s 
constitutional claim was ‘not ripe for judicial resolution.’443 
The same issue returned to the same court in 2010 when Warshak brought a 
criminal appeal following his conviction. The Court once again held that by 
compelling his ISP to turn over 27,000 of his e-mails, the government had 
violated Warshak’s Fourth Amendment rights.444 The Court applied the Katz 
test, determining that Warshak had clearly demonstrated an expectation that 
the privacy of his e-mails would not be interfered with.445 This satisfied the first 
prong of the Katz test. The Court then turned to the issue of whether society 
would consider the expectation of privacy to be a reasonable one, the second 
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prong of the Katz test. Here, it determined that because e-mails are 
fundamentally similar to more traditional forms of communication, clearly they 
deserve the same protection under the Fourth Amendment.446 Therefore, the 
government must obtain a warrant based on probable cause in order to force 
an ISP to deliver people’s e-mails and because the SCA permits the 
government to obtain e-mails without such a warrant, it declared the SCA to 
be unconstitutional.447 
Warshak highlighted the disparity between the protection afforded to letters 
on the one hand and e-mail on the other. Privacy of communications via postal 
services is protected as determined in ex parte Jackson448 in 1878. However, 
the SCA as worded does not translate such protections towards stored e-mail. 
In declaring the SCA to be unconstitutional, the Court sent a clear signal that 
e-mail must be afforded the same levels of protection as the more traditional 
or older forms of communication. As highlighted by Perry it is vital that Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence keeps pace with changing technologies - even 
though e-mail did not exist at the time, the dissenting statement of Brandies 
J. in Olmstead still holds true.449 
3.7 The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
(CALEA) 
Although Title III of the OCCSSA enabled legal wiretaps, it did not provide any 
means by where law enforcement could coerce telecommunications providers 
into assisting in investigations.450 ECPA had amended Title III to bring it in line 
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with technology which was new at that time, but the legislation was not future 
proof.451 In particular, the change to digital and mobile communications meant 
that there was often no wire to attach a wiretap to, and even if there were the 
digital nature of communications could render them inaccessible. Through 
several bill proposals,452 one of which spurred Phil Zimmerman to publish his 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) email encryption code for free,453 this problem of 
access would eventually be passed to equipment manufacturers as a 
requirement to provide such access. This requirement was enshrined in the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) which passed 
into law in October 1994. 
The aim of CALEA is to ensure that CSPs maintain the ability for law 
enforcement agencies to ‘readily install wiretaps on individuals under criminal 
investigation’454 in an ever changing environment. CALEA was a major 
change. Before the Act, wiretap law focused on what could be obtained and 
how it should be obtained, given the constraints of the technology. CALEA 
would now effectively dictate how CSPs would configure their networks.455 In 
effect, the government would require the telecommunications industry to 
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change its products so that the government could better spy on their 
customers.456 
3.8 9/11 and the USA PATRIOT Act 
On 11th September 2001, members of the terrorist organisation al Qaeda 
hijacked four commercial aircraft within the US. Two were flown into the twin 
towers of the World Trade Center in New York, causing both towers to 
collapse. A third plane hit the Pentagon and the fourth came down in fields 
without reaching its intended target which was possibly the White House or 
the Capitol building in Washington DC.457 This event is popularly known as 
9/11. In the wake of the atrocity, thoughts of privacy took a back seat, 
surveillance gaining increased public support and Congress enacting 
legislation to increase the authority to surveil458 in the form of the Patriot Act459 
which became law on 26th October 2001. 
Before the Patriot Act, the sole purpose of FISA court orders for surveillance 
had to be to obtain foreign intelligence.460 This was weakened such that orders 
could be obtained where ‘a significant purpose’461 was the acquisition of such 
foreign intelligence. Not only did this remove the primary purpose standard of 
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FISA462 but it also posed a real danger that surveillance could be carried out 
for criminal investigations without the usual warrant requirements.  
The scope of FISA was further widened by Section 215 which enabled access 
to business records about any non-US person or anyone (US people included) 
if the purpose was to ‘protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities’.463 The only caveat here is that if the target is a US 
person, the reason for the investigation must not be solely based on activities 
which attract First Amendment protection.464 The actual information which 
may be obtained was greatly expanded, now being termed ‘any tangible 
things’.465 Section 215 featured heavily in the 2013 Snowden revelations.466  
Section 216 modified the definition of the recording ability of pen registers and 
trap and trace devices to include not only dialling information, but also routing 
and addressing information.467 This means that these devices can now record 
IP addresses. 
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3.8.1 Expanding surveillance capabilities 
FISA was modified in 2004 by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Protection Act of 2004468 which solved a problem that became apparent after 
9/11. The modification altered FISA’s definition of an agent of a foreign power 
to include any non-US person who ‘engages in international terrorism or 
activities in preparation thereof’.469 This became known as the ‘lone wolf 
amendment’.470 The FBI had arrested Zacarias Moussaoui on 16 August 2001 
after he had sought flight training but with neither the relevant qualifications 
nor the desire to become a commercial pilot. Moussaoui did not agree for his 
laptop to be searched. The FBI attempted to assemble a case for a FISA 
order, but found no evidence that Moussaoui was a member of any terrorist 
group and were thus defeated by the wording of 50 USC S1801(b) as written 
at that time.471 
One may consider the modification for FISA a reasonable one given the 
changing nature of terrorism. However, the Press would reveal a far more 
sinister program instigated by the President in the aftermath of 9/11. Despite 
assurances that wiretapping is not aimed at terrorists without a court order,472 
in December 2005, the New York Times revealed the President signed an 
order in October 2001 directing the NSA to collect foreign intelligence by the 
use of electronic surveillance aimed at countering terrorism in the US.473 The 
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order permitted surveillance in the US without either warrant or court order. 
Under the Order, the NSA was to collect the contents of international 
communications under a program later named the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program (TSP) and to collect bulk telephone and Internet metadata. The 
authorisation was renewed continually every 30 to 60 days and the TSP and 
metadata collection became collectively known as the President’s 
Surveillance Program (PSP).474 
The PSP had none of the safeguards of FISA and provided the intelligence 
community with powers which were never granted by Congress or the 
courts.475 The overall legality of the program was assumed under both Article 
II of the Constitution and the Authority for Use of Military Force (AUMF)476 
which gave the President broad powers in the fight against terrorism.477 NSA 
Director Hayden stated the NSA could not use FISA because obtaining orders 
via the FISC took too long, and even the emergency provision of 72 hours 
surveillance before a court order was obtained was not instant, requiring the 
Attorney General to first ensure the surveillance would in fact be acceptable 
to the FISC.478 
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The TSP finally came to an end on 17 January 2007 when Attorney General 
Gonzales informed the Senate that the TSP would not be reauthorised. The 
reason was that the FISC had issued orders which authorised the Government 
to surveil communications into and out of the US where it believed that one of 
the parties was a member of al Qaeda or an associated organisation.479 
FISA was once again modified by the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA)480 
which redefined the meaning of electronic surveillance under FISA such that 
it excludes any surveillance of a person ‘reasonably believed to be outside of 
the United States.’481 This effectively removed all of the protections provided 
by FISA as well as any limitation that FISA placed on collection methods or 
scope where the target is outside the US.482 In other words, it permitted 
warrantless surveillance of communications between foreign people outside 
the US where those communications happened to be routed through the 
US.483 The significance for Internet privacy is that a great deal of the world’s 
Internet traffic may be routed through the US. 
The role of the FISC under the PAA was significantly reduced. It could only 
get involved if the recipient of an order for surveillance under the PAA 
challenged its legality.484 
Under the PAA, surveillance could be authorised for periods up to a year by 
the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General for the 
‘acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning persons reasonably 
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believed to be outside the United States’.485 In addition, there is no 
requirement to specify the ‘specific facilities, places, premises, or property’486 
at which the surveillance is aimed, and a ‘significant’487 but not primary 
purpose must be to obtain foreign intelligence information.  
Due to the fact that it was so controversial,488 the PAA had a sunset clause to 
expire its provisions after only 6 months except that any authorisations already 
in effect would remain so.489 Therefore, surveillance authorised the day before 
the sunset clause took effect could continue for up to a year regardless. 
The PAA was challenged by Yahoo!490 which had been ordered to ‘assist in 
warrantless surveillance of certain customers’491 in 2007. The case went first 
to the FISC which ended with a threat of civil action against Yahoo! which then 
complied with the order at the same time requesting that the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) examine the case.492 
Yahoo! claimed that the government still needed a warrant and even if there 
were an exception to that rule, the surveillance was unreasonable and 
therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. The court found that there are 
cases not related to foreign intelligence which have ‘”special needs”’493 when 
the requirement for a warrant would be excused, specifically when the 
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‘purpose behind the governmental action went well beyond routine law 
enforcement and insisting upon a warrant would materially interfere with the 
accomplishment of that purpose.’494 Using the principles in these special 
needs cases, the court determined that surveillance under PAA ‘possesses 
characteristics that qualify it’495 for an exception to the warrant requirement. 
The court held that: 
a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement exists when surveillance is conducted to obtain foreign 
intelligence for national security purposes and is directed against 
foreign powers or agents of foreign powers reasonably believed to be 
located outside the United States.496 
Despite this, the court did state that this does not give the government free 
reign. The Fourth Amendment protects from unreasonable searches and 
seizures and therefore, there is a reasonableness requirement. In assessing 
the reasonableness of the surveillance, the court considered the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’497 to balance the importance of the needs of the government 
against the Constitutional protections afforded to an individual. As the 
importance of the government’s intrusion increases, so does the level of 
intrusion which may be tolerated under the Constitution.498 The court 
determined that the government’s need for the surveillance was high499 and 
Yahoo! had not produced any evidence of harm, or potential major risk of error 
or abuse.500 The court found the intrusions to satisfy the reasonableness 
test.501  
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FISA was once again modified by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA).502 
The FAA replaced Title VII of FISA and repealed the PAA, thereby removing 
the redefinition of electronic surveillance which had allowed surveillance under 
the PAA to bypass the FISC. 
FAA s.702 dealt with the surveilling of non-US persons located outside the 
US. Like the PAA, the FAA maintained the joint authorisation requirements of 
the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence for surveillance of 
up to a year targeting people reasonably believed to be outside the US for the 
acquisition of foreign intelligence information.503 
The FAA sets specific limitations such as it must not be used to intentionally 
target people in the US504 or intentionally target someone outside the US with 
the intention of using that to target a specific known person in the US.505 
Furthermore, it must not be used to intentionally target US people outside of 
the US506 nor intentionally acquire communications where all parties are 
located in the US.507 The FAA also contains the condition that all acquisition 
of communications must be carried out in a manner consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment508 and this must also be considered by the FISC.509 However, as 
stated by Blum foreign nationals located overseas are not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.510 
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On the issue of retrospective immunity for communications providers, the FAA 
finally provided a solution. Like the PAA, the FAA essentially gave immunity 
to service providers going forward. However, in addition to this, it specifically 
provided immunity to any CSP which had provided assistance on surveillance 
that was authorised by the President between 11 September 2001 and 17 
January 2007,511 provided they had a written request from the Attorney 
General or intelligence community head or deputy stating the request was 
legal and authorised by the President.512 As aforementioned, 17 January 2007 
was the date on which the Attorney General informed the Senate that the TSP 
would not be re-authorised. 
3.8.2 Bulk collection programs 
As discussed above, three articles permit various collection of 
communications content and metadata, namely s.215 of the Patriot Act 
(Section 215), s.702 of the FAA (FAA 702), and EO12333. Actions under FAA 
702 are examined in Chapter 6 along with the Snowden revelations. 
On issuing a Section 215 order in 2013, the FISC noted that the provision of 
metadata is ‘squarely controlled’513 by Smith v. Maryland, the case which led 
to the Third Party Doctrine. Although the Court recognised that the Snowden 
revelations had resulted in ‘unprecedented disclosures’514 about Section 215 
and other intelligence programs, it found nothing in the Constitution or law to 
prevent it issuing the order. 
                                            
511 FAA 802(a)(4)(A) 122 Stat. 2468-2469 
512 FAA 802(a)(4)(B) 122 Stat. 2469 
513 In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, Docket Number BR 13-
109, p6-9 <http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/BR%2013-
109%20Order-1.pdf> accessed 3 July 2016 
514 Ibid., 29 
- 97 - 
Telephone records gathered under Section 215 were stored in a database by 
the NSA. Provided that there is ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’515 that a 
number is associated with terrorism, analysts are able to chain up to 3 hops 
to look for associations, namely the first hop is all numbers in contact with the 
number being queried, the second hop is all numbers in contact with all those 
numbers revealed in the first hop and similarly, the third hop is all numbers in 
contact with all those numbers revealed in the second hop. If people have an 
average of 40 active contacts this could result in a chain containing over 2.5 
million phone numbers.516 The significant this surveillance has on privacy is 
clear.  
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) determined that 
while Section 215 was designed to grant the FBI access to relevant business 
records, the NSAs telephone metadata program ‘bears almost no 
resemblance’517 of the original aim of Section 215. The potentially all-
encompassing data collection could not be regarded as relevant to any FBI 
investigation as required by Section 215, and that requiring telephone 
companies to continually send metadata had no basis in Section 215 and was 
‘inconsistent with FISA as a whole.’518 It was also determined that the program 
violated the ECPA which only permits telephone companies to share customer 
records with the government under certain circumstances and Section 215 is 
not among these. 
The PCLOB was critical of the fact that such bulk metadata collection could 
reveal so much detail about a person’s life that this could have a ‘significant 
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and detrimental effect on individual privacy.’519 Furthermore, it was mindful of 
the potential for mission creep, the potential use of the information to target 
specific groups and the chilling effect that the program might have on the 
freedom of speech and association.520 Moreover, it did not find any cases of 
threats to the US where telephone metadata had made any significant 
difference to investigations or directly aided the discovery of a terrorist plot.521 
Bulk collection under Section 215 was finally halted by the USA FREEDOM 
Act of 2015.522 Under the changes, the US Government would no longer be 
permitted to collect bulk telephony metadata after the 29 November 2015. 
Instead, specific telephone numbers would be sent to CSPs who would then 
produce the relevant records. This method was ‘expected to be operationally 
sufficient’.523 Although this is a positive outcome for communications privacy 
in the US, this research found that it has no bearing on bulk Internet metadata 
collection which is still carried out under different legislation as described 
above. Particularly, although the arguments are the same, it has no effect on 
the drag-net Internet surveillance revealed by Snowden and this is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 6. 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter showed that the development of legislation in the US has 
followed changes in technology and changes in ways in which the intelligence 
and security agencies have carried out communications surveillance. From 
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the early days of Olmstead, the government has sought to carry out 
surveillance without judicial review and the courts have struggled to keep 
pace. Katz was a step change in surveillance with the courts extending Fourth 
Amendment protections and the formulation of a viable test of the expectation 
of privacy. The decision in Keith set the US on course to enact FISA. ECPA 
brought the law up to date regarding digital communications, and CALEA 
ensured that CSPs would maintain tapping ability in the Internet age. 
The research reveals an ongoing cycle with legislation being modified to limit 
surveillance, followed by law enforcement or the executive encroaching on 
privacy once more, with the cycle beginning once again. Laws such as the 
PAA and FAA providing retrospective immunity for CSPs who were compelled 
to mount invasive surveillance show the ultimate desire to destroy Internet 
privacy. Some surveillance programs only became evident in 2013 as a result 
of the Snowden revelations. When one views the sheer amount of material 
that may be collected given the level of non-US Internet traffic that transits the 
US, these programs remain a major concern which becomes the subject to be 
discussed in Chapter 6. However, as the courts will react to legislative 
changes in order to maintain some protection of privacy one must hope that 
this will continue and that Internet privacy in the US, while in retreat is not yet 
dead. In the next chapter, Chapter 4, focus is now turned to Internet privacy 
and communications surveillance in the UK context. 
 
- 100 - 
This page is intentionally left blank 
- 101 - 
Chapter 4: Internet privacy and communications surveillance 
in UK 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 carried out an in-depth investigation of communications 
surveillance in the US context in order to explore whether or not Internet 
privacy still exists. It concluded that while the courts are willing to take steps 
to maintain privacy in the face of mass Internet surveillance programmes 
Internet privacy in the US still has a chance for survival. The aim of this chapter 
is to review the development of UK communications surveillance laws to 
examine how these may affect Internet privacy. The review includes those 
regional and supranational instruments that have a direct effect on the UK. 
Additionally, as with the previous chapter, the principal governmental 
interference with privacy considered here is communications surveillance 
because this encompasses Internet surveillance. Several key cases are 
examined and presented to illustrate as well as provide supportive evidence 
on the effect these cases had on the way UK surveillance law developed. As 
will be argued, like the US, surveillance laws in the UK have been shaped by 
several unfavourable court decisions.  
4.2 Communications surveillance in the UK 
As with the case of the US presented in Chapter 3, in order to understand 
Internet privacy and how the law may protect it, it is necessary first to examine 
the evolution of communications surveillance in the UK context. It is found that 
the authority to intercept communications in the UK has ‘obscure’524 origins. 
The first publically recorded requirement for a warrant for the interception of 
                                            
524 Privy Council, Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors appointed to 
inquire into the interception of communications (Cmnd 283, October 
1957) p7 at (9) (Birkett Report) 
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communications in the UK dates back to 1663, but the practice of opening 
letters had been going on long before this.525 
With the invention of the telegraph, the first interception laws were put into 
place making it an offence to intercept messages or disclose their content.526 
Changing technology meant that protection of telephone communications, 
which only became widespread in the 1880’s, was not included.527 This is 
evidently an early indication of the law’s inability to cope with changes in 
technology which would become a theme where UK laws were concerned. 
In fact, the Post Office held the view that the power to intercept 
communications exercised by the Crown was also held by ‘any other operator 
of telephones’.528 Because of this, warrants were not obtained, interception 
arrangements were being dealt with directly between the Post Office, the 
Security Service and/or the Police. This problem was addressed in 1937 and 
thereafter, it required a warrant from the Secretary of State.529 Even so, it was 
not until 1969 that the defence of acting in accordance to a warrant was added 
by s.1(1) of Schedule 5 of the Post Office Act 1969.530 Section 80 of that Act 
was drafted to ensure that interceptions by the Post Office would still be 
carried out on request from the Government. In spite of this, this was about to 
be tested in the ECtHR. 
                                            
525 Ibid. 
526 Telegraph Act 1868 s.20; see also Telegraph Act 1863 s.45; protection of 
Telegrams was added by the Post Office (Protection) Act 1884 s.11 
527 Alexander Graham Bell invented his telephone in 1875 and had the 
invention notarised in Boston on 20th January 1876. See Burns, R.W., 
Communications: an international history of the formative years 
(Institution of Electrical Engineers, London, 2004) p171 
528 Privy Council  (n 524) p13 at (40) 
529 Ibid., p14 at (41) 
530 Post Office Act 1969, Schedule 5, 1(1); the Act created the Post Office as 
a public body. 
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4.2.1 Telephone interception – the Malone cases 
As with the US, laws protecting Internet privacy and regulating surveillance in 
the UK can be traced back to the regulation of telephone interception. As 
found in this research, the Malone cases are significant as they would test the 
legality of telephone tapping in the UK in the high court and, later, the ECtHR. 
Malone had been charged with handling stolen property and found not guilty. 
Realising his communications had been intercepted, Malone sought an 
injunction against the Police. Malone's claim in this case was that the 
interception had been unlawful, even if under a warrant signed by the Home 
Secretary, and that this breached his human rights under Arts 8 and 13 of the 
ECHR. In Malone v Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police (no.2),531 the 
Court determined that there had been no breach of the law regarding the 
telephone interception simply because ‘there was no law against it’,532 and 
although not specifically permitted by law s.80 of the Post Office Act 1969 
indicated that interception was lawful under warrant. There had been no 
trespass as the interception was carried out at an exchange.533 On this point, 
it is worth noting that the ruling in Malone is similar to the 1928 ruling in 
Olmstead534 in the US, over 50 years earlier (which was discussed in Chapter 
3). 
Malone had relied in part on Klass v Germany535 in which the Court had noted 
that the ‘mere existence’536 of surveillance legislation can create a ‘menace of 
surveillance’537 which itself can potentially breach Art 8 of the ECHR by 
                                            
531 Malone v Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police (no.2) [1979] 344 Ch. 
532 Ibid., 345 
533 Ibid., 369 
534 Olmstead v. US, 277 US 438 (1928) 
535 Klass and Others v Germany, App. No. 5029/71, (ECtHR, 6 September 
1978) 
536 Ibid., 41 
537 Ibid. 
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creating an environment where people are naturally concerned their 
communications may be surveilled. The Court did not find a breach of Art 8 
because German laws were in place permitting surveillance and it was 
deemed necessary in a democratic society, thus passing the tests of Art 8(2). 
However, it was clear that the Court would set limits, there otherwise being 
the danger that democracy itself is destroyed by those trying to protect it.538 
While the court in Malone noted that the law as it then stood would not 
withstand the scrutiny of the Strasbourg court it dismissed the case.  The court 
did, however, highlight that the subject of telephone tapping ‘cries out for 
legislation.’539 The Government contested this, stating that if legislation were 
needed, it would set down appropriate safeguards and restrictions on 
interception.540 After studying the Malone judgment, a Command Paper541 (the 
'White Paper') was released to bring up to date the account given in the Birkett 
report. Furthermore, the Home Secretary stated that, as interception needs to 
be done in secret it cannot be subjected to ‘normal processes of parliamentary 
control.’542 One may argue that the balance between State security and 
individual liberty should be the subject of legislation and be accountable to 
Parliament.543 However, even after reminders that the UK is required to bring 
surveillance matters under statutory control as required by Art 8 of the 
ECHR,544 in particular in the light of Malone,545 no legislative changes were 
                                            
538 Ibid., 49 
539 Malone v Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police (no.2) [1979] 344 Ch. 
346 
540 HC Deb 08 March 1979 vol 963 at 751 
541 Home Office, The Interception of Communications in Great Britain 
(Cmnd. 7873, 1980) 
542 HC Deb 01 April 1980 vol 982 cc205-220 at 207 
543 Ibid., 214 
544 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, (Cmnd 8092, January 
1981), 3.56 
545 Ibid., 3.60 
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proposed. This inaction on the part of the government would offer little 
protection from the scrutiny of the Strasbourg court as Malone took his case 
there. 
4.2.2 The Telecommunications Act 
The Conservative government elected in 1983 was committed to privatising 
telecommunication services, which it progressed via the Telecommunications 
Act 1984 which removed BTs exclusivity with regard to the provision of such 
services. However, privatisation would lead to private organisations potentially 
carrying out telephone intercepts with no effective legal control.546 As Malone 
had brought surveillance into the public eye there was concern that 
surveillance not covered by statute would always be viewed with suspicion.547 
The Telecommunications Act 1984 did make it an offence to intentionally 
intercept a message548 as well as intentionally disclosing the contents of any 
intercepted message.549 However, no offence is committed if the interception 
is carried out under a warrant from the Secretary of State, and it is not an 
offence to disclose the contents of intercepts if it is done in connection with 
the investigation of any criminal offence.550 The Act gave the Secretary of 
State the ability to direct public telecommunications operators ‘to do, or not to 
do, a particular thing’551 in the interests of national security. Also, the operator 
could be prevented from revealing the fact that any actions had taken place. 
In fact, this research found that this lose, nondescript language would later be 
                                            
546 Ian J Lloyd, ‘The Interception of Communications Act 1985’, 49 MLR 
January 1986 86-95 at 88 
547 HL Deb 19 March 1984 vol 449 cc977-1036 at 1032 
548 Telecommunications Act 1984 s.45(1)(a) 
549 Ibid., s.45(1)(b) 
550 Ibid., s.45(3) 
551 Ibid., s.94 
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relied upon by the UK government to permit bulk metadata collection which 
will be discussed in Section 4.5 below. 
4.2.3 The Interception of Communications Act 
Having exhausted national remedies, Malone took his case to the ECHR. 
There was no question that the interception of communications performed 
under a warrant issued by the Secretary of State was lawful under UK law.552 
However, the major issue was determining whether or not the law had any 
control over how and why warrants were issued in order to comply with Art 
8(2).553 
The analysis of the Commission focussed on s.80 of the Post Office Act 1969 
which the government claimed provided a statutory basis for the issuing of 
interception warrants by copying into law previous practices. However, no 
legal restriction as to what a minister could impose on the Postmaster General 
prior to the Act could be found.554 Furthermore, the issuing of a warrant by the 
Secretary of State was an administrative practice not defined in law.555 
Because of this, the Commission found it uncertain that the law laid down any 
conditions or procedures for the issuing of interception warrants. It therefore 
concluded that this was a breach of Art 8(2)556 and thus, a breach of Malone's 
Art 8 rights.557 The Court concurred. 
The Act passed to address the issues highlighted in Malone was the 
Interception of Communications Act 1985 (IOCA). It made it an offence to 
intercept communications being transmitted by post or public 
                                            
552 European Commission on Human Rights, App No 8691/79 James 
Malone against United Kingdom, 17 December 1981, at 125 
553 Ibid., at 126 
554 Ibid., at 138 
555 Ibid., at 139 
556 Ibid., at 144 
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telecommunication systems unless a warrant had been issued by the 
Secretary of State.558 Warrants could be issued on grounds of national 
security559 to prevent or detect serious crime,560 or to safeguard the economic 
wellbeing of the UK.561 IOCA thus finally put authority for interception on a 
statutory basis. 
ECHR jurisprudence resulted in further changes in UK law. In Hewitt and 
Harman v United Kingdom562 the court found that surveillance was not in 
accordance with law because the relevant law was not in statute. It found that 
the surveillance of Hewitt and Harman had breached their Art 8 rights. This 
was rectified by the enactment of the Security Services Act 1989 which put 
the service on a statutory basis, stating there would ‘continue to be’563 such a 
service. 
IOCA was found to provide the necessary statutory basis in the case of 
Christie v United Kingdom564. In this case, the applicant alleged that GCHQ 
had intercepted trades union telexes addressed to him. The government 
neither confirmed nor denied this, but accepted that it might have happened. 
The Commission determined that, as procedures for interception were set out 
in IOCA and the Security Services Act 1989, the interference was in 
accordance with law. Furthermore, the law was accessible as it was set out in 
statute. The case was declared as inadmissible. 
                                            
558 Interception of Communications Act 1985 (IOCA) s.1 
559 Ibid., s.2(2)(a) 
560 Ibid., s.2(2)(b) 
561 Ibid., s.2(2)(c ) 
562 Hewitt and Harman v United Kingdom, App No 12175/86 (Commission, 9 
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563 Security Service Act 1989, s.1(1) 
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However, IOCA was only designed to provide a statutory basis for the 
interception of communications carried by public systems. The Government 
reasoned that as communications would at some point traverse the public 
system, it did not need to legislate for private systems connected to it. By not 
considering fully the technologies available at the time, the Government had 
ignored the issue of the point of interception, which itself may lie outside of the 
public system and would therefore be unprotected by IOCA. This was 
evidently shown in the case in R v Effick and Mitchell565 in which the House of 
Lords held that a cordless telephone was not a part of the public 
telecommunications system. In this case, when a cordless telephone was 
used, the police could pick up the conversations by the use of a radio receiver. 
No warrant had been obtained for the surveillance566 and yet, because IOCA 
did not cover private systems, the interception was not prohibited.567 
Unfortunately, this case was not taken to the ECHR. However, the lack of 
coverage of private networks would be tested by the ECHR in Halford v United 
Kingdom568 which is presented next. 
4.2.4 Halford: the issue of private communications systems 
The next important case in the evolution of interception legislation in the UK 
was Halford v United Kingdom. Halford was an Assistant Chief Constable. 
She had applied for promotion, but the Chief Constable had recommended 
against this, allegedly because he objected to her views on equality between 
men and women.569 She commenced proceedings in an industrial tribunal. 
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She had an office with two telephones, one of which was provided for private 
use.570 These telephones were connected to the internal police telephone 
network which was a private system, not a part of the public 
telecommunications system. She had been assured by the Chief Constable 
that she could use her office phone in relation to the ongoing tribunal case. 
She alleged that both her home and office telephone communications had 
been subjected to interception to obtain information to use against her in the 
tribunal,571 and provided evidence of this.572 The Government accepted she 
had established a ‘reasonable likelihood’573 that her office telephone 
communications had been intercepted. 
Halford raised her concerns about this interception at a tribunal hearing. 
However, IOCA s.9 excludes the use of intercept evidence in court or 
tribunals.574 On submission to the Interception of Communications Tribunal, 
she was informed that there had been no breach of IOCA s.2-5,575 which the 
Court took to mean that either an offence had been committed under IOCA 
s.1 or that an intercept warrant had been issued.576 
Although the Government argued that employers should be able to monitor 
calls made by employees on telephones provided by the employer,577 the 
Court determined that Halford had a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’,578 in 
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572 See European Commission on Human Rights, Plenary Commission, App. 
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particular as she had a private office and a telephone for private use. However, 
the fact that IOCA was not written to cover private telecommunications 
systems was critical. This is because there was effectively no law covering the 
interception meaning that Halford’s Art 8 rights had been breached because 
the action was not in accordance with the law.579 Enacted because of the 
ruling in Malone, IOCA’s failing in Halford would lead to new legislation being 
introduced. That new legislation was the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000 (RIPA) but it was not enacted in time to prevent adverse rulings in 
two more cases - Copland and Liberty - heard by the Strasbourg court, both 
of which were actually decided some years after RIPA was in place. These 
two cases are discussed next. 
4.2.5 Copland: the issue of workplace surveillance 
The ruling in the Halford case provided a recognition of privacy in the work 
place with regard to private telephone communications.580 In the case of 
Copland v United Kingdom,581 the ECtHR extended this to cover the 
monitoring of an employee’s e-mails and Internet usage.582 
Copland had had her phone, e-mail and Internet usage monitored by her 
employer, Carmarthenshire College. This included analysis of the telephone 
bills but more significantly, included an analysis of the websites she visited 
along with an investigation into her e-mails583. The Court found that Copland 
had a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’584 because she had not been 
warned that her communications might be monitored. It had further issue with 
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the fact that data about Copland's telephone and Internet usage were 
recorded and stored.585 The Court found that Art 8 had been breached as 
there was no UK law regulating monitoring of employee communications at 
the time.586 This research has, once again, found another supportive evidence 
to indicate the law’s inability to cope with or keep pace with changes and/or 
advances in technology. 
The Copland case was submitted to the ECHR at a time when the UK was 
about to introduce RIPA to regulate surveillance.587 It did, however, indicate 
that Art 8 of the ECHR had expanded to include workplace communications 
and could and would encompass Internet communications. 
4.2.6 Liberty: pre-Snowden mass surveillance 
The case of Liberty and Others v United Kingdom588 shows just how far the 
Government was prepared to go to intercept communications in the 1990s. 
This case surrounds the construction of a tower at Capenhurst in Cheshire 
which was allegedly positioned in such a way as to be able to intercept the 
microwave beam linking to British Telecom radio stations in Clwyd and 
Chester. Telecommunications passing across this link would include much of 
that going to and from Ireland.589  
The legality of mass surveillance had been tested in the Strasbourg court 
previously in Weber and Saravia v Germany590 which built on Klass. In Weber 
the applicants claimed that by carrying out mass surveillance to determine if 
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there was the danger of an armed attack Germany had breached their Art. 8 
rights. The Court found that the methods and reasons by which 
communications were selected out of all of those intercepted were defined in 
legislation as were the procedures for sharing, retaining or destroying such 
communications. It concluded that there were sufficient safeguards against 
arbitrary interference with Art. 8 rights and found that the interference was in 
accordance with law.591 The Court further determined that the actions of the 
German government in mounting mass surveillance coupled with the 
safeguards present in German law were such that Germany was entitled to 
consider the privacy invasions to be necessary in a democratic society for the 
protection of its national security and fight against crime.592 The application 
was declared inadmissible.593  
Applying this Weber test to Liberty the Court found that the government was 
not acting in accordance with the law.594 The Court argued that warrants under 
IOCA s.3(2) could be extremely broad in scope with ‘no limit to the type of 
external communications’595 that could be included. The government 
confirmed that ‘in principle’,596 anyone sending or receiving 
telecommunications outside the UK could have had those intercepted under 
an IOCA s.3(2) warrant. IOCA was further criticised by the Court because the 
methods to be employed to determine which communications, out of all the 
intercepted communications were to be examined,  were not publically 
available.597 The Court found there had been a breach of Art 8. 
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In Weber the Court had by now developed a three part test for when 
determining if an interference was in accordance with the law. First, there must 
be a basis in domestic law; second, the domestic law must be compatible with 
the rule of law and must be accessible to the citizen concerned; and third, the 
affected citizen must be able to foresee the effect that law may have upon 
them. Expanding on the foreseeability of the effect of law in the special case 
of national security the Court added that in such cases, there is not a 
requirement that an individual can foresee when they are likely to be targeted 
and thus adapt to avoid surveillance. However, there must be clearly defined 
rules on interception to ensure that any interference with privacy is not 
arbitrary. The Court noted that this is particularly important given the rate of 
change of technology.598 
The use of technology which led to this case bears a stark resemblance to 
methods allegedly used to tap into Internet connections revealed in the 
Snowden revelations in 2013 as discussed and presented in Chapter 6. 
4.3 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 (RIPA) 
Since the enactment of IOCA, the telecommunications sector had expanded, 
in particular with mobile phones and Internet use becoming more widespread. 
It was noted in a government consultation paper that IOCA had not kept up 
and yet, ‘criminals and terrorists had been quick to exploit’599 these new 
services. The paper also noted the adverse decision in Halford, mentioning 
that private networks must be covered. 
In order to regulate surveillance and ensure it was brought into line with ECHR 
jurisprudence, the Government enacted RIPA which was described during its 
passage as a ‘significant step forward for the protection of human rights’.600 
Indeed, on the face of it, RIPA was legislation aimed at legitimising 
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interception of communications while at the same time protecting human 
rights. However, critics described it as ‘hastily drafted and ill-conceived 
legislation that is merely reactive and not proactive’,601 as it was not so much 
protecting human rights as protecting the large number of authorities ‘from the 
consequences of actions that would otherwise be unlawful’602 under the HRA.  
RIPA addressed a major flaw in IOCA by making it not only an offence to 
unlawfully intercept communications carried by public postal603 or 
telecommunications systems,604 but also those carried by private 
telecommunications systems.605 The research found that not only was this 
important in addressing the failings of IOCA, but it was also particularly 
significant from the Government’s perspective if RIPA were to have any effect 
on the Internet which is operated predominantly by private companies. This is 
because even where Internet traffic passes across a public network and could 
thus be intercepted under IOCA, it is more efficient to intercept at the ISP 
concerned.606 Furthermore, RIPA also allowed interception of all 
communication of a target person and was not bound to a particular telephone 
or address. Additionally, it dealt with the transmission of communications ‘by 
any means’,607 of great importance when considering the many and varied 
methods of Internet communications. 
The government also wanted to be able to use interception earlier than was 
possible under IOCA. Section 2(3) of IOCA required the Secretary of State to 
consider if the information sought could be obtained in other ways before 
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signing a warrant for interception.608 The government was concerned that this 
meant interception was only used in the most serious cases and as a last 
resort.609 
RIPA also required CSPs to ‘take reasonable steps to ensure that their system 
is capable of being intercepted.’610 Although an intercept warrant under IOCA 
would require a CSP to comply, no account was made of that CSPs ability to 
comply. While recognising that smaller CSPs may have difficulty in complying 
technically with a warrant, it decided to force them all to comply anyway. The 
costs to a CSP of providing intercept capabilities would be contributed to from 
government funds.611 As previously discussed in Chapter 3, this requirement 
compares to that set out by CALEA in the US. 
RIPA intercept warrants are issued by a Secretary of State who is required to 
ensure that the warrant is proportionate612 and necessary for national security 
purposes,613 or for the detection or prevention of serious crime,614 or for 
safeguarding the economic wellbeing of the UK.615 However, in addition to 
this, a warrant can be issued for the purposes of assisting, under mutual 
assistance agreements other jurisdictions in the detection or prevention of 
serious crime.616 These warrants are quite broad. They permit, for example 
the interception of communications not identified in the warrant where this is 
                                            
608 IOCA (n 558) s.2(3) 
609 Home Office (n599), 3.2 
610 Ibid., 5.3; RIPA (n 603) s.12 
611 Ibid., s.14 
612 Ibid., s.5(2)(b) 
613 Ibid., s.5(3)(a) 
614 Ibid., s.5(3)(b) 
615 Ibid., s.5(3)(c) 
616 Ibid., s.5(3)(d) 
- 116 - 
necessary in order to carry out the intended authorised interception.617 The 
warrants also provide authorisation to obtain all associated metadata.618 As 
Taylor points out it is possible to use this data to construct a ‘very 
comprehensive dossier on an individual's private life’,619 potentially to a far 
greater extent that access to the content of communications may provide.620 
A RIPA warrant must specify either a single person621 or a single set of 
premises622 as the subject of the interception. However, these restrictions are 
not applicable where the warrant is for the interception of ‘external 
communications’623 in transit in a telecommunication system. This permitted 
GCHQ to run a programme named Tempora, revealed in the Snowden 
revelations, which involved tapping subsea cables to copy off Internet traffic. 
The implications of this all-encompassing interception provision will be 
discussed further and presented in Chapter 6. 
4.3.1 Kennedy v The United Kingdom 
Although RIPA is complex legislation the government published a code of 
practice detailing its operation and made this available via the Web on 1 July 
2002.624 This aided the government in the ruling by the ECtHR in Kennedy v 
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The United Kingdom.625 Kennedy had been convicted of murder but released 
on appeal. He believed that his communications were being intercepted and 
that this had an effect on his business. He further believed the intelligence 
agencies were continually renewing an intercept warrant targeting his 
communications in order to disrupt his business.626 
Having attempted a Subject Access Request under the DPA which was 
denied on the grounds of national security he complained to the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal (IPT) which did not find in his favour. The ECtHR noted that 
this either means there had been no interception or that there had and it was 
lawful.627 On the issue of renewed warrants the Court was satisfied that the 
rules in RIPA regarding the renewal of warrants would have been followed 
and are also subject to the scrutiny of the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner. Finding that RIPA, in conjunction with the Code of Practice is 
sufficiently clear and there being no evidence of shortcomings the Court found 
that there had been no violation of Art.8.628  
Kennedy served both to endorse RIPA as being ECHR-compliant and also to 
confirm that the ECtHR regarded the IPT as an ‘independent and impartial 
body’629 not constrained by the government or security services. The 
independence of any oversight body is an important factor when the ECtHR 
judges potential abuses.630 
When one considers RIPA’s US counterpart, FISA differs significantly in the 
terms of privacy protection. FISA treats US people differently from the rest of 
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the world and is more protective of them, whereas RIPA, in particular when 
one considers s.8(4) is extremely broad and all-encompassing. RIPA also 
contained provisions to grant access to communications data.631 This is 
discussed next. 
4.4 Increased surveillance after 9/11 
As with the US, 9/11 caused a step-change in the intensification of Internet 
surveillance and the associated invasion of privacy. One day after the events 
of 9/11, legislation in the form of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001 (ATCSA) was presented to Parliament. Part 11 of the Act deals with the 
retention of metadata. Section 102 of the Act stated that the Secretary of State 
would introduce a code of practice relating to data retention, after a strict 
process where the code is published632 and passed by Parliament633 after 
consultation with both the Information Commissioner634 and with CSPs that 
would be affected by it.635 Section 104 gave the Home Secretary the power to 
require CSPs to retain metadata for periods which would be specified in 
secondary legislation. However, this research found that the UK was not alone 
in the desire to retain metadata. 
In its conclusions of 20 September 2001, the Justice and Home Affairs Council 
of the EU requested that the European Commission proposed ways to ensure 
that law enforcement agencies could ‘investigate criminal acts involving the 
use of electronic communications systems’.636 The Council indicated that it 
would find a balance between the need to protect personal information and 
                                            
631 RIPA (n 603) Part 1 Chapter 2 
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633 Ibid., s.103(4) 
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the needs of law enforcement to access such information.637 Although this 
was a high level statement not relating to any particular techniques, the 
Council’s statement raised concerns with the European Data Protection 
Commissioners who released a statement via the Article 29 Working Party 
that data retention would be an ‘improper invasion of the fundamental rights’638 
that people enjoy under Art. 8 of the ECHR, with retention for any period longer 
than the limited time permitted under Art 15(1) of the Directive on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications639 being ‘disproportionate and therefore 
unacceptable’.640 
Although the Council’s 2001 statement did not explicitly mention metadata, 
this was addressed in 2002. In its conclusions of 19 December 2002, the 
Council urged that all parties engage in dialogue both at national and EU level 
to find solutions to the ‘issue of traffic data retention’641 to enable it to be used 
for the ‘prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal 
offences’642 while protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. 
Of note, this statement was dealing specifically with organised crime, not 
terrorism. 
4.4.1 The UK voluntary code of practice 
In the UK, the data retention powers under ATCSA were never brought into 
force. The Act included a sunset clause which would cause the code of 
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practice to expire unless renewed. This was set initially for two years from the 
passing of the Act.643 It was extended twice, in 2003644 and 2005,645 but after 
this, it allowed it to lapse.646 By this time, European legislation was being 
discussed. Instead, it introduced a voluntary code of practice in 2003,647 under 
which retained data must be made available on request from relevant 
authorities as set out in Chapter II Part I of RIPA meaning it would be available 
to ‘any public authority’.648 The Joint Committee on Human Rights questioned 
the legitimacy of the data retention regime, given that data would be available 
to agencies other than those tasked with national security.649 As stated by 
Walker and Akdeniz, while the retention of data for national security purposes 
may be acceptable, it ‘does not necessarily mean that blanket retention is 
justified’.650 
4.4.2 The effects of the Madrid and London bombings 
Terrorist attacks resulted in renewed attempts to create laws regarding 
metadata retention. In its Declaration on Combating Terrorism in the wake of 
the terrorist attack in Madrid of 11 March 2004, the European Council stated 
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that it would examine proposals for the establishment of rules on the retention 
of metadata by providers, with a view to these being adopted by June 2005.651 
A proposal by France, Ireland, Sweden and the UK on 28 April 2004 stressed 
the need to retain metadata,652 making  it clear that identifying which data was 
required may not be possible perhaps for years after the communication was 
made.653 The proposal also relied on the permission to retain data as set out 
in Art 15 of the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications.654 While 
the proposal specified the retention of data ‘for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection and prosecution of crime and criminal offences’655 it 
included terrorism in the definition of criminal offences.656 The proposal was 
initially rejected by the European Parliament, but the London bombings of 7 
July 2005 put them back on the European Council’s agenda, the presidency 
of which had just passed to the UK.657 It was followed shortly after by the 
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European Commission’s own proposal,658 which itself was followed by a highly 
critical Opinion from the Art 29 WP,659 which stated that data retention would 
interfere with the ‘inviolable, fundamental right to confidential 
communications.’660 This would become the Data Retention Directive and is 
covered next. 
4.4.3 The Data Retention Directive 
The Data Retention Directive661 (DRD) was adopted on 15 March 2006. The 
Directive set out the types of data which must be retained. Regarding the 
Internet, the data to be retained includes the connection date and time, userid 
and IP address,662 and the calling telephone number663 or digital subscriber 
line664 of the source of the communication. For VoIP calls, the userids used, 
the telephone number and name and address for both subscriber665 and 
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recipient666 must be retained. For mobile calls, cell location at the start667, and 
all cell locations during the communication668 must be retained. It can thus be 
seen that each Internet user will leave at the very least data showing their IP 
address and the date and time they connected while mobile users would leave 
a great deal more. The Directive was incorporated into UK law in two stages. 
The Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2007 entered force on 1 
October 2007 and implemented retention of communications data from 
telephony. This was superseded by the Data Retention (EC Directive) 
Regulations 2009 which included Internet data, entering into force on 6 April 
2009. 
It is found by this research that data retention as defined by the Directive has 
some fundamental flaws. Its aim to harmonise the provisions across the 
community falls short because of the flexibility in retention times. For example, 
where law enforcement is interested in who communicated with a given 
person after 12 months, data relating to calls from a State with a retention 
period of less than 12 months would have been deleted. The communications 
methods are also too specific, covering fixed and mobile and Voice over IP 
(VoIP) but no other forms of synchronous communication such as Instant 
Messengers.669 It is somewhat surprising that this popular communications 
mechanism was overlooked. In fact, as echoed by Walker, the research found 
that even as the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 were 
implemented, the Government were already aware that they were 
inadequate.670 In a consultation launched in 2009, the Government stressed 
that changes in the communications industry could undermine the 
effectiveness of metadata gathered under the current legislation. In sum, this 
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research evidently demonstrated that the Government wanted access to a lot 
more and as a result the Intercept Modernisation Programme (IMP) was 
launched. 
4.4.4 Interception Modernisation Programme 
In 2008, the then Labour Government announced plans to create a centralised 
database to store all communications metadata for a 12-month period. 
Sensationalised in the Press as ‘Orwellian’,671 the Information Commissioner 
described this as ‘a step too far for the British way of life’.672 The proposal was 
later dropped. The Government next attempted a public consultation on the 
issue in which three options were put forward, namely to do nothing, amass a 
huge central database of metadata which was rejected,673 or require CSPs to 
retain, in addition to data already retained, data relating to third-party traffic 
passing across their networks which does not come under the Data Retention 
Directive.674 The third option was the proposal that was put forward. 
The Government proposed not only to require CSPs to retain third-party data, 
but also to process this third-party data, linking it where possible to their own 
data. This may be feasible, for example, where the various data comes from 
the same person or device.675 This would represent a step change, seeing 
CSPs creating and then storing new data by combining their own data with 
that provided by others.676 CSPs would need a mechanism to determine what 
of the data passing through their networks was, in fact, metadata. To do this, 
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CSPs would need to read and then analyse all data using a technique called 
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI).677 The LSE points out that DPI constitutes an 
interception under RIPA s.1 and thus, is illegal without a warrant.678 Therefore, 
the Government would need to introduce new legislation to cater for this. 
However, the Labour Government shelved the programme and left power after 
the 2010 general elections. 
Clearly, the incoming Coalition Government were not about to abandon their 
desire for more metadata. While the Coalition gave some hope by stating they 
would ‘end the storage of internet and email records without good reason’,679 
this statement gave no illusion that the Government could not find a ‘good 
reason’ to continue to store such data. The finding was backed up by an action 
in the draft structural reform plan relating to the protection of people’s 
freedoms which included the requirement to publish proposals for the ‘storage 
of internet and e-mail records, including introducing legislation if necessary’.680 
IMP was revived under the name Communications Capabilities Development 
Programme (CCDP). Proposed legislation surfaced in the form of the Draft 
Communications Data Bill in June 2012. It maintained the IMP’s concept of 
processing of third-party data in the form of filtering. 
Processing third-party data, no matter in what name is extremely invasive as 
found in this research. Assembling data from all sources would potentially 
create a profile of every user. This has major privacy implications such as a 
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dramatic shift of the balance away from privacy in favour of the State’s ability 
to know what everyone is doing online.681 
The Bill made no attempt to analyse the changes which would be required to 
technology. Networks are built in a way which allows traffic to bypass failures 
or bottlenecks caused by overloading. If networks are redesigned to ensure 
that all data, including third party data can be captured and analysed, then this 
resilience is negated. Evidently, this research illustrates that having all data 
pass a single point creates a single point of failure and a possible 
bottleneck.682 Furthermore, having the knowledge that all traffic is being 
analysed in the way proposed may well speed up the adoption of encryption 
as the norm rather than the choice. This could put third party traffic beyond 
the reach of retention plans.683 
4.4.5 Challenges to Data retention & bulk interception 
The implementation of the Data Retention Directive was not smooth. On 6 
July 2006, Ireland, with the support of Slovakia, brought an action in the CJEU 
requesting the annulment of the Directive.684 Their grounds were that the 
adoption of the Directive was not on an appropriate legal basis. Ireland argued 
that the Directive had been based on Art. 95 EC and therefore, must be aimed 
at improving the internal market by the harmonisation of national laws. Ireland 
contended that the Directive’s aim was law enforcement and should have 
been based on Title VI of the EU Treaty. However, the Council and the 
Commission argued that the disparity of retention schemes across the 
community meant that the Directive was protecting and unifying the internal 
market. Therefore, the basis was correct. The Court dismissed the action. 
However, the Court noted that it was dealing solely with the legal basis and 
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not ‘any possible infringement of fundamental rights’685 caused by actions 
taken under the DRD. 
There were other legal challenges in a number of EU States which resulted in 
delays or redrafting of national laws.686 However, in 2010, not only did 
Germany find the transposed laws to be unconstitutional but it also annulled 
the Directive. As a result, the European Commission commenced legal action 
against Germany in 2012.687 However, action brought before the High Court 
of Ireland by Digital Rights Ltd on 11 August 2006 resulted in that Court 
referring the question of validity of the DRD to the CJEU.688 This action was 
joined by a request from the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof. Additionally, a 
request for judicial review of the 2009 Data Retention Directive was brought 
in 2011 by Tracey Cosgrove,689 but was stayed pending the outcome of CJEU 
judgment. That judgment came on 8 April, 2014 in the joined cases C-293/12 
and C-594/12. 
The Court noted that metadata can provide very accurate information about 
people, their habits, where they live, where they go and who they meet.690 It 
further noted that that the retention and use of data without even informing the 
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people concerned may lead to people considering that they are under 
constant surveillance.691 
In determining the necessity of data retention, the Court stated that data 
retention did not ‘adversely affect the essence’692 of the rights granted by Art.7 
of the Charter because content of communications was not retained. In 
addition, the Court recognised the need for States to fight crime and protect 
their citizens.693 However, when verifying the proportionality of the 
interference to privacy created by data retention, the Court found that the EU 
legislature had a reduced level of discretion694 and although data retention is 
an appropriate mechanism to aid in the fight against serious crime,695 the 
mechanisms set out in the DRD may not, by themselves be a necessary 
measure.696 On the issue of necessity, the Court also noted that the DRD 
interfered with the ‘fundamental rights of practically the entire European 
population’697 regardless of whether there is evidence that individuals are 
linked, even remotely to serious crime. The Court found major weakness in 
the limits to how retained data could be used and by whom, it being left to 
member States to determine the nature of serious crime and to set procedures 
for data access.698 Moreover, the Court found that there was no judicial or 
independent review to limit the access to and use of data to what is strictly 
necessary for the fight against serious crime.699 Furthermore, the Court was 
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critical that the DRD did not require that retained data remain in the EU, 
potentially leading to breaches of data protection legislation.700 
Although it accepted that the reasons for retaining metadata were genuinely 
to aid the fight against serious crime, the Court stated that the EU legislature 
had ‘exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of 
proportionality.’701 The Court found the DRD to be invalid. This was the first 
time an entire legal instrument had been declared invalid for breaching 
fundamental rights in the EU.702 
This research has shown that the effect of the Court’s declaration indicated, 
once again, just how far the UK government would go in its quest for such 
data. The Open Rights Group reported that a Swedish ISP deleted all its 
retained data, the Government of Finland announced a review indicating that 
it wishes to uphold the law, whereas the UK government introduced 
emergency legislation to permit it to continue to retain data.703 This legislation 
was enacted as the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, 2014 
(DRIPA) which progressed from Bill to Royal Assent in just three days.704 
However, DRIPA went further than simply permitting the continuation of data 
retention in the wake of the striking down of the Data Retention Directive. It 
expanded to the definition of telecommunication service in RIPA by adding the 
case where such a service included facilities to create, manage, store or 
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transmit a communication.705 This makes it clear that services such as 
webmail are to be included. 
The Government also included modifications to RIPA s.11 to enable warrants 
for interception to be served on people outside the UK which ‘may relate to 
conduct’706 outside the UK. Similarly, RIPA s.12 was modified to enable the 
UK to order extra-territorial companies to maintain the technical ability to 
assist with interception,707 and to retain and disclose metadata.708 As 
illustrated in this research, this effectively expanded the UK’s intercept and 
data retention abilities globally.709 
Section 21 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA) modified 
DRIPA s.2(1) to specifically add the requirement to retain IP addresses.710 
DRIPA had a sunset clause revoking all sections on 31 December 2016.711 
Potentially, the only positive inclusion in DRIPA was the requirement to 
appoint an independent person who would review terrorism legislation and the 
operation of investigatory powers.712 
Although clearly a stop-gap with a short sunset clause, DRIPA had a much 
shorter life than anticipated by the Government. On 17 July 2015, DRIPA s.1 
was found to be inconsistent with EU law and was ordered to be disapplied. 
The Court found that DRIPA did not set clear rules for access and use of 
metadata, in particular there was no precise definition of what serious offences 
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were in its scope.713 The Court was also critical of the fact that metadata could 
be made available without prior review by a court or independent body which 
could place limits on how the data may be used.714 
The Government had requested that the Court referred the case to the 
CJEU.715 While declining, the Court noted that the sunset clause of DRIPA 
would make it unlikely to get a response from the CJEU in time.716 The 
claimants had stated they did not wish DRIPA to fall without a suitable 
remedy.717 The Court granted this by suspending the disapplication of DRIPA 
s.1 until 31 March 2016.718 The Government appealed, but the Court of 
Appeals concluded that it had to refer the matter to the CJEU.719 The outcome 
is further examined and presented in Chapter 7. Meanwhile, legislation to 
allow metadata retention to continue would come in the form of the 
Investigatory Powers Act and hence, this is discussed next. 
4.5 The Investigatory Powers Act 
Out of all the sometime complex legislation in force in the UK governing 
surveillance, when introducing the Investigatory Powers Bill to Parliament, the 
Home Secretary revealed that bulk metadata collection had been carried out 
under the direction of secretaries of state via Section 94 of the 
Telecommunications Act 1984 which simply permitted the government to 
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require providers to essentially do whatever they were asked.720 This research 
found that the action was effectively undertaken in secret with only a few 
senior cabinet ministers being aware.721 
With so much press involvement after Snowden and with the striking down of 
DRIPA, the Government had to take action to ensure it could continue to 
monitor Internet communications. There were three major reviews published 
in 2015. The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of Parliament 
published a redacted version of its report in March 2015. In June 2015, the 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation issued his report of the 
investigatory powers review (IPR). The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 
published its independent surveillance review (ISR) in July 2015. The ISC and 
ISR reports were both as a result of the Snowden revelations, whereas the 
ISR report was undertaken as required by DRIPA s.7. 
Paying attention to the findings of all three reports, the UK Government 
published the draft Investigatory Powers Bill in November 2015. This Bill 
aimed to create one consolidated Act, incorporating bulk interception and 
acquisition of metadata both within the UK and overseas722 while only seeking 
enhanced powers over metadata retention via the requirement to create and 
retain Internet Connection Records (ICRs)723 which would be retained for 12 
months.724 However, despite this reassurance, the House of Commons 
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Science and Technology Committee found that the actual nature of ICRs were 
not made clear.725 
The Investigatory Powers Act became law on 29 November 2016 and it 
repealed ATCSA Part 11 and CTSA s.21, both dealing with data retention, 
and all of DRIPA. It also repealed Part 1 of RIPA, and s.94 of the 
Telecommunications Act 1984. The various provision of these acts and 
sections were incorporated into the Act. On a positive note, the Act purports 
to set out how privacy may be invaded and protected. In this, it recognises 
that investigatory powers are privacy invasive.726 There are improvements in 
oversight in the dual lock that requires a Judicial Commissioner to check any 
warrants.  However, there is one wholly new provision in the Act which is 
examined next. 
4.5.1 Communications data and Internet Connection Records 
Section 87 defined relevant communications data as that data which may 
identify or assist in the identification of any of the following five categories: 
1. ‘the sender or recipient of a communication (whether or not a 
person)’727 
2. ‘the time or duration of a communication’728 
3. ‘the type, method or pattern, or fact, of communication’729 
4. ‘the telecommunication system (or any part of it) from, to or through 
which, or by means of which, a communication is or may be 
transmitted’730 
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5. ‘the location of any such system’731 
The section notes that this specifically includes ICRs. By specifying any part 
of a telecommunication system and including non-persons in the definition of 
sender or recipient, it means that no part of the Internet is safe. 
An ICR is defined as metadata which has two characteristics. First, it is data 
which ‘may be used to identify, or assist in identifying, a telecommunications 
service to which a communication is transmitted by means of a 
telecommunication system for the purpose of obtaining access to, or running, 
a computer file or computer program’.732 Second, it is data ‘generated or 
processed by a telecommunications operator in the process of supplying the 
telecommunications service to the sender of the communication (whether or 
not a person)’.733 
The definitions of telecommunications system and telecommunications 
service are the same as in RIPA s.2. However, the access and use clause of 
the latter is specifically defined as including the ability to create, manage or 
store a communication which has been or may be transmitted.734 This would 
cover webmail systems. 
Communications as related to the Internet are defined as data of any form and 
the signals that carry a communication between entities,735 whereas an entity 
being defined as a ‘person or thing’.736 As written, this would appear to be all 
encompassing including communications between Internet devices, routers, 
for instance, and IoT devices. Communications data is split into entity data 
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and events data. Events data refers to the timing of a communication,737 while 
entity data is data about an entity or its association with a telecommunications 
service or system and can identify or describe the entity, potentially including 
its location.738 
Communications data is defined as consisting of: 
 data about an entity that a service has been provided to and relates to 
the provision of that service;739 
 data which is necessary to enable a communication to take place;740 
 data relating to the use of a telecommunication system or service;741 
 data about the architecture of the system which is not about a specific 
person.742 
Some potential examples were listed in the Communications Data Draft Code 
of Practice issued in August 2016.743 It is expected that this data will be held 
by a telecommunications operator directly or held on their behalf, or that the 
capability to hold this data exists or could exist.744 In the case of data 
necessary to enable a communication, this may also be available directly from 
the telecommunication system.745 
                                            
737 Ibid., s.261(4) 
738 Ibid., s.261(3) 
739 Ibid., s.261(5)(a)(i) 
740 Ibid., s.261(5)(a)(ii) 
741 Ibid., s.261(5)(a)(iii) 
742 Ibid., s.261(5)(c) 
743 Home Office, Communications Data Draft Code of Practice, August, 2016 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
ata/file/557862/IP_Bill_-_Draft_CD_code_of_practice.pdf> accessed 14 
December 2016 
744 Investigatory Powers Act (n 726) s.261(5)(a) 
745 Ibid., s.261(5)(b) 
- 136 - 
The creation and retention of ICRs have the potential to create a vast amount 
of data. Desktop PCs and mobile devices continually make connections to 
services. CG-NAT, Web accelerators and browser pre-fetching all further 
complicate the issue. Because of this, the ICRs become a record of what the 
device was doing, not what the user was doing. Recording information in this 
way not only records which servers a device connects to, but also it could be 
used to indicate what apps are installed on that device, further invading the 
owner’s privacy. Even if ICRs prove feasible, there are major issues. Use of 
publically-available Wi-Fi, for example, in a hotel or surgery where no initial 
sign-up is required will mean there is no data as to who a user may be. 
Someone routing through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) in a foreign 
jurisdiction will place their onward connections out of the reach of the Act.746 
Had the Act simply specified that an ISP must be able to determine who 
accessed what server or service and when, then the ISP can then work out 
the best mechanism to do so and adjust that method as technologies 
change.747 
Towards the end of 2016, the Investigatory Powers Act became the latest in 
a series of legislation whose primary aim is to enable surveillance. On one 
hand, the Act has had a great deal of scrutiny and this has been carried out 
with the full inclusion of CSPs and other providers. Scrutiny will continue via 
the Investigatory Powers Commission. On the other hand, by introducing 
ICRs, it reveals just how far the government wants to go in order to legitimise 
existing and enable new ways to invade Internet privacy. 
                                            
746 House of Lords, House of Commons, Joint Committee on the Draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill report, HL Paper 93, HC 651, 3/2/16, at 132-
133 
747 House of Lords, House of Commons, Joint Committee on the Draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill: Written Evidence, Richard Clayton written 
evidence (IPB0032) 
- 137 - 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated how the UK has had to implement laws due to 
unfavourable court decisions of the ECtHR which found that the UKs 
surveillance was not lawfully defined. It can be seen that the Government has 
not readily legislated on or provided proper control of such surveillance until 
there was no other option but to introduce legislation. As illustrated in this 
chapter, the Malone case, and then other ECtHR cases have had a very 
significant effect on surveillance laws in the UK. The UK has laws dealing with 
data protection, but these give no real protection from the State. It has laws 
regulating surveillance, but these have developed in order to protect the 
Government in an international context rather than as a benefit to the people. 
The result as shown in this research is that current online privacy comes from 
a ‘hodgepodge of laws and the side-effect of complex regulations’748 and yet, 
in other complex areas, the existing laws have been codified into simple acts 
such as the Theft Act and Fraud Act. 
Like the US, the UK has faced a cycle of legislative changes followed by 
changes in technology outdating those laws. However, unlike the US which 
has scaled back some of its most intrusive surveillance programmes the UK 
has now implemented what has been described by Snowden as ‘the most 
extreme surveillance in the history of western democracy [going] farther 
than many autocracies’.749 When comparing the US and the UK, the UK 
must take the lead in the eradication of Internet privacy. While the previous 
chapter concluded that Internet privacy is not yet lost in the US it is much 
closer to death in the UK due to the introduction of the Investigatory Powers 
Act and ICRs. While these are new and it is as yet uncertain exactly how 
they will be implemented the ability to record and store for future use the 
                                            
748 All Party Parliamentary Communications Group (n 313) 149 to 151 
749 Edward Snowden (Twitter, 17 November 2016) 
<https://twitter.com/i/web/status/799371508808302596> accessed 25 
January 2017 
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browsing habits of the entire population can only be seen as the loss of 
Internet privacy in the UK. 
After reviewing the extent to which Internet privacy is affected by 
communications surveillance legislation and practices within the US and the 
UK, the focus is now turned to China. This is because China has been viewed 
by the West as an autocratic institution which attempts to control its population 
using various means including a country-wide firewall and Internet monitoring 
system. Many people will think that Internet privacy is non-existent in China. 
So, the question is how different, or indeed if, the US and the UK really are 
from the situation as we see it in China. This becomes the focus of the 
discussion in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: China, its Internet and its surveillance 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters provide a detailed, in-depth analysis of the level 
and status of Internet privacy in the contexts of the US and the UK. One of the 
significant research findings is that communications surveillance has been 
highlighted as a precursor to invasion of Internet privacy. Additionally, the 
situation in the US and the UK was shown to be biased against Internet 
privacy, heavily so in the case of the UK since the passage of the Investigatory 
Powers Act at the end of 2016. 
However, in China, the telecommunications infrastructure did not begin to 
develop in earnest until after 1980. Prior to this time, telecommunications were 
viewed mainly as a state or military system and used for bureaucratic 
purposes. By 1980, the penetration of telephones was only 0.43%.750 China’s 
criminal law as amended in 1997 still did not consider telecommunications, 
referring only to the unlawful opening of letters as invasive of a person’s right 
to freedom of correspondence.751 Thus, there was no law criminalising the 
interception of communications or, indeed, mentioning the subject in any way. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether Internet privacy exists, or 
indeed can exist in China, in particular given its tight level of control over its 
national Internet and the flow of information to and from the rest of the global 
Internet. 
                                            
750 Zhenzhi Gou and Mei Wu, ‘Dancing thumbs: Mobile telephony in 
contemporary China’, in Xiaoling Zhang and Yongnian Zheng, (Eds.) 
China’s Information and Communications Technology Revolution: Social 
changes and state responses (Routledge, Abingdon 2009) p39 
751 Criminal Law (n 225) Art. 252 
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5.2 Regulation of the Internet in China 
China acted quickly to introduce legislation that required that all computer 
systems which had international access were to be registered.752 It 
promulgated interim provisions in February 1996753 which stated the 
requirement that any network in China that was to have an international 
connection would use such a connection provided by the MPT;754 otherwise, 
it was not permitted to establish an international connection.755 Networks 
would be connected via an interconnection network756 of which four were 
defined as being run by the MPT, the Ministry of Electricity Industry (MEI), the 
State Commission of Education and China Science Academy.757 They also 
required that users must be registered,758 and stated that international 
networks must not be used for illegal activities or those which would damage 
social order or national security. Access to pornography was also banned.759 
The interim provisions were followed two months later in April 1996 by another 
set of regulations dealing specifically with the public network - Chinanet. 
                                            
752 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China for Safety Protection of 
Computer Information Systems, promulgated by Decree No. 147 of the 
State Council of the People’s Republic of China and effective as of 
February 18,1994, Art.11 
753 Interim Provisions Governing the Management of the Computer 
Information Networks in the People’s Republic of China Connecting to 
the International Network, adopted at the 42nd Executive Meeting of the 
State Council on January 23, 1996, promulgated by Decree No. 195 of 
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China on February 1, 1996 
754 Ibid., Art.6 
755 Ibid., Art.6 
756 Ibid., Art.8 
757 Ibid., Art.7 
758 Ibid., Art.10 
759 Ibid., Art.13 
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These regulations included the need to cooperate with State monitoring.760 
Moreover, the regulations imposed the duty to report infringements761 as well 
as the duty to not infringe other people’s legal rights.762 By now, China had a 
functional Internet with international connections and was finding ways to at 
least discover what the networks were being used for. 
The requirement to gain a licence to connect to international networks was 
added in 1997 when the 1996 interim provisions were updated.763 Evidently, 
this was a purposeful move by China as licences can be revoked, which would 
result in the relevant provider being effectively cut off from the global Internet. 
5.2.1 Laws and regulations governing the Internet 
China's development of the Internet combines both expansion and 
management. It aims to constantly develop methods to manage the Internet 
‘in accordance with the law’764 to protect ‘social stability and state security.’765 
Nevertheless, China's approach tends to be to implement laws and 
                                            
760 Measures on the Regulation of Public Computer Networks and the 
Internet, promulgated by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 
on April 9, 1996, Art. 12 
761 Ibid., Art. 10 
762 Ibid., Art. 11 
763 Interim Provisions Governing the Management of the Computer 
Information Networks in the People’s Republic of China Connecting to 
the International Network, promulgated by Decree No. 195 of the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China on February 1, 1996, and 
revised in accordance with the Decision of the State Council Regarding 
the Revision of the Interim Provisions Governing the Management of the 
Computer Information Networks in the People’s Republic of China 
Connecting to the International Network, promulgated on May 20, 1997, 
Art. 8 
764 Wang Chen, Concerning the development and administration of our 
country's Internet, (HRIC tr.) I (3) 
<http://www.hrichina.org/crf/article/3242> accessed 4 October 2011. 
Note this is a translation of the speech as published on 4 May 2010 
which was later heavily edited and replaced the next day. p24 
765 Ibid. 
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regulations which are both complex and, sometimes, overlapping, making it 
increasingly hard to understand right from wrong.766 The many government 
entities which have an interest in the Internet resulted in numerous laws being 
drafted. These laws are in some cases never enforced, or worse are in conflict 
with one another. However, they do provide the maximum level of control.767 
In 1997, China promulgated the Computer Information Network and Internet 
Security, Protection and Management Regulations.768 Art. 3 of these 
Regulations charged the Computer Management and Supervision Bureau 
(CMSB) of the Ministry of Public Security (MSP) with maintaining the physical 
and online security of China’s computer networks. Art. 4 of the Regulations 
prohibits the use the Internet to disclose state secrets or harm national 
security, or to harm the interests of China, its society, groups or individuals. 
Criminal activity on the Internet is also prohibited.769 
Art. 5 defines several prohibited categories of information and it is not 
permitted to create, copy, transmit or even to retrieve information which falls 
into any of the following categories: 
(1) Inciting to resist or breaking the Constitution or laws or the 
implementation of administrative regulations; 
(2) Inciting to overthrow the government or the socialist system; 
(3) Inciting division of the country, harming national unification; 
(4) Inciting hatred or discrimination among nationalities or harming the 
unity of the nationalities; 
                                            
766 Cullen and Choy (n 298) 132 
767 Nina Hachigian, ‘China’s Cyber–Strategy’, 80 Foreign Aff. 118 2001, 
p123 
768 Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and 
Management Regulations, approved by the State Council on December 
11, 1997 and promulgated by the Ministry of Public Security on 
December 30, 1997, Art. 3 
769 Ibid., Art. 4 
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(5) Making falsehoods or distorting the truth, spreading rumours, 
destroying the order of society; 
(6) Promoting feudal superstitions, sexually suggestive material, 
gambling, violence, murder; 
(7) Terrorism or inciting others to criminal activity; openly insulting other 
people or distorting the truth to slander people; 
(8) Injuring the reputation of state organs; 
(9) Other activities against the Constitution, laws or administrative 
regulations.770 
Furthermore, Art. 6 covers harm to China’s Internet itself, for example by 
introducing computer viruses or deleting or altering information in transit.771 
Finally, Art. 7, which is the most important of all, states that the freedom and 
privacy of Internet users is legally protected.772 
Regulation of ISPs was equally strict. For instance, Art. 8 states that ISPs 
must assist the Public Security Bureau (PSB) by discovering and handling 
violations.773 If a violation of Arts. 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the Regulations is discovered, 
the information concerned must be preserved in an unaltered form and 
reported to the local PSB,774 and more specifically for breaches of Art. 5, the 
relevant server is to be removed from the network.775 Because of the fines and 
potential criminal prosecution for failures to comply with the duties set out by 
the Regulations,776 ISPs implemented policies for self-censorship and 
                                            
770 Ibid., Art. 5 
771 Ibid., Art. 6 
772 Ibid., Art. 7 
773 Ibid., Art. 8 
774 Ibid., Art. 10(6) 
775 Ibid., Art. 10(7) 
776 Ibid., Art. 20-23 
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employed staff to supervise potentially large groups of volunteers who policed 
and cleaned bulletin boards and chatrooms.777 
Overarching Internet rules were implemented in 2000 by a Decision of the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee. China’s Internet 
laws are generally based on general laws; however, the Decision made it clear 
that while violations of people’s rights would result in civil liability,778 where an 
action was a crime, it would be prosecuted under the relevant provision in the 
criminal code.779 Furthermore, actions in violation of public order which are 
not specifically crimes would result in penalties levied by public security 
organs or administrative departments.780 
The Decision set out specific violations regarding the use of the Internet. Of 
these, several are relevant to this research such as the spreading of rumours, 
slander, subversion and harm to the socialist system or the undermining of 
national unity; theft and publication of state, intelligence or military secrets; 
ethnic hatred; and the setting up of or communication with evil cults are all 
violations presenting a danger to national security and social stability.781 
Detecting such violations requires surveillance and monitoring to the detriment 
of Internet privacy. 
The publication of or provision of access to pornography is also a violation,782 
as is the use of the Internet to insult or slander others,783 or to commit ‘theft, 
                                            
777 International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 
Review of China’s Internet Regulations and Domestic Legislation 
778 Ninth National People’s Congress Standing Committee: Decision of the 
National People’s Congress Standing Committee on Safeguarding 
Internet Security 1-5  
779 Ibid., (unnumbered) 
780 Ibid., 6 
781 Ibid., 2 
782 Ibid., 3(5) 
783 Ibid., 4(1) 
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fraud or extortion’.784 Additionally, modification or deletion of another person’s 
e-mail or other data, and intrusion into a person’s ‘civil freedoms and 
confidentiality of correspondence’785 are violations. This last point suggests 
there may be some protection of Internet privacy at a personal level, but not 
against the State. 
The wording of the Decision is designed to be future-proof. Where an action 
does not fall into one of the categories outlined above but does constitute a 
crime, then it too will be dealt with under the relevant criminal code.786 The 
requirements set out in the Decision would filter down into all subsequent 
Internet-related laws and regulations. 
Regulation of pornography was particularly strict, criminalising not only the 
production of such material but also the act of knowingly linking to it.787 The 
policing of pornography is a burden placed on all citizens, a person was also 
guilty of a crime if they were aware that others were dealing with obscene 
material but failed to report it.788 
As found in this research, there is some protection for people’s rights on the 
Internet in China. Regulations promulgated in 1997 made it an offence to use 
the Internet to violate the privacy and freedom of users.789 In addition, 
                                            
784 Ibid., 4(3) 
785 Ibid., 4(2) 
786 Ibid., 5 
787 Explanations of a Number of Issues in the Specific Application of the Law 
on Handling Criminal Cases of Using the Internet, Mobile 
Communications Terminals, and Voice Sets for the Production, 
Reproduction, Publication, Sale, and Dissemination of Obscene 
Electronic Information, 6th September, 2004, Art. 4 
788 Ibid., Art. 7 
789 Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and 
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publishing ‘contents that … infringe upon other people's legitimate rights’790 
on a bulletin board system is an offence. It is similarly an offence for Internet 
information service providers,791 Internet news and information services792 
and providers of Internet cultural products.793  
Furthermore, e-mail messages get specific confidentiality protection, 
exceptions being for national security or tracing crime.794 E-mail providers are 
also required to keep users’ registration and e-mail addresses confidential.795 
China’s desire to control information is further illustrated by regulations applied 
to Internet news services in 2005. The regulations stipulate that services 
publishing political or current affairs news to the public must not alter the 
original official news material. Furthermore, services set up in order to 
republish existing material are not permitted to create their own material.796 
George W. Bush, then governor of Texas said: ‘Imagine if the Internet took 
hold in China. Imagine how freedom would spread.’797 However, freedom as 
                                            
790 Ministry of Information Industry, Regulations on the Management of 
Internet Electronic Bulletin Services, Art. 9(8) 
791 State Council, Measures for the Management of Internet Information 
Services, Art. 15(8) 
792 Ministry of Information Industry, Regulations on the Management of 
Internet News and Information Services, Art. 19(8) 
793 Ministry of Culture, Interim Regulations on the Management of Internet 
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796 Regulations on the Management of Internet News and Information 
Services, Art. 16 
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a Western construct did not spread as a result. This research found that China 
has managed to create an Internet infrastructure which permits a great deal 
of control. It’s Internet laws set out clearly that, while there may be some 
protection of privacy at an interpersonal level, there is little protection from the 
State. Additionally, providers are given the responsibility of policing the 
Internet and reporting violations. In order to do so they form an army of 
censors and monitors keeping watch over what citizens are doing on the 
Internet. Last but not least, the Internet structure China created allowed it to 
build a country-wide firewall and filtering system which sits between China and 
the rest of the global Internet. This is discussed in the next section. 
5.3 Controlling the Internet: Golden shield 
China’s Golden Shield is one of a series of ‘Golden’ projects which were 
China’s ‘telecommunication and information infrastructure initiatives’798 of the 
1990s. They consisted of projects to build the network infrastructure, 
implement e-Commerce and provide information to China’s leaders.799 
Golden Shield is a public security and surveillance system which 
encompasses a full range of monitoring technologies from telephone to 
Internet.800 In part, it aims to stop Internet crime, guarantee the security of the 
public Internet and combat groups such as Falun Gong.801 
The name Golden Shield has become synonymous with the Great Firewall of 
China; the Firewall is only one component of the whole Shield, yet it still has 
great significance on influencing Internet privacy in China. 
                                            
798 Walton (n 300) 17 
799 Ibid., box 2 at p17 
800 Ibid., 17 
801 Cisco Public Security Sector slides p57 – the slide notes that this 
information was from a statement of government goals from a speech by 
Li Runsen. 
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5.3.1 Technical censorship 
In a speech in 2000 former US President Bill Clinton questioned how much 
the Internet could change China. He commented that although China was 
attempting to control the Internet it was ‘sort of like trying to nail Jello to the 
wall’.802 Despite this, China has, in fact, done just that. China ‘devoted 
extensive resources’803 to build what became ‘one of the largest and most 
sophisticated’804 Internet content filtering and blocking systems in the world. It 
has become known as the Great Firewall of China. 
Because of the way its Internet has been constructed, it is relatively easy for 
China to impose this total control.  The system allows China to ‘physically 
monitor all traffic into or out of the country’805 and also to forward its own 
cause.806 
The system works in two ways: it uses an IP address block list and also a list 
of forbidden keywords. The former is the simplest way because the system 
can simply drop connections where the destination IP address matches one 
on the list. However, keyword checking requires the use of DPI because the 
information exists within the content part of the packet. Further explanations 
of DPI are given in Chapter 6. The system checks words in URLs against the 
forbidden list and can terminate the connection if a match is found. Thus, 
                                            
802 Speech by Bill Clinton at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 
International Studies, Washington D.C., Mach 8, 2000 
<http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2000/000380/epf302.htm> accessed 25 
April 2011 
803 OpenNet Initiative, Internet filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country 
Study, 1 
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805 James Fallows, ‘The connection has been reset’ (The Atlantic, March 
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taking ‘falungong’807 as an example of a blocked word, any URL containing 
the string ‘falungong’ would be blocked. This same mechanism will block 
searches via search engines as the search terms will appear in the URL string 
being requested. 
Encryption can prevent access to the data, but the Firewall blocks access to 
Google’s encrypted search.808 In addition, the firewall can also block any form 
of encrypted connection, ensuring that data passing across it remains in clear 
text and therefore, subject to interception.809 Hence, there is a significant 
impact on Internet privacy in China. 
As one may expect the keyword blocking system handles Chinese characters. 
However, it is found that it is prone to over block. For instance, in 2010, the 
word ‘carrot’ was blocked as one of the Chinese characters which makes the 
word is the same as the surname of President Hú Jǐntāo;810 the filters are set 
to trap searches for the names of China’s leaders.811 
On one hand, this kind of firewall may be viewed simply as a very large scale 
implementation of the blocking systems often found on school networks in the 
                                            
807 Falun Gong, or Falun Dafa is described as the ancient practice of self 
refinement and is heavily censored by China. Falun Gong was made 
illegal in China after protests in 1999; see for example 
http://www.falungong.org.uk/ accessed 24/sep/2011 
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UK812. However, it is also a national surveillance system and users who are 
constantly trying to reach blocked resources may well attract the attention of 
the security authorities.813 
The Firewall is, however, generally located between the Internet in China and 
the rest of the world.814 Its aim is to prevent people in China from accessing 
material held outside of China rather than controlling access within the 
country. For example, human rights material that is published by the China 
Society for Human Rights Studies815 via a website within China is freely 
accessible. Nevertheless, even if this material is accessed via an external 
agent such as Google reader, the results are blocked by the Firewall as the 
pass through it.816 
One major advantage of the filtering system is the ability to get people to view 
only the information China wants them to see. Bias can be created by forcing 
people to use China’s own search engine, Baido. For example, a search on 
Google for many human rights topics will be blocked, yet a search on China’s 
                                            
812 See for example the UK Safer Internet Centre’s Appropriate Filtering and 
Monitoring guidance <https://www.saferinternet.org.uk/advice-
centre/teachers-and-professionals/appropriate-filtering-and-monitoring> 
accessed 13 January 2017 
813 Fallows (n 805) 
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Measurement: 12th International Conference, PAM 2011 LNCS 6579 
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Beijing (verified 24/Sep/2011) 
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data enters China via the firewall as is blocked, whereas direct access to 
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www.chinahumanrights.org website is accessible from outside China, it 
means the firewall does not block outgoing material. 
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own search provider, Baido will not be blocked, nor will any of the news 
agency websites within China. Most people will attempt to find information 
elsewhere if their first choice of search engine is blocked,817 and most people 
are only interested in information about their own country.818 Baido itself will 
not index external, blocked content; thus, when users turn to Baido they will 
see heavily controlled sources of information, biased in favour of the state.819 
Evidently, as explained above, the Great Firewall acts as a controller of 
information and a country-wide surveillance system which has significant 
influence on Internet privacy in China. Furthermore, in this research, it has 
been found that there has been much criticism of Western companies for 
supplying the equipment to China in the first place. Regardless of thoughts of 
right or wrong, China is such an important market that companies supplying 
equipment take a commercial decision to put profits first ‘even at the risk of 
overlooking human rights.’820 
The effects of the Firewall are varied. Although Facebook and Youtube are 
permanently blocked China has its own popular social media blogging site in 
Weibo. The majority of external websites and other Internet services remain 
accessible.821 Furthermore, China's attempts to block pornographic websites 
are not abhorrent. 
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5.3.2 Internet monitoring and surveillance 
As the effectiveness of the firewall declines due to an increase in traffic, a 
logical solution for China is to move content filtering from the border gateways 
to homes and offices.822 
In 2009, the MIIT announced its intention that all new PCs sold in China would 
have a software package pre-loaded known as Green Dam Youth Escort. A 
concern with this kind of software is that it may contain mechanisms to report 
back on what URLs have been attempted, thus moving surveillance into the 
home.823 However, although Green Dam was not rolled out generally due to 
problems, it is still used in schools and cybercafés in China. 
In addition to Green Dam Youth Escort, seemingly benign software can also 
be used to monitor online activity. For example, TOM-Skype, the Chinese 
version of Skype provided by TOM Online, was discovered to record the text 
of chat messages where these contained certain keywords relating to 
sensitive issues in China.824 This practice would seem to be in line with 
China’s law regarding the reporting of infringing content. 
It is important to realise that unlike the US and the UK where the Internet is 
effectively provided by and operated  by private companies, the Chinese 
government operates the backbone networks and has a controlling interest in 
the IAPs and gateways that connect it to the rest of the global Internet.825 In 
                                            
822 Walton (n 300) 20 
823 Robert Farris, Hal Roberts and Stephanie Wang, ‘China’s Green Dam: 
the implications of government control encroaching on the home PC’, 
(OpenNet Initiative Bulletin, undated), 18 
824 Nart Villeneuve, ‘Breaching trust: An analysis of surveillance and security 
practices on China’s TOM-Skype platform, Information Warfare Monitor / 
ONI Asia Joint Report’ <http://www.nartv.org/mirror/breachingtrust.pdf> 
accessed 31 March 2016) (note the original URL as published in the 
document is no longer valid) 
825 David Kurt Herold, ‘An inter-nation-al Internet: China’s contribution to 
global Internet governance?’ <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1922725> 
accessed 16 February 2016, 5 
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2002, Amnesty International reported that there were ‘30,000 state security 
personnel’826 monitoring websites, chat rooms and e-mails. Hence, one may 
wonder what the level and magnitude of communications surveillance actually 
are in China. 
To make matters worse, the research also found that metadata retention is a 
requirement in China. ISPs must keep a record of users’ time online, URLs 
visited, and their account and telephone numbers827 for 60 days and make the 
data available when required by law.828 Premises established to provide 
Internet access such as cybercafés gained regulations in 2002, which 
specified that they must check and also record the identification cards or other 
credentials of customers as well as recording their login information. Once 
again, this data was to be kept for 60 days and made available on request.829  
Unrestricted cybercafés often allowed anonymous access for citizens but 
China plans to eliminate stand-alone cybercafés by 2016, replacing these with 
regulated chains.830 With the demise of these facilities it is not easy to use the 
Internet in China anonymously. So, once again, it leads one to wonder to what 
extent Internet privacy exists in China. 
Worse still, Internet Content Providers (ICPs) are also expected to police the 
Internet. Content which spreads ethnic hatred, pornography, gambling or 
illegal acts, or damages social order or stability or the state itself are 
banned.831 On finding such content, it is to be blocked, preserved and reported 
                                            
826 Amnesty International, People's Republic of China: state control of the 
Internet in China, (Amnesty International, 2002, ASA 17/007/2002) p2 
827 Measures for the Management of Internet Information Services Art. 14 
828 Ibid. 
829 Regulations on Administration of Business Premises for Internet Access 
Services, Art. 23 
830 China Media Bulletin, issue 6 January 20 2011, ‘Stand-alone cybercafes 
to be eliminated in China by 2016’ 
831 Measures for the Management of Internet Information Services Art. 15(6) 
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to the authorities.832 Operators of electronic bulletin services, which includes 
bulletin boards, chatrooms and other interactive systems833 have a similar 
duty as above to record user details834 and report infringements.835 Despite all 
these, ICPs also have a duty to keep the personal details of their users 
confidential, unless the user consents to disclosure or some other provision 
of law requires disclosure.836 Internet news services carry the same content 
reporting requirements837 and such services also include blogs. The evolution 
of Web 2.0 has placed a ‘higher demand on Internet users to abide by the law 
and learn to discipline themselves.’838 
The content of e-mails839 is subject to China's telecommunications regulations 
which prohibit contents that ‘spread rumours, disturb social order, or 
undermine social stability’.840 ISPs must record e-mail addresses, IP numbers 
and times of messages sent through their relays for 60 days.841 In addition, e-
mail providers must respond to reports of prohibited content. Reports were to 
                                            
832 Ibid., Art. 16 
833 Regulations on the Management of Internet Electronic Bulletin Services 
Art. 2 
834 Ibid., Arts. 14-15 
835 Ibid., Art. 13 
836 Ibid., Art. 12 
837 Regulations on the Management of Internet News and Information 
Services, Art. 19 
838 Chen (n 764) 24, 30-31 
839 Ministry of Information Industry, Measures for the Management of 
Internet E-mail Services, Art. 11 
840 Regulation concerning Telecommunications of the People's Republic of 
China, Art. 57(8) 
841 Ministry of Information Industry, Measures for the Management of 
Internet E-mail services, Art. 10 
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be passed to a handling unit operated by the China Internet Association on 
behalf of the MII.842 
5.3.3 Enforcement 
Although information is scarce there is evidence of the effectiveness of the 
monitoring and filtering outlined above. Below are depicted some supporting 
cases for this. 
Lin Hai became the first person to be sentenced specifically for an Internet 
crime in 1998. He was accused of sending the e-mail addresses of some 
30,000 Chinese citizens to a US pro-democracy magazine.843 
In 2001, Huang Qi844 became the first person in China to be tried for posting 
human rights articles.845 In 2002, student Liu Di was arrested for posting 
material on the web, persuading others to protest at the arrest of Huang Qi. 
As a result, thousands of people signed an online petition for her release. She 
was not known as a dissident, simply being someone who posted her thoughts 
online.846 She was released in November 2003 on bail.847 
This, and other similar cases, is, perhaps, unsurprising in a country where a 
‘sophisticated security apparatus monitors what citizens read and write 
online.’848 Amnesty International reported that it believed 54 people were in 
                                            
842 Ibid., Art. 15 
843 Cullen and Choy (n 298) p127 
844 Huang Qi is a human rights activist. He runs a website known as Tian 
Wang, now hosted on a server in the USA and blocked from access 
from within China. See http://64tianwang.com accessed 9/oct/11 
845 Amnesty International, People’s Republic of China: controls tighten as 
Internet activism grows, (Amnesty International, 2004, ASA 
17/001/2004) p3 
846 Ibid., p5 
847 Zheng (n 806) p127 
848 Ibid. 
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detention in China for Internet-related offences, with prison sentences ranging 
from 2 to 12 years.849 In many cases this has involved people downloading 
and disseminating or writing material online about sensitive or banned topics; 
for example, 17 people were jailed for discussing Falun Gong and 16 for 
discussing the democracy movement.850 The Amnesty International report 
includes the names of a further four people arrested for Internet offences who 
died in custody.851 It is clear that most cases relate to freedom of expression 
rather than privacy. Openly posting material online shows little expectation of 
privacy by the individual concerned. However, the Amnesty International list 
includes four people arrested for signing the online petition or posting articles 
demanding the release of Liu Di.852 One of these four853 posted under a 
pseudonym, and it would be reasonable to assume this person did so to 
attempt to maintain privacy. 
Up until now, the research findings have shown that Internet law in China is 
both complex and strict, and its effects can be extreme; for instance,  in 1998, 
two brothers found guilty of hacking into a bank database were sentenced to 
death.854 
In addition to severe penalties, the mere fact that one’s actions online can 
easily be monitored creates a very chilling effect and as a result, it promotes 
                                            
849 Amnesty International, People’s Republic of China: controls tighten as 
Internet activism grows, (Amnesty International, 2004, ASA 
17/001/2004), 2 
850 In addition to the 54, the Amnesty International report lists a further four 
Chen Quilan, Li Changjun, Xue Hairong and Zhao Cahunyin, all Falun 
Gong supporters or practitioners, who died in custody. See Appendix II 
of the Amnesty International 2004 report (AI 17/001/2004) 
851 Amnesty International (n 849) p35 
852 Cai Lujun (also wrote essays calling for democratic reforms), Du Daobin 
(also posted about social and political issues), Kong Youping (also 
posted articles about the 1989 uprising), and Lou Changfu. 
853 Lou Changfu posted using the pseudonym ‘Justice add Consciousness’ 
854 Cullen and Choy (n 298) 128 
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and enforces self-censorship by individuals, ICPs and ISPs alike. 
Nevertheless, this is self-censorship by fear. Mobilising agents to find and 
arrest individuals found to be in breach of China’s Internet laws serves as a 
warning to others. The vagueness of the laws themselves makes people over 
cautious.855 As a result, from this research, it would seem that in China, the 
only way to protect one’s Internet privacy is to not use the Internet.856 
In fact, the effects of self-censorship have gone further than the 
aforementioned and some implications are worth noting. For instance, 
western companies providing search engine facilities became a part of this 
overall censorship. Yahoo!, Microsoft and Google all altered their products in 
order to filter keywords or close down blogs.857 Yahoo! would go further. The 
trial in 2005 of Shi Tao was widely reported at the time. Shi Tao was the 
director of a newspaper news and editorial department and had been briefed 
on state secrets in confidence. He emailed information about the briefing to 
an editor acquaintance in New York asking that the information be quickly 
disseminated. The Court heard that Shi Tao had used his personal Yahoo! e-
mail account. The authorities had obtained a copy of the e-mail and Yahoo! 
Hong Kong had provided the IP address and corresponding information tying 
this to the newspaper’s telephone line user for dial-up Internet access. Shi 
Tao was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and a further 2 years loss of 
political rights.858 
                                            
855 Kissel (n 299) 244-245 
856 Shaojung Sharon Wang and Junhao Hong, ‘Discourse behind the 
Forbidden Realm: Internet surveillance and its implications on China’s 
blogosphere’, Telematics and Informatics 27 (2010) 67-78, 74 
857 Miriam D D’Jaen, Breaching the Great Firewall of China: Congress 
Overreaches in Attacking Chinese Internet Censorship, 31 Seattle U. L. 
Rev. 327 2007-2008, pp332-334 
858 Changsha Intermediate People’s Court’s Written Judgment in the Shi Tao 
State Secrets Trial <http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-
analysis/changsha-internediate-peoples-courts-written-judgment-in-the-
shi> accessed 20 March 2016 
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5.4 Data protection in China 
In 2001, elements of data protection were written into China’s criminal law.859 
Art. 253a states that anyone who illegally obtains personal information will, if 
the offence is serious enough be sentenced to up to 3 years in prison and/or 
fined. On 5 January 2010, Zhou was prosecuted under the amended law for 
his role in a ‘data scam’860 in what was reported as the ‘first-known case of 
violating the security of personal information’.861 He obtained the phone 
numbers of 14 government officials via his private investigation company and 
sold these to a scammer. He was sentenced to 1.5 years in prison. 
New guidelines aimed at the protection of personal information took effect on 
1 February 2013.862 These appear to attempt to implement many of the 
protections present in EU data protection law. For example, it includes the 
principle of informed consent,863 confidentiality,864 the right to know what data 
is held about oneself,865 and the right to have data corrected.866 There is 
clearly a change in China towards the protection of personal information. 
                                            
859 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China as amended by 
Amendment 7 on February 28th, 2009 
860 Quanlin Qui, ‘Personal data scam, 8 jailed’ (China Daily, 01/05/2010) 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-01/05/content_9263566.htm> 
accessed 23 March 2016; note the news item incorrectly states the 
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861 Ibid. 
862 Information Security Technology – Guidelines for Personal Information 
Protection Within Public and Commercial Services Information Systems 
863 Ibid., 3.7 
864 Ibid., 4.2 
865 Ibid., 4.3 
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In 2012 the NPC Standing Committee issued a Decision that aims to protect 
personal information including that which involves an individual’s privacy.867 
The Decision deals generally with data protection and provides a suitable 
framework, requiring, for example that providers state what personal 
information they are gathering, why, and how it will be used, and ensuring they 
will keep personal information confidential.868 
5.5 Internet privacy in China 
Westin finds that anonymity is one of the cornerstones of privacy and provides 
‘freedom from identification and surveillance’.869 However, online anonymity 
in China is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve.870 As many Western 
social media platforms remain blocked in China, local providers have created 
similar versions. For example, Tencent’s QQ and Weibo are popular blogging 
and messaging services. QQ is anonymous to an extent as people are 
identified by number. However, this only maintains anonymity from the general 
population because one has to formally register in order to use the service 
and this information would be available to the Chinese government. 
People on standard mobile phone contracts or fixed phone lines already had 
to register in order to obtain a service. However, pre-paid SIM cards were still 
available without registration. Nevertheless, this was changed on 1 
                                            
867 National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision concerning 
Strengthening Network Information Protection, adopted on 28 December 
2012 at the 30th Committee Meeting of the 11th National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee, 
<https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/12/28/national-
peoples-congress-standing-committee-decision-concerning-
strengthening-network-information-protection/> accessed 19 January 
2017,I 
868 Ibid., II-IV 
869 Westin (n 42) 31 
870 Sanja Kelly and Sarah Cook, ‘New Technologies, Innovative Repression: 
Growing Threats to Internet Freedom’ in Sanja Kelly and Sarah Cook 
(Eds.) Freedom on the Net 2011: A Global Assessment of Internet and 
Digital Media, (Freedom House, 2011),19 
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September 2010 when the MIIT required that all people purchasing a SIM card 
present valid identification in order to register. Although this was aimed at 
stopping spam and fraud, it also removed the remaining method of 
anonymous communication in China.871 
In addition to the above, China put into place a regulation that requires people 
to use their real names when they sign up for Internet services. Since 
December 2012, service providers have been required to obtain the real 
names of subscribers.872 This, in fact, delivered a hard blow to anonymity on 
the Internet in China.873 
Furthermore, access to free Wi-Fi services in China is not anonymous. For 
example, to gain access to McDonald’s Wi-Fi service one first needs to enter 
one’s name, email and China Mobile phone number. A Short Message Service 
(SMS) message is then sent to the number entered with further instructions. 
In this way, the ISP will log your personal details and these can be tied in with 
your mobile number.874 
In spite of this, in reality, there is little difference between the situation in China 
and that of the US and UK. For example, McDonald’s in the UK now require 
some personal information before one can use their free Wi-Fi,875 and, in 
                                            
871 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/01/content_11243699.htm 
accessed 22/08/11 
872 National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision concerning 
Strengthening Network Information Protection (n 867) VI 
873 Jyh-An Lee and Ching-Yi Liu, Real-name registration rules and the fading 
digital anonymity in China, 25 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 1, 2016, p13 
874 Captured during a test session at a McDonalds in Beijing, summer 2011: 
Pursuant to Article 23 of "Regulations on Administration of Business 
Premises for Internet Access Services of the People’s Republic of 
China", network operator is required to collect personal particulars from 
Internet users, please fill in below and click "Continue" to enjoy the 
FREE Wi-Fi Service. 
875 See McDonald’s Free Wi-Fi FAQ at 
http://www.mcdonalds.co.uk/ukhome/Restaurants/Free-WiFi/Free-WiFi-
FAQs.html accessed 26/3/16 which states that in the UK one needs first 
to register; the US information does not suggest that registration is 
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general, one will need to register personal information and credit card details 
for home broadband. 
In this research, it is clear from the evidence and examples shown that China 
has a sophisticated technological mechanism with which to control the 
Internet. Although the principal aim of this mechanism is to control information 
and apply censorship, it invades privacy in doing so. Anonymity is outlawed – 
people are required to register using their real names in order to use the 
Internet. However, in recent years, a right of privacy has been found from an 
unlikely source – the human flesh search which by nature is the antithesis of 
privacy. 
The human flesh search, which originated in China, is massively privacy 
invasive, becoming a ‘striking phenomenon’.876 Human flesh searches involve 
groups of people finding out everything they can about a target individual and 
then making that information public. Chinese web users would perform human 
flesh searches to identify ‘corrupt government officials and individuals 
engaged in other illegal or unethical activities’877 and thus, turning surveillance 
back onto the state. 
There is the possibility of action under law against service providers who carry 
information as a result of a human flesh search. This is because providers 
must not ‘produce, reproduce, publish, or disseminate’878 information, the 
                                            
required, see http://www.mcdonalds.com/us/en/services/free_wifi.html 
accessed 26/3/16 
876 Xue (n 231) 288 
877 Fei Yue Wang and others, A study of the human flesh search engine: 
crowd-powered expansion of online knowledge, IEEE Computer Society, 
August 2010, 45-53, p45 
878 Measures for the Management of Internet Information Services Art. 15. 
The text is available in 43 Chinese Law and Government 5 (Sept-Oct 
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contents of which ‘spread rumours, disturb social order, or undermine social 
stability’.879 
On the face of it, this is not actually anything new. Ever since search engines 
were created and people put their information online it has been possible to 
use search sites to gather information about an individual. However, this 
research noted that what was new was the way it became a phenomenon, 
using groups of people and both online and offline sources. 
However, the case of Wang Fei v Zhang Leyi, Daqi.com and Tianya.cn880 
would have a significant outcome. Wang had had an affair and on its discovery 
his wife committed suicide after blogging the facts and her intention. The 
ensuing human flesh search collected and disclosed Wang’s contact 
information along with that of his family and his alleged mistress. Wang sued 
Zhang Leyi, a friend of Wang’s wife, who had published information about 
Wang and his affair on a website, along with two other websites which had 
also published the information – daqi.com and tianya.cn – which also 
published the information. The Beijing court found Zhang and daqi.com to be 
liable for causing emotional distress to Wang; tianya.cn had removed the 
information previously and was not prosecuted.881 
Previously, the courts in China had always tied any concept of privacy to the 
right to reputation. In the Wang Fei case the court took privacy as a separate 
issue. In what Ong describes as a ‘landmark decision’882 the court determined 
that a person’s love life is private, and privacy includes those facts that one 
                                            
879 Measures for the Management of Internet Information Services Art. 15(6). 
The text is available in 43 Chinese Law and Government 5 (Sept-Oct 
2010) 30-35, translated by Ted Wang 
880 Wang Fei v Zhang Leyi, Daqi.com and Tianya.cn, Beijing Chaoyang 
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privacy, Comp. L. & Security Rev. 25 (2009) 275-279, 276 
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does not wish others to know. Zhang had infringed Wang’s right of privacy by 
publishing his personal information. This is a clear violation of autonomy - as 
stated by Kupfer (Section 2.2 page 18) autonomy gives us control over what 
is known about us. 
5.6 Conclusion 
China is an ancient country with a new legal system which has both embraced 
and attempted to control the Internet. Yet, the Internet is just one, relatively 
new method of communications and China attempts to control the whole 
sphere of communications technologies. Mobile phones do not escape the 
censor. SMS services can be scanned for keywords and messages blocked; 
or, in some cases service to that mobile phone terminated. Due to the ease 
with which mobile phones can be used to organise protests, China has sought 
to increase its control over such services.883 
China’s surveillance and real name policy leaves little room for Internet 
privacy, at least from state actors. China is thus presented as the worst case 
scenario, one which the West is getting ever closer to. The similarities are 
stark. For instance, China’s content filtering and blocking is simply a larger 
scale version of that which occurs within school networks in the UK. The ability 
to block offending sites is echoed in the UK where courts can order ISPs to 
block infringing websites. Finding people that have accessed terrorist 
websites or that publish terrorist material is, in fact, no different from finding 
those accessing or disseminating information about Falun Gong. 
After examining the situation in detail within the contexts of the US, the UK 
and China, the research has found that the three are not that different when it 
comes to the invasion of Internet privacy. One may wonder whether there are 
any technical solutions and/or measures that can preserve Internet privacy. 
This becomes the core discussion theme in the next chapter, focusing both 
on technical measures to maintain Internet privacy and the equal and opposite 
                                            
883 China Media Bulletin, issue 5 January 13 2011, ‘Chinese government 
expands mobile-phone controls’ 
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technical measures implemented by the intelligence agencies as revealed in 
the 2013 Snowden revelations. 
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Chapter 6: Enhancing Internet privacy; expanding Internet 
surveillance 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have investigated Internet privacy, describing how the 
Internet works and indicating where communications surveillance may be 
carried out with particular focus on the US, the UK and China in order to 
advance our understanding of whether privacy has any place left in the 
Internet in these three culturally and politically different jurisdictions.  
In this chapter, the focus is now turned to addressing the question ‘what 
measures can be taken to prevent mass Internet surveillance from destroying 
Internet privacy?’. Of note, in this chapter the scope of investigation is 
primarily based on the technical perspective. Also, of note, in the course of 
the investigation conducted by this research, particular reference is made to 
the 2013 Snowden revelations. This is because the issues examined here are 
global in reach as the Internet is truly global in scope and surveillance 
techniques are not bound by geography. 
In this chapter, web access is used as an example of a common Internet 
application. The reason for choosing this from amongst the plethora of Internet 
applications is that its use is widespread, not only via browsers on home 
computers, but also apps on mobile devices. It is important to understand the 
functioning of the Internet from a technical perspective building on Chapter 2. 
This is because while the Internet remains largely hidden from view behind 
the user friendly applications of today, it is necessary to understand exactly 
what data is transferred both when we use those applications and even when 
a device is simply turned on. The situation is made worse by the utility of smart 
devices which may have a number of network-aware features communicating 
all the time, potentially including the user’s identification or other identifying 
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information.884 Even where information is encrypted, these data transfers will 
still leave a metadata trail. 
The outlines of this chapter are first to examine web browsing from a technical 
perspective in order to understand how and where privacy can be invaded. 
Such access may be for any number of reasons including access to static web 
pages, social media websites, news sites, or e-mail via a webmail service. 
Access may be passive, in that one reads information, or interactive such as 
posting a message on a social media site or composing e-mails via webmail. 
In each case, there will be a metadata trail left by the access, and as will be 
shown this may be in multiple jurisdictions. Then a set of technical privacy 
protection mechanisms are explained and presented. Finally, evidence of 
mass Internet surveillance are presented and discussed, leading to a set of 
useful insights to conclude the chapter.  
6.2 Mechanics of website access 
When a browser accesses a web page, several things occur during that 
access. For the purpose of this discussion a website address885 can be 
considered to have two component parts, namely the address of the host web 
server holding the required web page, and the path to that web page if 
required. For example, the URL http://www.leeds.ac.uk/info/5000/about 
illustrates these two component parts. As defined above the host is 
www.leeds.ac.uk and the path is /info/5000/about. However, the latter 
component may be omitted if the page required is the websites index page, 
for example http://www.leeds.ac.uk/ will return the home page for that website. 
                                            
884 The iPhone, for example makes a connection to Apple’s ‘Find my iPhone’ 
service as well as cloud and e-mail providers. In an experiment, it was 
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885 Web addresses are termed Uniform Resource Identifiers, see Tim 
Berners-Lee, R Fielding and L Masinter, Network Working Group 
RFC3986 Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax, January 
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The URL is the visual aspect of this process and what the user sees. It gives 
little clue as to the underlying technology. Once typed into the browser’s 
address bar or clicked on if it is a link in some other page, the user’s device 
will first request the IP address of the host, www.leeds.ac.uk (in the above 
example), from the DNS. Once it has the IP address, 129.11.26.33 in the case 
of www.leeds.ac.uk it then makes a connection to the remote host. By 
convention, normal web page access uses port 80, whereas encrypted access 
uses port 443. Typically, these are selected automatically by default with 
http:// accessing port 80 and https:// accessing port 443. 
In order to access a required web page (such as /info/5000/about in the above 
example), the browser now sends commands and information to the remote 
host to request it. The host will then return the requested page. It is important 
to realise that the remote host may serve a number of websites. Among the 
information passed to the host server is the name of the host that is actually 
required. The web server in the above example hosts numerous websites 
including www.leeds.ac.uk, medhealth.leeds.ac.uk, ses.leeds.ac.uk, and 
purchasing.leeds.ac.uk. In order to select the relevant website the server 
needs the name of the host requested and, referring to Chapter 2 this is not a 
part of the information needed to route packets across the Internet. The web 
server will unpack the data in its entirety and access the host name which is 
in the deepest part of the packets along with the actual content of the 
communication.886 
Now that the remote host has received the information it needs, it sends the 
web page to the user’s browser. Once it has completed sending the page, the 
server will typically log the transaction in a log file. Information recorded in the 
log includes the user’s IP address, the address of the web page or resource 
requested, and may include the previous  URL visited and information about 
the user’s browser. Once the web page has been received, there are still more 
steps before the page is displayed in the browser. It is important to understand 
                                            
886 There is an exception to this where the data is encrypted. In such a case 
the web server needs advanced notification of the host name and this is 
examined in Chapter 6. 
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that a modern  web page will rarely be simple text, but will also include 
graphics and code which forms the overall design in which to display that text. 
It may also contain analytics and advertising code, all of which can refer to a 
different web server anywhere on the Internet. The user’s IP address and 
potentially their browser information (as shown above) can be recorded by 
each web server serving each individual part of the website because the 
browser must connect to each server in order to download the requested 
material. 
What at first may seem a simple web page request may actually result in 
connections being made to many web servers as illustrated in Table 6.1887 
Table 6.1: IP addresses accessed by a browser while accessing 
www.asda.com 
URL IP address Area 
http://www.asda.com 95.101.128.147 UK 
http://www.asda.co.uk 161.170.248.158 US 
http://b.wal.co 184.30.96.35 UK 
http://www.googleadservices.com 216.58.213.98 US 
http://js.dmtry.com 2001:4860:4802:32::1b US 
https://fonts.googleapis.com 2a00:1450:4009:804::200a Eire 
https://googleads.g.doubleclick.net 2a00:1450:4009:805::2002 Eire 
http://www.googletagmanager.com 2a00:1450:4009:804::2008 Eire 
http://walmartasda.d2.sc.omtrdc.net 66.235.148.132 US 
https://www.google.com 2a00:1450:4009:804::2004 Eire 
http://log.dmtry.com 54.88.143.253 US 
https://www.google-analytics.com 2a00:1450:4009:804::200e Eire 
https://5832323.fls.doubleclick.net 216.58.214.6 US 
https://www.google.co.uk 2a00:1450:4009:804::2003 Eire 
https://stats.g.doubleclick.net 74.125.206.154 US 
http://static.hotjar.com 108.161.188.192 US 
https://www.facebook.com 31.13.90.36 UK 
http://cm.g.doubleclick.net 216.58.213.98 US 
https://beacon.asda.com 161.170.236.122 US 
https://script.hotjar.com 94.31.29.64 UK 
http://dev.visualwebsiteoptimizer.com 5.10.110.36 UK 
 
                                            
887 Browsing to http://www.asda.com/ using Firefox with the IPvFox plugin 
which reveals what connections the browser made. Location and ISP 
information discovered using iplocation.net. 2/Dec/2016 
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Like many other websites, the Asda website is rich in design elements and 
functionality and this is why there are so many requests for what is essentially 
just the home page of their website. However, this simple example adequately 
illustrates the complexities of a modern website and also shows how one’s 
personal information, or at least IP addresses can be recorded in other 
jurisdictions. Most importantly, this research shows how little control over or 
knowledge of this the user has. Personal information, via metadata, is left (or 
retained) at each step when people access websites. An IP address has the 
potential to be classed as personal information and a threat to anonymity. As 
stated by Westin (Section 2.2 page 20) anonymity enables one to be free from 
‘identification and surveillance’888 and yet, even at this most basic level one 
can already see how this is put at risk. 
6.2.1 Privacy issues caused by browser pre-fetching 
One can see from the above given example that when a web page is accessed 
a data trail may be left. Web server logs may contain a record of the visits 
made by your browser, and web servers not seemingly involved with the 
delivery of that web page may also record similar details because they have 
served certain parts or functions of the page. 
There is one other mechanism of note here – pre-fetching. Here, the web 
browser will examine the page the user has just accessed and will make 
access to associated content in the background to save time in case the user 
wishes to access this. For example, a news website is accessed and the 
browser then accesses the five top stories in case the user wishes to access 
one of these. This mechanism exists in order to give an apparent speed-up of 
access. From the user’s perspective, the page loads quickly because the 
browser has already downloaded it. However, there is an implication. The 
pages which have been pre-fetched may never be accessed by the user, but 
have been accessed by the user’s browser through no action on their part. 
Each access will have left the same metadata trail as outlined above. As 
illustrated in this research, this is another example of a hidden data transfer 
                                            
888 Westin (n 42) 31 
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which could conceivably make access to information which may put the user 
under suspicion. 
6.2.2 Cookies and the implications for privacy 
There is one other common factor which can be privacy invasive. Cookies are 
text files which can be placed on and read from the user’s device. These are 
used for a wide variety of purposes, and can be set in such a way that only a 
specific web server can access them, or so any number of servers in a specific 
domain can gain access. For example, a cookie may be set such that only the 
web server supporting www.leeds.ac.uk can access, or that access can be 
made from any server within leeds.ac.uk. The use of cookies is regulated at 
the EU level and was covered in Chapter 2. Cookies are more invasive than 
an IP address. As discussed in Chapter 2 an IP address does not identify a 
specific system but a cookie is stored on the system itself potentially opening 
up the possibility of tracking a specific system as it visits different websites 
which can read the same cookie. 
Cookies may be used to control functions such as shopping carts, or may be 
used to control advertising, to name just two such uses. However, if one were 
able to trick the user’s browser into sending cookies, an adversary could 
potentially learn personal information about the user. For example, webmail 
sites will typically store the user’s details in a cookie to speed up access 
controls. Snowden revealed just such a use which will be examined in Section 
6.6.3 below. 
6.2.3 Browser summary 
As aforementioned, browsing the web can result in one’s IP address being 
logged by multiple servers in multiple jurisdictions and this is rarely evident to 
the user. If one is interacting with a website it is reasonable to assume that 
any data one sends will be recorded by that site, but exactly where else it may 
be recorded is often not obvious. For example, one may interact with a UK 
website but actually send personal information to a website in the US as a 
result. Accesses to a given website may result in accesses to many other 
websites behind the scenes and unknown to the user. Combine this with the 
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fact that mobile devices make such access all the time, certain apps are 
loaded regardless of whether or not we are using them and one can see how 
privacy may be put at risk. The metadata we leave as a result may be left in 
multiple jurisdictions and often on a different continent to the website we are 
accessing. As stated by Wacks (Section 2.2 page 18) this removes our 
freedom to choose to be private. Despite all these, there is another factor 
controlling where our Internet data may be sent, and this is presented next. 
6.3 Internet routing 
The previous section showed how the common task of using a web browser 
to access a website can lead our IP addresses, as a minimum being recorded 
in multiple jurisdictions. However, the way that data is routed across the 
Internet can also lead to unexpected loss of informational privacy. From a 
user’s perspective the Internet transfers data from one edge to the other and 
the user is unaware of the complexities within. While a user using the Internet 
to communicate with a web server may see it as a straight line path, peering 
arrangements and intervening geography shape the network path actually 
being used. In order to illustrate aspects of Internet routing, Table 6.2 is used 
to show the path that data took between Brazil and South Africa, both points 
in the Southern Hemisphere:889 
Table 6.2: A simplified traceroute from Brazil to South Africa 
1 gw-pinger.unesp.br 200.145.255.42 Sao Paulo, Brazil 
2 miami15.mia.seabone.net 195.22.199.209 Miami, US 
3 ashburn2.ash.seabone.net 195.22.199.185 Ashburn, US 
4 AEQ-Ashburn.as6453.net 216.6.87.202 Ashburn, US 
5 NJY-Newark.as6453.net 216.6.87.242 Newark, US 
6 SV8-Highbridge.as6453.net 80.231.138.17 Highbridge, UK 
7 PV9-Lisbon.as6453.net 80.231.158.6 Lisbon, Portugal 
8 KLT-Cape-Town.as6453.net 80.231.159.62 Cape Town, South 
Africa 
9 ns2.gcis.gov.za 164.151.129.19 Cape Town, South 
Africa 
                                            
889 http://ping.unesp.br/cgi-bin/traceroute.pl?target=164.151.129.19 
accessed 02/12/16 
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In Table 6.2, steps 2 to 3 involve the Seabone IP backbone operated by 
Telecom Italia Sparkle.890 There are several potential oceanic cable routes 
between Brazil and the US, but it was not possible to determine the exact 
one.891 At step 4, the route passes from the Seabone IP backbone to the 
network operated by Tata communications.892 Between steps 5 and 6, the 
route traverses the TGN-Atlantic cable893 while between steps 6 to 8, the West 
Africa Cable System (WACS) is used.894  
From an Internet privacy perspective although a user in Brazil communicating 
with another user in South Africa may view the Internet as a direct line 
between the continents, their data actually goes via both the US and the UK, 
putting it at risk of interception as revealed in the 2013 Snowden revelations. 
Six Cable Landing Stations (CLSs) are involved, two per each oceanic cable, 
each of which provides a useful bulk Internet tapping point. Of particular note, 
the Internet hub at Ashburn, US is claimed to carry 70% of the world’s Internet 
traffic,895 an ideal location for an NSA tap. 
                                            
890 See <http://whois.domaintools.com/seabone.net> accessed 22 January 
2017 
891 See for example Monet 
<http://www.submarinecablemap.com/#/submarine-cable/monet and 
South America 1 http://www.submarinecablemap.com/#/submarine-
cable/south-america-1-sam-1> accessed 2 December 2016 
892 See <http://whois.domaintools.com/216.6.87.202> accessed 22 January 
2017 
893 See <http://www.submarinecablemap.com/#/submarine-cable/tata-tgn-
atlantic> accessed 2 December 2016 
894 See <http://www.submarinecablemap.com/#/submarine-cable/west-
africa-cable-system-wacs> accessed 2 December 2016 
895 Sean Buckley, ‘Windstream establishes 100G express route in red-hot 
Ashburn, Va. Market via NJFX’, (FierceTelecom, 19 January 2016) 
<http://www.fiercetelecom.com/telecom/windstream-establishes-100g-
express-route-red-hot-ashburn-va-market-via-njfx> accessed 2 
December 2016 
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Covert methods or technical failures can also modify the path taken. In 
February 2008, the Pakistan government instructed Pakistani ISPs to block 
access to YouTube. Pakistan Telecom changed its routing tables to attempt 
to route YouTube calls to a web page stating that YouTube had been blocked. 
Unfortunately, in so doing, it advertised the routing change to its upstream 
providers which advertised the route change further, resulting in the Internet 
at large then routing all YouTube connections to Pakistan for a short while.896 
In March 2011, a routing error in AT&Ts network routed Facebook 
connections via China and Korea.897 In the case of the action by Pakistan 
Telecom, YouTube became unavailable. However, in the AT&T case, users 
would be unaware that their data was being routed via China and Korea as 
Facebook was still accessible. The AT&T case indicates how a government 
could covertly change Internet routing to its advantage, forcing it to pass 
across its tapping point.898 
From the above sections one can see how personal information may be left in 
foreign jurisdictions that are not apparently associated with the web service 
one accesses. At a minimum the IP address of a person’s device will be 
recordable as connections are made to the various web servers associated 
with a web page. Additionally, the actual communications path taken may be 
unexpected, again presenting the risk of one’s personal information being 
recorded by, for example the US and the UK even when the services one 
accesses are in a different continent. 
                                            
896 See www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/02/pakistans-accid/ accessed 
27/Oct/13 
897 See www.blyon.com/hey-att-customers-your-facebook-data-went-to-
china-and-korea-this-morning/ accessed 27/Oct/13 
898 Kevin Butler and others, ‘A Survey of BGP Security Issues and 
Solutions’, 98 Proc. IEEE 1, January 2010, p100-101 
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6.4 Deep Packet Inspection 
The previous sections explained and illustrated potential risks for privacy 
when using common Internet applications. Evidently, there are a number of 
places where an adversary may acquire data in transit across the Internet. 
Clearly, if an adversary can access all the data packets forming a 
communication they will be able to access the content which may contain 
personal information. The content of a communication is generally protected 
in the laws in the US and the UK as covered in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. 
It is not so protected in China, and it is indeed clearly accessed by filtering 
software and the army of censors as was discussed in Chapter 5. 
There is another component part which itself can be privacy invasive. 
Metadata indicates the facts of a communication, for example where it came 
from and where it is going. This was already discussed and presented in 
Chapter 2. Accessing this data is not as straightforward as a telephone tap or 
a pen register. Most of the metadata of interest is contained deep within the 
data packets and it is necessary to understand the essential technique 
necessary to access it. In order to understand how data can be extracted from 
packets of information passing across the Internet it is necessary to examine 
the communications protocol and the structure of packets more closely. 
As was described in Chapter 2 packets of data are routed across the Internet 
depending on the addressing information they contain. The actual content of 
a communication may be spread across many data packets or may be held in 
a single packet, depending on the size of the data. This content is of no 
interest to the systems responsible for delivering it: routers need access to IP 
addresses and so they access the Internet layer (OSI layer 3). The deeper we 
look into the packet, the more information we can find. Shallow Packet 
Inspection (SPI) can be used to access the Transport layer (OSI layer 4) 
where it then has access to TCP ports. This may be used for resource 
management; an example being to route web traffic to one server and video 
traffic to another, or to throttle the speeds of some types of traffic to permit 
greater bandwidth for others. However, the technique known as Deep Packet 
Inspection (DPI) decodes the entire packet and thus, can gain access to the 
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payload data. Data in this case contains a mixture of content and metadata. 
For example, the headers of an email and the requests for a web page exist 
at the Application layer (OSI layer 7) along with any content. 
Figure 6.1: simplified data packets899 
                            Header 
 
                    Source IP address 
                Destination IP address 
                           Options 
Source port Destination port 
 
Sequence number 
Flags and options 
Data example 1: 
 
GET /info/5000/about HTTP/1.1 
Host: www.leeds.ac.uk 
 
 
Data example 2: 
 
POST /register.cgi HTTP/1.1 
Host: somebank.com 
 
name=Harmer&sex=M&year=1986&passport= 
 
Figure 6.1 shows two simplified examples of data contained in a packet. The 
first example (Data example 1) is a request for a web page while the second 
example (Data example 2) is a request to send data to an application on the 
web server. This illustrates the complexity of extracting metadata required 
under the US and UK surveillance laws. The data field contains a mixture of 
metadata and content. In Data example 1, this is the sequence that would be 
sent as a browser request for http://www.leeds.ac.uk/info/5000/about. The 
GET command informs the web server of the file required and will be defined 
as content. The following line indicates the host name (www.leeds.ac.uk in the 
above example) and is defined as metadata because it is here only that the 
                                            
899 For a description of the formats and fields, refer generally to RFC791 
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc791> accessed 18 December 2016), and 
RFC793 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc793> accessed 18 December 
2016, and their updates. 
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server part of the URL appears in the data. As was described earlier, the IP 
address rarely yields the web server name. Data example 2 shows data being 
sent to a remote application. Again, the first line is content and the second is 
metadata. The content data appears after these lines. As all parts of the 
packet are accessible at this level, care must be taken to separate metadata 
from content. 
The UK’s plans to record ICRs was already discussed in Chapter 4. DPI is a 
requirement in order to make ICRs feasible because at the very least, ICRs 
require the recording of host names. Wherever DPI is in place, one simply 
needs to extract the HTTP host header as is shown in Figure 6.1.900  
As was discussed in the above sections our activities on the Internet can leave 
our personal information or potential identifying information in any number of 
jurisdictions, thus posing issues for our Internet privacy. The structure of the 
Internet is such that surveillance can easily be carried out at a number of 
points. Additionally, it is never clear to the user exactly where their data will 
go when it traverses the Internet. Internet communications consist broadly of 
two components – the content of the communication, and the metadata 
associated with the transmission of that content – and whether these can be 
protected is discussed next.  
6.5 Technical methods of improving Internet privacy 
In order to maintain Internet privacy two component parts of a communication 
must be protected. The content of a communication is the easiest of the two 
because encryption can be used. This is described below. However, as will 
be explained the metadata, which consists of information including the fact 
that the communication took place as well as who the sender and recipient 
are is more difficult to protect. 
                                            
900 Science and Technology Committee (Commons), Investigatory Powers 
Bill: technology issues 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmsctech
/573/57305.htm>, 26 
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6.5.1 Protecting the content – encryption 
Encryption is the process of converting a message into a cryptogram (or 
ciphertext),901 and cryptography is the set of techniques which enable this 
encryption. A key is needed to unscramble the message to produce the 
original.902 There are three common cryptographic techniques employed on 
the Internet, namely digital certificates, symmetric key cryptography, and 
public key cryptography. Depending on the communications mechanism 
used, these three cryptographic techniques may be used sequentially, and 
this is depicted below. 
Symmetric key cryptography is a symmetrical system with a single key being 
used to both encrypt and decrypt the information to be passed between 
parties. Both the sender and receiver need the same key. The principal issue 
with symmetric key encryption is how the communicating parties obtain the 
key. For instance, if Bob wants to send encrypted information to Alice, he has 
to first send the key to Alice. If Eve obtains this key in transit, Eve can decrypt 
any information sent between Bob and Alice. 
Unlike symmetric key cryptography, public key cryptography uses two keys - 
one public and freely distributable, and one private, the security of which is 
critical. A message encrypted with a user’s public key can only be decrypted 
by their private key and vice versa. Here, when Bob wants to send an 
encrypted message to Alice, he obtains her public key and uses this to encrypt 
the message. Alice then uses her private key to decrypt the message, and 
vice versa. Even if Eve obtains the public, keys she cannot decode any of the 
messages as she does not have either private key. 
Despite this, there are two issues with public key cryptography. The first issue 
is that it is computationally expensive and therefore, it is only suitable for short 
exchanges. In order to exchange encrypted information more efficiently 
                                            
901 Don J Torrieri, Principles of secure communications systems (2nd edn.) 
(Artech House, Boston, 1992), p463 
902 Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau (n 336) p13 
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symmetric key encryption is used, with public key encryption used first to 
exchange the symmetric key in a secure fashion. The second issue with public 
key cryptography is ‘how does Alice know that Bob really is Bob?’. Eve could 
just as easily publish a public key in Bob’s name and sent this to Alice; 
therefore, Alice could unknowingly be communicating with Eve. It is here 
where digital certificates play a role. A digital certificate has some form of proof 
attached to it, typically obtained when the certificate is purchased from a 
Certificate Authority (CA). For example, a CA may request copies of passports 
and proof of address, though procedures can be weak as illustrated by the 
fact that two researchers were able to trick Comodo’s automated checking 
system into producing a certificate for a server which they had no relationship 
with.903  
Digital certificates contain the user’s or server’s public key, an expiry date, and 
other validation information. The overarching standards and processes that 
permit the creation of certificates forms a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). 
Public key cryptography was seen as a threat both by GCHQ and the NSA 
who ‘doggedly fought’904 against it.905 Once a message has been encrypted, 
it can only be decrypted in one of two ways: using the relevant key; or by a 
brute force attack. The latter mechanism is described by Parker Voors as 
                                            
903 Shaun Nichols, ‘Como-D’oh! Infosec duo exploits OCR flaw to nab a 
website’s HTTPS cert’, (The Register, 21 October 2016) 
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/21/comodoh_researchers_exploit
_image_recognition_bug_to_steal_certs/> accessed 30 October 2016 
904 Richard J Aldrich, GCHQ: the uncensored story of Britain’s most secret 
intelligence agency (Harper Press, London, 2010), p492 
905 At one stage the US government was so concerned at the evolution of 
encryption technologies outside of the NSA’s control that it classified 
them as munitions, meaning strict export controls could be applied. See 
David Baron and Victoria Chang, Sophis Networks and encryption 
export controls (A), Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 
case no. Sp-34(a), 2000, p8 
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someone ‘holding a key ring with millions of keys, trying each key in the lock’906 
until a match is found.  
Proposals such as key escrow, where all or part of a key would be lodged with 
a third party, or key recovery, where the encryption system itself effectively 
had a back door were planned, but the availability of strong encryption from 
European countries made this unworkable.907 However, RIPA did incorporate 
a section to deal with the issue of encryption. Part III of the Act came into force 
on 1 October 2007908 and dealt with this subject. Essentially, in order for the 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to have any hope to gain access 
to the contents of an encrypted communication, they need to obtain the 
encryption keys909 by issuing a notice under RIPA s.49.910 The penalties 
involved raise an interesting issue: for example, when faced with a sentence 
of 10 years to life for possession of child abuse images a person may choose 
to refuse to decrypt these for the lesser sentence of up to two years.911 One 
may wonder how effective s.49 will be against the criminal underworld or, 
indeed, a hardened terrorist. This has already been noted by the courts, for 
example, in Harlan Laboratories UK Ltd & Anor v Stop Huntingdon Animal 
                                            
906 Matthew Parker Voors, ‘Encryption regulation in the wake of September 
11, 2001: must we protect national security at the expense of the 
economy?’, 55 Fed. Comm. L.J. 331 2002-2003, p336 
907 Aldrich (n 904) 492 
908 SI 2007/2196 
909 Although it is technically possible to break many forms of encryption by 
brute force means, the computing power and time required can be 
enormous. However, this is further discussed in Chapter 6. 
910 A principle argument against RIPA s.49 was that being forced to hand 
over an encryption key could lead self-incrimination and would thus 
breach ECHR Art. 6. However, this was clarified in R v S and A [2008] 
EWCA Crim 2177 in which it was determined that an encryption key 
merely makes readable evidence that is already in the lawful possession 
of the police and the key by itself is no different to the key to a locked 
drawer. 
911 HC Deb 06 March 2000 vol 345 cc767-835 at col.812; See RIPA (n 689) 
s.53. 
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Cruelty ("SHAC") & Anor912 that one of the defendants willingness to be 
prosecuted under RIPA s.53 indicated the extent to which he desired to keep 
his material out of police hands.913 Even as modified by s.15 of the Terrorism 
Act 2006 the maximum term of imprisonment under RIPA s.53 is five years in 
national security cases. This section of RIPA seems more focused on the 
‘average citizen’ who, faced with the threat of legal action under the Act is 
most likely to hand over the keys with little regard to their privacy. 
Although there are weaknesses in the CA model and PKI itself which will be 
discussed in Section 6.6.2 below encryption is a proven mechanism for 
protecting the content of communications, but this leaves the issue of the 
metadata. This is discussed next. 
6.5.2 The problem of metadata 
Encryption is a viable means to protect the content of a communication 
provided the method of encryption itself remains secure. The increasing use 
of End-to-End Encryption (E2EE), in particular in apps, means encryption is 
always enabled and that the supplier has no access to the encryption keys. 
Therefore, the provider cannot be compelled to assist with decryption. Where 
encryption is used to access web resources, only the source and destination 
IP addresses and ports, and potentially the web server’s host name, remain 
accessible as metadata. The metadata trail between communicating users 
can also be broken by passing communications via a central server. In such 
a case communications metadata will only show Bob communicating with 
some central server, and later Alice communicating with the same server but 
not with each other.914 WhatsApp915 offers voice, video and messaging 
                                            
912 EWHC 3408 (QB) (7/12/12) 
913 EWHC 3408 (QB) (7/12/12) at 43 
914 If the server itself or its Internet connections were being surveilled it may 
be possible to match Bob and Alice if the timing of the communications 
suggested a link. However, this may be impractical on a busy server with 
numerous simultaneous connections. 
915 See https://www.whatsapp.com accessed 03/01/17 
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between people and uses E2EE by default. For messaging WhatsApp routes 
these through central servers. 
However, for more general Internet communications such as accessing 
websites connections are made between the user’s browser and the target 
web server and the metadata trail is left accessible. Only the data part of the 
TCP segment can be encrypted as otherwise communications would not be 
possible – for example, the IP addresses and TCP ports must still be available. 
Although the HTTP headers are a part of the encrypted content there is a 
further weakness in the requirement that the name of the host being 
connected to be sent in clear text by Server Name Indication (SNI).916 This is 
done to enable a web server to select the relevant digital certificate to be used 
to enable encryption, but it means that this important piece of metadata is still 
available regardless of encryption. In other words, even when encryption is 
used, the host name is still available using DPI. 
In order to protect one’s metadata as well as content, there would need to be 
a way to encrypt or otherwise, hide that metadata. One method is to use a 
VPN where the only metadata trail from one’s device is to the VPN server. 
Communications between the client and the VPN server are encrypted. The 
VPN server is then used to make onward connections and communications. 
For scenarios such as ICRs, it means the ICR would only ever record the 
connection between the client and the VPN server, not the target website.  
VPNs are a practical way to maintain one’s Internet privacy, but an adversary 
with sufficient resources and metadata could still potentially determine the 
end-to-end path. For example, if a VPN was supporting only one client one 
may assume that any onward connection from the VPN is done as a result of 
a request from that client. If the VPN were supporting a number of 
simultaneous clients this becomes problematic. However, there is a system 
which provides anonymity by using a mixture of encryption and routing via 
                                            
916 Donald Eastlake, ‘Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension 
Definitions’, RFC6066 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066> accessed 19 
November 2016 
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different systems which are widely dispersed, and which also encrypts the 
actual metadata. This is described next. 
6.5.2.1 Onion routing – Tor 
The issue of metadata can be solved by the use of onion routing. In 
conventional routing, the source and destination IP addresses are held in each 
data packet and thus, enabling the communication to be routed to its 
destination, but also allowing the data to be traced. Onion routing breaks this 
by the use of both encryption and multiple varying paths through the Internet. 
Tor917 is a decentralised mesh of computers spread throughout the world, with 
accessible entry and exit points, and a random path between interconnecting 
nodes. 
The concept of onion routing, also known as telescopic encryption,918 was 
originally developed by the US Navy Research Laboratory primarily to protect 
government communications.919 By using the onion routing technique, Tor 
enables people to ‘improve their privacy and security’920 while using the 
Internet. The 'onion' description refers to the fact that Tor encrypts the data 
once per each node in the chain. By default, a three node circuit is decided by 
the client browser and the encryption keys for each node acquired. The data 
and the required routing metadata is then encrypted by each set of keys, 
starting with the last node and working backwards. Finally, the encrypted 
bundle of data is sent to the first node. The first node decrypts the first layer 
of the data to determine where next to send it. This process happens 
sequentially until the data is sent to its destination by the final node. In this 
way, each node only knows where the data came from and where to send it 
                                            
917 Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson and Paul Syverson, Tor: the second-
generation onion router, Proc. Of the 13th Usenix security symposium, 
August 2004, 303-320, p303 
918 Cormac Callanan, and others, Leaping over the Firewall: a review of 
censorship circumvention tools, Freedom House, p41 
919 See http://www.onion-router.org/History.html accessed 07/11/12 
920 Ibid. 
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next; no node knows the entire circuit. Only the first node knows where the 
client is and it is only the last node which knows the actual destination of the 
communication. Only the last node has access to the communication itself and 
if this is encrypted at source, then it remains secure. The communication 
entering the Tor network is already encrypted, so the first node itself cannot 
access the content.921 
Figure 6.2: Tor routing 
 
Consider Figure 6.2. Bob is communicating with Alice. At first, the connection 
(denoted by the dashed line) goes from Bob to nodes A, C and E, and then to 
Alice. Later, the connection changes to nodes H, I and G (denoted by the dot 
and dash line). Later on during their conversation it will change again. For the 
sake of argument, we will assume that nodes A, D and G are in the US, nodes 
                                            
921 Damon McCoy and others, ‘Shining light in dark places: understanding 
the Tor network’, in Nikita Borisov and Ian Goldberg, (eds.) Privacy 
enhancing technologies, Proc. 8th international symposium, PETS 2008, 
Leuven, Belgium, July 2008 (Springer, Berlin, 2008), 63; see also 
Joshua A Altman, ‘A Schrodinger's onion approach to the problem of 
secure Internet communications’, 7 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 103 
2008, 112 
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B, E and H are in the UK, and nodes C, F and I are in Russia. In this scenario, 
nodes A and H are entry nodes, E and G are exit nodes, and C and I are 
intermediate nodes. These intermediate nodes are only aware that data is 
coming from and going to other nodes, but cannot see any information which 
relates to either Bob or Alice or their IP addresses. The entry nodes see Bob, 
but have no other information and are unaware of Alice; and, in the same way, 
the exit nodes know Alice but not Bob. Even if one had access to the metadata 
from each node as shown in Figure 6.2, if those nodes are busy and thus 
sending and receiving a lot of traffic it would be extremely difficult to identify 
the actual user.922  
Tor is even more secure where two users are communicating wholly within it. 
For example, the TorChat Instant Messenger uses a hidden service as 
intermediary between Tor-connected users. As the encryption of any 
communication sent via Tor is encrypted before it is sent to the entry node, all 
communications remain encrypted throughout. 
6.5.2.2 Disadvantages of using Tor 
Websites are often rich in content and functionality. As was discussed in 
Section 6.2 access to one web page can result in access being made to many 
other resources across the Internet. While images will be accessed over Tor, 
some scripts may make direct access, bypassing Tor. The Tor Browser 
Bundle has options to block scripts and also to attempt https access to 
websites. File downloads can also bypass Tor. Blocking scripts may result in 
a lack of functionality on websites and this, along with latency caused by the 
rate at which data passes through the Tor network can dissuade users from 
                                            
922 When observed (07/11/12) there were 2,968 Tor relays online. The exit 
node, and thus apparent IP address (via the Tor checker) changed after 
approximately 5 minutes, moving from a node in the US to one in 
Sweden; then after approx 10 minutes it changed again, this time to a 
node in Russia. 
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using it. The average user may not be willing to ‘trade their connection speed 
for the added security and privacy’923 offered by Tor. 
Another significant fact for this research is that China is able to block access 
to Tor entry points, thus making it difficult for users there to access Tor.924 The 
most common method employed to block Tor is to block access to its directory 
servers, the IP addresses of which are published. To counter this, the 
developers of Tor have established a series of systems called Tor bridges 
which can be used to connect into the Tor network but which are not 
themselves Tor nodes and are not listed in the directory. The identity of these 
bridges can be obtained via other means, for example, via a website925 or by 
e-mail.926 
6.5.3 Improving Internet privacy – summary 
The above sections have shown the issues surrounding keeping one’s 
information and communications private. In sum, encryption can be used to 
secure the content and much of the metadata of communications and, where 
that is all that is required, then it does provide an easy solution. Where the 
fact that someone is communicating also need to be made private, VPNs can 
be used. For a greater level of privacy protection, Tor can be used, albeit with 
a reduction in the rich user experience that the modern web provides. 
However, despite the methods explained above there are still ways in which 
                                            
923 C Callanan and others, Leaping over the Firewall: a review of censorship 
circumvention tools, Freedom House, p42 
924 See in general Philip Winter and Stefan Lindskog, ‘How China is blocking 
Tor’, arXiv:1204.0447, 2 April 2012 <https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.0447>  
accessed 10 January 2017 
925 <https://bridges.torproject.org> 
926 Sending an e-mail from a Gmail or Yahoo! account to 
bridges@torproject.org with the text get bridges in the body will cause a 
list of bridges to be e-mailed back. It is important to note that, as Google 
and Yahoo! e-mail accounts can be obtained anonymously, even this 
step of the process maintains a level of anonymity 
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intelligence agencies can surveil the Internet and acquire our personal 
information while it is in transit. These are examined next. 
6.6 Intensifying Internet surveillance 
The previous section outlined, from technical perspectives, the issues of 
privacy in an Internet context, and indicated ways to at least attempt to 
maintain privacy. However, as explained and demonstrated in the previous 
chapters of this thesis, there are so many ways that data passing across the 
Internet may be surveilled. For instance, to recapitulate some of the research 
findings, one can intercept data either close to or at the client (user's) system, 
at the target, or as it passes across the Internet. One may surveil only the 
metadata, or the whole content. 
Technically speaking, tapping the Internet is very different from tapping a 
telephone. In the case of a telephone, a tap may consist literally of wires 
connected to the telephone line as it leaves the customers premises. Any 
communications sent or received along that line would be tapped. However, 
tapping the Internet differs from telephone tapping in two ways: first, there may 
be a vast number of communications between different parties travelling 
across the tap, depending on where the tap is applied; second, the content of 
a communication is buried within the protocols carrying that data and must be 
extracted. Assuming one has access to a tap, one needs to use DPI to extract 
the information from the data packets. 
In fact, mechanisms for acquiring Internet data are readily available. In the 
US, for instance, the company Amesys offers such a system927 and also 
published information relating to massive surveillance, where all data 
travelling across a link are analysed and archived for later analysis.928 The 
                                            
927 Amesys Intelligence Solutions  
<https://wikileaks.org/spyfiles/document/amesys/95_critical-system-
architect/95_critical-system-architect.pdf> accessed 23 January 2017 
928 Amesys, From Lawful to Massive Interception: Aggregation of sources, 
<https://wikileaks.org/spyfiles/files/0/21_200810-ISS-PRG-
AMESYS.pdf>, slide 11 
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company claimed this could enable ‘[g]lobal search and surveillance of all 
internet traffic’.929 Such tapping was revealed by Mark Klein in 2006. Klein 
claimed to have knowledge of a secure room - 641A - within the AT&T building 
in San Francisco where ISPs optical fibres were tapped. The tapped data 
could be analysed to give access to the entire data stream of all traffic.930 
Included in the various hardware in room 641A was a Narus STA 6400 
semantic traffic analyser.931 This device was able to analyse all traffic 
presented to it, via the fibre taps. Narus claims its products have been 
deployed by governments ‘around the world to protect their countries and 
infrastructure’932 with the capability to surveil whole networks regardless of 
speed and size. If located on major Internet backbones or CLSs or China’s 
Great Firewall this claim would appear surprisingly easy to achieve. 
Hence, based on the above a though provoking question needs to be asked 
that if an all-encompassing surveillance system were established, can there 
be any Internet privacy at all? This becomes the focus of discussion in this 
section, specifically looking at supportive evidence to testify whether Internet 
surveillance has been intensified to form a global surveillance mechanism. 
6.6.1 Mass Internet surveillance 
In the summer of 2013, the defence contractor Edward Snowden began 
leaking to the Press a number of secret documents from the NSA. He fled the 
US and worked with the Guardian, Washington Post and New York Times who 
published a series of articles revealing some of these documents. 
                                            
929 Ibid., slide 12 
930 See <https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/presskit/ATT_onepager.pdf> 
accessed 17 February 2013 
931 Mark Klein, Wiring up the big brother machine… and fighting it 
(Booksurge, South Carolina, 2009), 127 
932 See <archive.is/JKVOG> accessed 7/July/2013. The original page 
referred to as <www.narus.com/products/intercept.html> no longer exists 
but had been copied by the above archive facility 
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The first document to appear in the Press revealed that on 25 April 2013, the 
FISC had ordered Verizon to produce, on a daily basis, a record of all 
telephony metadata for calls both within the USA and from the USA to 
abroad.933 Incoming calls to the US from outside or wholly-external 
communications were not included. This information was to be passed to the 
NSA for the duration of the order, which expired on 19 July 2013. The order 
made it clear that no-one was to reveal the fact that this data collection was 
being carried out.934 
The Press releases which followed were to indicate the existence of extensive, 
mass Internet surveillance programmes operated by both the US and the UK 
such as PRISM, Upstream and Tempora which are depicted below. 
6.6.1.1 PRISM and Upstream: mass Internet surveillance programmes 
The mass Internet surveillance programmes PRISM and Upstream were 
revealed in the 2013 Snowden revelations. PRISM deals with direct 
acquisition of data from key providers while Upstream focuses on gathering 
data directly from major Internet links. Both programmes operate under s.702 
of the FAA. 
Several companies are described as being key providers to the PRISM 
programme. These include Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, 
YouTube (now owned by Google), Skype (now owned by Microsoft), AOL and 
Apple. It has been suggested that data is taken directly from the servers of 
these providers.935 Facebook quickly issued a statement denying that the NSA 
had a way to access the data they held, claiming to have ‘never received a 
                                            
933 US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Re Application of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation for an order requiring the production of tangible 
things from Verizon Business Network Services, Inc. on behalf of MCI 
Communication Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business Services  
<www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-
data-court-order> accessed 20 October 2013, 1 
934 Ibid., 2 
935 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data 
accessed 21 September 2013 
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blanket request or court order from any government agency asking for 
information or metadata in bulk’.936 However, Facebook also had a patent 
granted in May 2011, detailing a system which could in some cases 
automatically send personal data to a requesting law enforcement agency.937 
Moreover, the essence of an ability to tap into providers in the way suggested 
in the PRISM slides is covered by CALEA which was described in Chapter 3. 
Further evidence suggest that companies were indeed working with the 
government. For instance,  a document released by Snowden dating from 
2012 discusses the fact that Microsoft had introduced encryption to some 
services, cutting off PRISM access. Microsoft worked with the FBI to produce 
a solution.938 A further document released by Snowden and dating from 2013 
indicated that Microsoft had been working with the FBI in providing access to 
Skydrive (now Onedrive) and that had become a part of PRISMs standard 
stored communications collection.939 
The Snowden revelations resulted in a prompt response from the European 
Commission. Questions about PRISM were posed in a letter to the US 
Attorney General on 10 June 2013. This letter highlighted the scope of US 
legislation, stating that ‘direct access of US law enforcement authorities to the 
                                            
936 See https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10100828955847631 
accessed 13/nov/13 
937 US Patent 8438181 
938 Microsoft releases new service, affects FAA702 collection 
<https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/Microsoftreleasesnewservice
affectsFAA702collection2014-05-13nsadocs> accessed 29 May 2016 
939 SSO Highlight - Microsoft Skydrive Now Part of PRISM Standard Stored 
Communication Collection 
<https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/SSOHIGHLIGHT–
MicrosoftSkydriveCollectionNowPartofPRISMStandardStoredCommunic
ationsCollection2014-05-13nsadocs> accessed 29 May 2016 
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data of EU citizens on servers of US companies should be excluded unless in 
clearly defined, exceptional and judicially reviewable situations.’940 
The existence of the PRISM programme was confirmed in a statement from 
the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament which stated that 
PRISM was a programme ‘through which the US Government obtains 
intelligence material (such as communications) from’941 ISPs. President 
Obama also confirmed the existence of the PRISM and Upstream 
programmes.942 
It is found by this research, from a privacy perspective, these mass Internet 
surveillance programmes offer no protections to non-US persons as the 
Fourth Amendment only applies to US persons.943 With a  considerable 
percentage of global Internet traffic passing across the US, these surveillance 
programmes have the capability of accessing personal information not only 
within a particular nation state, but also on a global scale. As Wacks states 
(Section 2.2 page 18) this removes our freedom to be private. 
6.6.1.2 Tempora: GCHQs mass Internet surveillance programme 
An article published by the Guardian indicated that GCHQ had secretly gained 
access to submarine cables under its Mastering The Internet programme.944 
                                            
940 Viviane Reding, Letter to the US Attorney General from Viviane Reding, 
Vice-president of the European Commission, 10 June 2013, Ref. 
Ares(2013)193546 
941 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, ‘Statement on 
GCHQ’s Alleged Interception of Communications under the US PRISM 
Programme’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
ata/file/225459/ISC-Statement-on-GCHQ.pdf> accessed 20 July 2013 
942 ‘Barack Obama defends US surveillance tactics’ (BBC, 8 June 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22820711> accessed 10 
July 2016 
943 50 USC S1801(i) 
944 Ewen MacAskill and others, ‘GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret 
access to world’s communications’, (The Guardian, 21/June/2013) 
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Submarine cables provide an ideal tapping point for major worldwide 
communications. As was outlined in Chapter 2, these cables form pinch points 
in the global Internet, and much inter-regional and all intercontinental Internet 
traffic will flow through them. 
In fact, tapping undersea cables is not new. During the Cold War, the US 
tapped Russian submarine telephone cables in the seabed in an operation 
known as Ivy Bells.945 However, these cables were electrical, not fibre optic 
and could be tapped by induction. Modern fibre optic cables are a very 
different technology. These cables come ashore at CLSs which contain 
apparatus to combine Internet data from all ISPs involved in the cable 
operation into several light wavelengths which are then sent down the fibre to 
the remote CLS, and vice versa. Each wavelength typically carries data at a 
rate of 10 gigabits per second.946 It would be impractical to tap a fibre-optic 
cable on the seabed due to the following issues and constraints: (a) these 
cables run along the ocean floor and would need to be lifted on-board a ship 
in order to be tapped; (b) the cables also power repeaters located at points 
along the cable – this is typically between 5,000 and 10,000 volts; (c) CLSs 
continually monitor the state of the cable and a tap may raise an alarm; (d) if 
a cable were tapped at a distance from the coast one needs to install a similar 
cable and associated CLS in order to get the data back to shore. Hence, it is 
far more practical to compel CLS operators to install taps in their equipment.947 
Tapped data could then be retrieved, via dedicated cables or microwave links. 
It is important to note that, unless the tapped data can be processed at the 
                                            
<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-
communications-nsa> accessed 2 May 2016 
945 Grant Hodgson, ‘Breaking Encryption and Gathering Data: International 
Law Applications’, 20 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 39, 2015, 40 
946 As at 2016. Experiments are progressing to move to 40Gbps and 
beyond. 
947 See for example the Glimmerglass documentation that specifically 
discusses tapping single wavelengths in optical fibres to permit 
monitoring and interception 
http://www.glimmerglass.com/default/assets/File/Documents/app_notes/
App%20Notes%20-%20Lawful%20Interception.pdf accessed 25/04/16. 
- 192 - 
tapping point all of the data flowing across the tapped link must be transported 
to a remote facility for analysis. 
Described as a buffer, Tempora keeps all data acquired for 3 days and the 
metadata components for 30 days. As of May 2012, GCHQ had access to 46 
individual 10Gbps links.948 Tempora operates under RIPA s.8(4) which 
permits the interception of external communications without a warrant.949 
Taken together, PRISM, Upstream and Tempora present a major risk to 
informational privacy. Referring to Sections 6.2 and 6.3 it is clear that we run 
the risk of our personal information being recorded in multiple jurisdictions 
when browsing the web. Additionally, it is often not obvious where websites 
are located and these are often not in the same country as the user. Given the 
US and UK operate major Internet hubs and have programmes aimed at 
collecting Internet traffic data one can see how personal information may well 
be recorded without our knowledge or control. As stated by Kupfer (Section 
2.2 page 18) privacy enables us to decide when to share personal information 
with others and yet, mass Internet surveillance takes away this control and 
thus our autonomy. Given this knowledge one may conclude that Internet 
privacy is in fact dead. While one may consider encryption to maintain privacy 
to some extent, in particular privacy of the content of communications there 
are further threats which are discussed next.  
6.6.2 Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks on encryption 
As was discussed in Section 6.5.1 encryption can secure the content of a 
communication in transit. However, there are weaknesses in the mechanism 
which enables encryption to take place. As part of the process which 
establishes encrypted communications between a web browser and website, 
the website’s digital certificate will be checked by the browser. If anything is 
incorrect, the browser will issue a warning. Despite this, there are two issues 
                                            
948 See Tempora in https://edwardsnowden.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/tempora.pdf accessed 2 May 2016 
949 Big Brother Watch and others v United Kingdom, App. No. 58170/13, 33 
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with this process which can be exploited by an attacker. First, if there is a 
problem with the digital certificate sent by the web server it is up to the user 
whether or not to ignore the warning that the browser will issue. A study in 
2013 concluded that although browser warnings can be effective, almost 25% 
of users ignored malware and phishing warnings and 33% ignored certificate 
warnings in Firefox, with over 70% of Chrome users ignoring certificate 
warnings.950 Second, acceptance of the digital certificate is automatic unless 
the browser detects a problem. Both of these issues can be exploited in an 
attack. 
A MITM attack can be carried out where a user’s browser is sent to a different 
website than the one requested. One possible method is DNS poisoning. 
When a user enters a URL into a web browser, this causes a DNS lookup to 
determine the IP address to use. If the DNS return was altered, the browser 
can be made to target a different, rogue web server. Another and more direct 
approach is to simply force information to pass across a suitable tap as shown 
in Section 6.3. The user will be communicating with the rogue server directly. 
As found in this research, this is where the key weaknesses are. When the 
rogue web server sends its digital certificate, if any part of it is invalid, the 
browser will issue a warning. If the user ignores this, then communications will 
commence with the user wrongly assuming they are connected to the web 
server they originally wanted to access. If, on the other hand, the certificate 
appears valid, no challenge will be made and the user will be completely 
unaware they are communicating with a rogue server. For example, on 19 
July 2011, the Dutch company DigiNotar detected unauthorised accesses to 
its systems which had resulted in a number of ‘false (but authentic)’951 
                                            
950 Devdatta Akhawe and Adrienne Porter Felt, ‘Alice in Warningland: A 
large-scale field study of browser security warning effectiveness’, 
Proceedings of the 22nd USeNIX Security Symposium, August 14-16 
2013, Washington D.C., s.8 
<https://www.usenix.org/sites/default/files/sec13-proceedings.epub> 
accessed 28 October 2013 
951 Justin Hurwitz, ‘Trust and online interaction’, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1579, 
p1604 
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certificates being created. Certificates created included one for Google.952 The 
intruder appeared to be in Iran with the intention of using the rogue certificates 
to spy on users also in Iran.953 
Of course, even if the above scenario succeeds, unless the user receives what 
they expected, they may realise something is wrong. For example, Bob 
accesses Alice’s web server but Eve, as MITM, intercepts the connection and 
routes it to her own server. Unless Bob sees the expected information, he may 
not be fooled. However, all Eve needs to do is to receive the data request (e.g. 
the request for a web page) from Bob and retrieve that web page from Alice’s 
web server and send it on to Bob. In such circumstances, Bob will be unaware 
of any difference. As Eve intercepted the connection from Bob before it 
reached Alice, Eve can pretend to be Bob and so Alice’s web server will also 
be unaware of the deception too. Eve is truly the MITM. In fact, even an IM 
conversation could potentially be intercepted in the same way, with Eve 
intercepting messages from both Bob and Alice but sending her own 
responses to each.954 This technique was allegedly used by the NSA to route 
calls to Google to its own servers.955 
                                            
952 Hans Hoogstraaten and others, ‘Black Tulip: report of the investigation 
into the DigiNotar Certificate Authority breach’ (Fox-IT BV, Delft, 2012), 
p3 
<https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/rapporte
n/2012/08/13/black-tulip-update/black-tulip-update.pdf> accessed 27 
October 2013 
953 Ibid. 
954 Neal Hindocha and Eric Chien, ‘Malicious Threats and Vulnerabilities in 
Instant Messaging, Symantec Security Response White Paper, 2003’ 
<https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/malicious.threats.instant
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955 See https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-
mitm-google.html accessed 27/oct/13 
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6.6.3 Packet Injection – Man On The Side (MOTS) attacks 
The way data is broken into packets was described in Chapter 2. A data 
packet has everything in it needed to ensure that it reaches its destination. 
Data packets have sequence numbers in order to ensure that the data spread 
across them can be reconstructed. However, the Internet Protocol has a 
weakness caused by its ability to ignore duplicate packets. If two packets with 
the same sequence number arrive, only the first will be used. 
Packet injection is a technique whereby packets can be sent to the receiver in 
the hope that they arrive before the real packet. For example, when a user 
browses to a website, the browser sends a GET request to ask the remote 
server to send a page. The remote server will do so, sending the page as a 
series of packets. If an adversary can monitor the GET request being sent by 
the user’s browser, they can insert a packet with the relevant first sequence 
number. If the user’s browser receives this packet first, the real one arriving 
later is totally ignored.  
This research found that the packet injection technique is used in one of two 
ways. First, it is used by China’s firewall to disrupt communications. Here, the 
firewall injects a reset packet which will cause the user’s browser to give an 
error and not the desired web page. Second, as indicated by papers revealed 
by Snowden in 2013, it can be used to send redirect requests to the user’s 
browser. This technique, which is referred to as Quantum Insert956 works 
because web servers can legitimately send redirect requests to users’ 
browsers, for example to indicate that a web page has moved. An example of 
how this might be used is as follows. Bob browses to Alice’s website for some 
purpose. His browser issues a GET command in the usual way. The security 
forces use Quantum Insert to redirect Bob’s browser to Hotmail. On receiving 
the redirect Bob’s browser now connects to Hotmail and issues a GET 
command. Bob happens to be a Hotmail user. His browser now automatically 
                                            
956 ‘Deep Dive into Quantum Insert’ (Fox IT, 20 April 2015) <https://blog.fox-
it.com/2015/04/20/deep-dive-into-quantum-insert/> accessed 25 January 
2017 
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sends across any Hotmail cookies stored from previous sessions. These 
cookies may include Bob’s Hotmail userid and other information which can 
now be surveilled by the security forces. The security forces now have Bob’s 
IP address and, potentially, details of his Hotmail account. 
Quantum Insert relies on the ability to inject packets that beat the genuine 
packet back to the user’s browser. For this to be practical the injectors must 
be located on high speed Internet links, typically within the major CSPs. 
6.6.4 Exploiting fundamental weaknesses in encryption 
Encryption has always caused concern for law enforcement agencies. In 
1993, the US introduced the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) based on 
a cipher known as Skipjack which was created by the NSA. Devices known 
as the Clipper chip and Capstone chip implemented EES in hardware. The 
system worked by the government receiving a copy of the unique key 
embedded in each chip at manufacture.957 The Standard was eventually 
abandoned and in any event would only have been of use if no other 
encryption devices or products could be used. 
Therefore, given the variety of encryption products which are generally 
available, governments need some other way to gain access to encrypted 
content. Although MITM attacks can succeed they do so by fooling a client 
system into opening an encrypted communication with the intercepting third 
party rather than breaking the encryption. 
However, documents released by Snowden regarding project BULLRUN 
indicated that the NSA had spent 10 years leading an ‘aggressive, multi-
pronged effort’958 to break encryption and defeat ‘network security and 
                                            
957 Matt Blaze, Protocol Failure in the Escrowed Encryption Standard, 20 
August 1994 <http://www.crypto.com/papers/eesproto.pdf> accessed 25 
May 2016 
958 BULLRUN (undated) 
<https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/BULLRUN2014-12-
28nsadocs> accessed 22 May 2016 
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privacy’.959 Although no definite information is given, Snowden’s documents 
suggest that a mixed method is adopted, including Computer Network 
Exploitation (CNE), collaboration with other agencies, use of high-
performance computers and advanced mathematical techniques. The NSA 
considered the BULLRUN project to be so sensitive that even the knowledge 
of the possibility must be heavily restricted.960 
One outcome of BULLRUN was the modification of a key component of 
encryption systems. Modern encryption typically relies on the generation of 
random numbers in order to create the encryption keys. A report in the Press 
suggested that the NSA had created flawed random number generator which 
was incorporated by RSA961 into their security products.962 Allegedly, this was 
a modification to the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator  
(Dual_EC_DRBG) which was one of four random number generators 
authorised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This 
revelation was considered so serious that NIST removed the random number 
generator from its set of recommended products due to its own investigation 
and public opinion.963 The random number generator was set as the default in 
RSA’s own widely used BSafe library allegedly when RSA received a large 
                                            
959 BULLRUN CoI briefing sheet (undated) 
<https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/BULLRUNCoI–
BriefingSheet2013-09-05nsadocs> accessed 22 May 2016 
960 Ibid. 
961 RSA has multiple related meanings. RSA is formed from the initials of 
Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adelman who pioneered public key 
cryptography; as a company, RSA Security produce cryptographic 
libraries. 
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sum of money from the NSA.964 Weakening the randomness of the generator 
would make it computationally much easier to work out the seed numbers and 
therefore, recover the encryption keys. This would certainly fit BULLRUN’s 
aim of defeating Internet privacy. 
Another NSA program revealed by Snowden is aimed specifically at VPNs. 
TURMOIL is described as a passive device designed to extract the encryption 
key exchange data from a VPN connection. Collected traffic is then fed to the 
NSA for computational analysis and potentially decryption.965 By comparison, 
attempting a brute force attack on the symmetrical Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) is impractical. Researchers who proposed a method to 
shorten the key recovery time of 128-bit AES-128 theorised that a one trillion 
core machine capable of processing one billion keys per core per second 
could still take over two billion years to recover the key.966 This, plus the fact 
that the much stronger 256-bit AES-256 is commonly used now, means brute 
force computational cracking of encrypted information relies on weakening the 
encryption algorithms or finding other as-yet unpublished flaws. Any 
encryption product which has been deliberately weakened will provide access 
not only to governments, but also to criminals and hostile state actors. 
6.6.5 Exploiting weaknesses in Tor 
This research found that Tor still provides an adequate solution to maintain 
ones privacy. Slides revealed by Snowden show that the NSA themselves will 
                                            
964 Daniel Bernstein, Tanja Lange and Ruben Niederhagen, Dual EC: A 
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not be able to routinely de-anonymise Tor users.967 After analysing Snowden’s 
documents, it is found that the security services have access to some Tor 
nodes, but this is of little practical use unless they have access to all the nodes 
in a Tor circuit. As discussed in Section 6.5.2.1, these circuits change with 
time and can also be changed by the user at any time. Other attack vectors 
include timing attacks where one compares traffic entering and exiting the 
network. Yet, the practicalities of this attack method is reduced where Internet 
traffic is heavy through the various Tor nodes in a circuit, making it hard to 
determine that data entering really is the same as that exiting. Tor can also be 
degraded by flooding it with data or advertising slow nodes as fast, causing a 
bottleneck and potentially dissuading users from using Tor. 
However, Snowden revealed evidence of a more active attack on Tor using 
packet injection. Slides released by Snowden detail a programme called 
Egotistical Giraffe968 where Quantum Inserts were used specifically against 
Tor when websites under surveillance were accessed, redirecting browsers to 
Hotmail and Yahoo!, and reading any cookies transmitted as a result. These 
cookies could contain user account details or e-mail addresses, enabling 
identification of the user concerned. In addition, a programme referred to as 
FoxAcid was allegedly used with Quantum Insert diverting browsers to the 
FoxAcid server which would inject malware aimed at de-anonymising the 
actual user by causing the target computer to bypass Tor and access a server 
operated by the FBI. This malware caused the target computer to send its 
MAC address and IP number to the FBI server. This attack worked due to a 
                                            
967 Tor Stinks, June 2012 
<https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/TorStinks2013-10-
04nsadocs> accessed 29 May 2016 
968 Tailored Access Operations, ‘Peeling Back the Layers of Tor with 
Egotistigal Giraffe’, <https://www.eff.org/files/2014/04/09/20131004-
guard-egotistical_giraffe.pdf> accessed 25 January 2017 
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flaw in the version of Firefox used by Tor at that time. This exploit was used 
to uncover a hidden service969 hosting child pornography.970  
6.6.6 Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) 
More generally, ISPs themselves are vulnerable. Documents revealed by 
Snowden and published by Der Spiegel971 indicate the existence of an 
operation by GCHQ to gain access to BICS, a Belgacom subsidiary. The aims 
of the operation were to gain CNE access to Belgacom’s core routers in order 
to carry out MITM attacks against roaming smartphones,972 to ‘[e]xpand 
collection and capability to enable better exploitation of Belgacom’,973 identify 
key staff974 and map the Belgacom network,975 and ‘investigate VPN links … 
                                            
969 Hidden servers are those only accessible via Tor using special DNS 
entries within Tor itself; they use the .onion domain which does not exist 
outside of Tor. A well known example was Silk Road which was closed 
down by the FBI after its owner was traced as a result of using normal 
email accounts. These hidden services form what has become popularly 
known as the Dark Web. See United States of America v Ross William 
Ulbricht 
970 Kevin Poulsen, ‘FBI admits is controlled Tor servers behind mass 
malware attack’, (Wired, 13 September 2013) 
<https://www.wired.com/2013/09/freedom-hosting-fbi/> accessed 28 
May 2016 
971 ‘Britain’s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecoms Firm’ (Spiegel Online, 20 
September 2013) <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-
spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html> 
accessed 28 May 2016 
972 GCHQ Network Analysis Centre, Mobile Networks in MyNOC World, slide 
9 
<https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/MobileNetworksinMyNOCWo
rld2014-12-13nsadocs> accessed 28 May 2016 
973 Ibid., slide 11 
<https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/MobileNetworksinMyNOCWo
rld2014-12-13nsadocs> accessed 28 May 2016 
974 Ibid. 
975 Ibid. 
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to other telecoms providers’.976 This is an example of state sponsored CNE 
aimed specifically at gaining access to foreign networks. 
In addition to the above, other examples are found including the use of zero-
day exploits against targets. A zero-day exploit is the use of a vulnerability in 
software or hardware before that vulnerability is known and therefore, before 
it can be patched.977 FoxAcid, or similar exploits could be used to insert zero-
day malware into a target computer. There is no protection from such an 
exploit because until it is revealed, virus scanners and detection software 
cannot be updated to check for the vulnerability. Bilge and Dumitras 
determined that the average lifetime of such exploits is 312 days during which 
criminals and state actors alike can continue to use exploits undetected.978 
Hence, there is a clear implication on privacy. For example, if such an exploit 
were to install a key-logger, for example then everything typed could 
potentially be fed to an adversary, bypassing any privacy protections in place. 
Alternatively, access to the filesystem could give access to one’s private key 
which could then be used to decrypt any encrypted communications. 
6.7 Conclusion 
From a technical point of view, it is difficult to see how privacy can be reliably 
maintained when faced with state actors with significant resources and access 
to techniques like those of the US and the UK. Once again, this is a clear 
indication that when compared to China, the US and the UK are not so 
                                            
976 Ibid. 
977 An extreme example of a zero-day exploit is Stuxnet which was used to 
physically destroy centrifuges at an Iranian nuclear processing facility. 
Although not initially Internet delivered it used zero-day exploits in 
Microsoft Windows. See Ralph Langner, ‘Stuxnet: Dissecting a 
Cyberwarfare Weapon’, IEEE Security & Privacy, May/June 2011, pp 
49-51 
978 Leyla Bilge and Tudor Dumitras, ‘Before We Knew It: an Empirical Study 
of Zero-Day Attacks In The Real World’, CCS ’12: Proceedings of the 
2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 
October 2012. 
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different where Internet privacy is concerned. However, the argument that 
governments need to be able to invade the privacy of terrorists in order to 
keep us safe is a powerful one. Another equally powerful is the argument 
presented by governments is that if one could truly secure one’s 
communications content and metadata from the security agencies, this 
dramatically weakens their ability to fight terrorism and crime. 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) defines pervasive monitoring as 
an attack and will work to mitigate it.979 Therefore, it is very likely that future 
technical efforts to maintain Internet privacy will be proposed. Encryption is 
part of the privacy battleground. Efforts outlined above to increase the use of 
encryption on the Internet are met with potential legislation to weaken or 
provide back-door access to encrypted communications. China goes one step 
further and can now block encrypted communications. Encryption remains a 
viable mechanism to protect content privacy in the US and the UK, but this is 
threatened by legislative moves. In addition to this, new technologies threaten 
to dramatically decrease the time taken to computationally break 
encryption.980 The Internet has become a technology battleground, with 
methods of defeating encryption pitted against methods to protect it. 
Yet, finding the terrorist is a complex problem. An IP address is not a reliable 
way to prove that someone sent a communication or is communicating with 
someone else. Tracing what IP address connects to where does not 
necessarily show who is communicating with whom. An IP address by itself 
may only show who pays the bill for the relevant ISP service, and where 
services such as VPNs or Tor are used the recorded IP address may not even 
be on the same continent. 
                                            
979 Stephen Farrell and Hannes Tschofenig, Pervasive Monitoring is an 
Attack <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7258> accessed 23 December 2012 
980 Amy Nordrum, Quantum Computer Comes Closer to Cracking RSA 
Encryption, IEEE Spectrum, 3 march 2016 
<http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-
talk/computing/hardware/encryptionbusting-quantum-computer-
practices-factoring-in-scalable-fiveatom-experiment> accessed 19 
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As has been shown in this chapter, given the resources available to 
intelligence agencies tapping the Internet is relatively straightforward. If this 
tapping is done at sufficiently numerous, tactically relevant locations, then the 
whole Internet actually could become a surveillance mechanism. The issue 
then becomes not how to acquire the communications, but how to analyse the 
sheer quantity of data this would produce in order to produce any useful 
intelligence. 
This chapter also demonstrated methods of maintaining Internet privacy. 
None are perfect when faced with the programmes revealed by Snowden, but 
they are able to secure the content of communications and, to a great extent 
also the metadata. 
As described in Chapter 2, the Internet was likened to the road network with 
multiple paths where traffic is free to choose any path, and choke points 
through which everything must pass if travelling between countries. Although 
the Internet today is no longer so simple, it still has multiple paths and choke 
points. Also, information can be held at any point at the edge, or even in what 
may be considered the centre. Large datacentres store data which may then 
be described as being in the cloud and people may have no idea as to where 
their data actually is at any given time. The Internet of Things is causing an 
explosion in the amount of data being pushed into the cloud, data which when 
collated may well form a very detailed profile about a family or an individual. 
In a surveillance society, all of this data may be accessible by the State, or by 
all States. 
Turning the Internet into a global surveillance machine puts everyone under 
surveillance regardless of guilt. Currently, no other technology offers this. 
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Chapter 7: Recovering Internet privacy: reflection and 
discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
This research initially set out to answer the research question: Is Internet 
privacy dead? In relation to this primary research question, two sub-questions 
were also posed: have the US and the UK reached the level of China with 
regard to the invasion of Internet privacy; and what measures can be taken to 
prevent mass Internet surveillance from destroying Internet privacy? 
So far, this research has reviewed the meaning of privacy in an Internet 
context and focused on the protection of one’s personal information. The 
structure of the Internet has been explained in order to pinpoint and 
demonstrate where and how easily privacy may easily be invaded. Further, 
Internet privacy protections and violations in a set of three chosen jurisdictions 
– the US, the UK and China – were examined and discussed in Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 respectively. The research found that in each case, there is clear 
evidence to show that privacy takes a back seat to surveillance, regardless of 
the reason for that surveillance. Methods of protecting Internet privacy and an 
analysis of the Snowden revelations surrounding increasing government 
mass Internet surveillance programmes was discussed in Chapter 6. 
The aim of this chapter is to build on the research findings from the previous 
chapters and propose answers to the specific research questions. 
7.2 The US, the UK and China: A comparative introspection 
Have the US and the UK reached the level of China with regard to the invasion 
of Internet privacy? As was discussed in Chapter 5 China has a highly 
developed Internet surveillance system and firewall which is able to block 
access to content, to monitor content for keywords, and to block encrypted 
communications. Its surveillance system is a mixture of technological and 
human monitoring. China does this in order to censor information arriving from 
outside the country as well as to monitor what citizens such as micro-bloggers 
are writing online. 
- 206 - 
From a technical perspective, the Chinese firewall is effective because at that 
level, it becomes physically impossible to reach an external website which is 
blocked. Additionally, China has evolved its technology to enable it to block 
encrypted communications, thus preventing people inside China from 
accessing services such as VPNs, Tor or any other service offering E2EE. 
China blocks social media websites, but in turn offers its own versions of 
these. It was reported that Weibo logged 222 million active users in 
September 2015981 with WeChat recording 806 million active users per month 
in the second quarter of 2016.982 These Chinese social media websites are 
popular and active, although again the censors can easily have material 
removed and accounts closed down with ease. Providing such in-country 
services with little other choice also increases China’s ability to monitor what 
it’s citizens are doing online. 
China’s real name policy when combined with blocks on encryption and State 
surveillance means it is hard to maintain any form of anonymity on the Internet. 
Internet privacy in China is thus dead. For this reason, China is presented as 
a worse-case scenario in terms of Internet privacy protection. 
However, although China appears to be a rights-oppressive state with an 
impressive country-wide Internet censorship and surveillance system, it is 
increasingly hard to hold China up as a pariah when the West invests in ever 
new ways to surveil its own population as well as that of the entire Internet. 
Where China may carry out intensive Internet surveillance, it does so for 
reasons including censorship and social stability; when one considers its 
desire to block pornography not all of this censorship is bad. The West 
increasingly desires to surveil the Internet in order to find terrorists or to thwart 
serious crime. While this may be laudable, the fact remains that both the US 
                                            
981 CIW Team, Weibo Search Users Insight 2015 
<https://www.chinainternetwatch.com/16366/weibo-search-users-
insights-2015/> accessed 27 December 2012 
982 CIW Team, WeChat monthly active users reached 806 million in Q2 2016 
<https://www.chinainternetwatch.com/18789/wechat-monthly-active-
users-reached-806-million-in-q2-2016/> accessed 27 December 2012 
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and the UK mount mass Internet surveillance. The difference is that with 
China, everyone is aware of the state’s desires and the fact that censorship is 
happening. Although each jurisdiction has enshrined surveillance in laws, the 
US and UK have attempted to hide the shear breadth of their Internet 
surveillance operations and capabilities, in part only revealed as a result of 
the 2013 Snowden revelations. Chapter 6 discussed the Snowden revelations 
and set out how surveillance programmes mounted by both the US and the 
UK apparently sought to gather as much information as possible via Internet 
taps and partnerships with major players. In addition to this, the laws and 
surveillance mechanisms in both the US and the UK were examined in 
Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, and in both cases, these act extraterritorially.  
The similarities are stark. China can control its Internet because it controls all 
the gateways connecting China to the wider, global Internet. In the US and the 
UK these gateways are not government owned or controlled but are operated 
by for-profit corporations. This may appear to be a fundamental difference, 
yet, the US and the UK both mounted surveillance operations in conjunction 
with these for-profit corporations, either by compelling them or by 
implementing laws that require them to provide surveillance capabilities, such 
as CALEA in the US and now the Investigatory Powers Act in the UK. In reality, 
it means that all three jurisdictions have similar surveillance capabilities 
regardless of the actual ownership of the infrastructure. 
However, China’s surveillance is at its borders and inwards. The situation with 
the US and the UK is dramatically different in that each State has major global 
Internet infrastructure carrying a very high proportion of the world’s Internet 
traffic. As was explained in Chapter 6 even where countries in the Southern 
Hemisphere are communicating with each other there is a good chance the 
communications path will traverse the US, the UK or, indeed, both. Each State 
has laws in place permitting extraterritorial surveillance, which includes 
surveillance of foreign Internet traffic passing through its gateways. Mass 
Internet surveillance in the US under EO12333 and FAA 702, and in the UK 
under Tempora are clear indications that the Internet surveillance capabilities 
of these two States far exceed that of China. 
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The use of encryption, put forward in Chapter 6 as a way to protect privacy of 
the content of communications as well as some of the metadata can now be 
blocked by China. It may seem that China has the upper hand when it comes 
to the invasion of Internet privacy if all content is accessible because 
encryption cannot be used. However, MITM provides one way to maintain 
access to encrypted communications. Furthermore, the weakness inherent in 
digital certificates and the possibility that governments will compel CAs to 
produce certificates such that the intelligence agencies can set up servers that 
pretend to be those of legitimate providers means that there are still ways to 
access encrypted material. Additionally, the arsenal of techniques amassed 
by the intelligence agencies which may be used in Internet surveillance may 
not yet be fully revealed by the Snowden revelations. Again, these three 
jurisdiction are not that different when it comes to the invasion of Internet 
privacy. China defeats encryption by making it impossible to use – the US and 
the UK do so by employing a range of technical measures. 
So, have the US and the UK reached the level of China with regard to the 
invasion of Internet privacy? If they have, then given there is no Internet 
privacy in China it means that Internet privacy in general is indeed dead. 
However, China’s control of the Internet is total, whereas in the US and the 
UK there are still effective methods of maintaining privacy on the Internet. For 
example, the use of VPNs and Tor are still possibilities. While these remain 
viable, although it may appear that in some cases the US and the UK have 
exceeded the invasiveness of China, it is not in totality. Therefore, it is 
proposed that the US and the UK have come close to China’s level of invasion 
of Internet privacy but as will be examined next the situation is not yet 
completely lost. 
7.3 The protection of Internet privacy 
The principal issue dealt with in this research is mass Internet surveillance. 
Although brought into public view by Snowden, the issue of mass Internet 
surveillance was discussed several years before that. This type of surveillance 
is flawed. It is inevitable that data mining the large datasets created by mass 
Internet surveillance will generate large numbers of false-positives and 
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negatives, resulting in actions being taken against large numbers of innocent 
people with little actual chance of finding the terrorists or criminals.983 Looking 
for a needle in a haystack is a popular analogy to use, but Schneier warns 
that when examining the haystack to find a needle, the thing not to do is keep 
adding hay.984 Yet, the strategy to collect all available data employed by the 
security agencies is doing exactly that. Because terrorists make every effort 
to merge into the crowd, one is then faced with finding the right needle in a 
great many needles.985 This is wholly disproportionate and must therefore fail 
the necessity test of the ECHR. Furthermore, if the action were considered 
arbitrary it must also fail Art 17 of the ICCPR. In any event the effectiveness 
of this method of surveillance is in doubt. For example, in an investigation into 
225 cases where individuals were charged with some form of terrorism related 
crime, it is found that bulk metadata collection played a part in a maximum of 
1.8% of those cases.986 
Lessig’s regulatory model is centred around what he terms a pathetic dot. This 
dot has four modalities acting upon it: architecture, market, law and norms. 987 
When related to Internet privacy architecture, which Lessig terms ‘code’ is the 
Internet itself and includes software agents. However, these modalities can 
not only regulate but can also protect.988 Where the pathetic dot represents 
                                            
983 Ian Brown and Douwe Korff, ‘Terrorism and the Proportionality of Internet 
Surveillance’, European Journal of Criminology 6(2), 2009, 125 
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Internet privacy Lessig’s model thus shows that each modality can regulate 
Internet privacy and also protect it. The ability of the law to protect privacy and 
also to regulate its invasion has been examined in previous chapters. The 
architecture of the Internet has been examined in Chapter 2 and in more depth 
in Chapter 6 and the laws and regulations in the three chosen jurisdictions 
were covered in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. These are discussed further, below. The 
role of social norms and the market and how these may aid Internet privacy 
are examined next. 
7.3.1 Increasing the awareness of informational privacy 
We live in societies and are subject to the norms determined by those 
societies. These norms may define what actions are right and what are wrong, 
theft for example.989 Norms may also define a demarcation between public 
and private, restricting access to an individual in a private space,990 thus, 
privacy itself is a social norm.  
Lessig points out that norms on the Internet are different from those local 
norms that one is subjected to.991 People may thus act differently when using 
the Internet because the norms differ. The CEO of Facebook indicated that 
people have become comfortable in sharing information more openly with 
others, and that this is a social norm which has been built over time.992 Where 
one would not tell strangers one’s personal details one may be content with 
sharing personal information generally on social networks simply because this 
follows the norm. Similarly, one would not expect to pass personal information 
to a shop keeper on making a purchase. Yet, on an Internet store one may 
                                            
989 Ibid., 11 
990 Ferdinand David Schoeman, Privacy and Social Freedom, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1992) 15 
991 Lessig (n 987) 19 
992 Amitai Etzioni, ‘The Privacy Merchants: What Is To Be Done?’, 14 U. Pa. 
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need to supply a lot of personal information in order to create an account 
before a purchase can be made.  
People are mostly aware that personal information that they provide to 
websites on the Internet is collected but they may not be aware of the potential 
for invasions of privacy this data provides or even how their personal 
information will be used.993 Privacy policies and associated practices can 
change at any time with notification typically only announced in the policies 
themselves.994 These policies are often ignored, not necessarily because they 
are difficult to read but because people just do not want to read them.995 In 
addition functionality can be changed which result in one’s personal 
information being treated in a different and potentially more invasive way. For 
example, Facebook changed its privacy settings in May 2010 following 
protests from users who found that previous changes caused confusion as to 
what information was public.996 Those setting still proved complex. In 
September 2010, a girl advertised her 15th birthday party as a Facebook 
event. Intending to only invite her friends, the event was actually marked as 
public. As a result, some 21,000 people ticked the box to say they would 
attend.997 
While we may be willing to share our personal information with others via 
social media websites, for example, the Snowden revelations made it clear 
that governments can and will tap into that information. Facebook, which  
gathers a large amount of personal information from its users and is designed 
                                            
993 Ibid., 929 
994 Privacy policies can be hard to understand and take time to read, see 
Outlaw 'Average privacy policy takes 10 minutes to read, research finds' 
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such that people use their real names998 was named as one company that is 
a key provider of information to the US government under the PRISM program 
which was discussed in Chapter 6. 
Set against this background it is clear that people are becoming more aware 
of the issues of mass Internet surveillance. The press coverage of the 
Snowden revelations has resulted in change. In 2015, a report produced by 
the Pew Research Center stated that 30% of US adults had ‘taken at least 
one step to hide or shield their information from the government.’999 The 2016 
TRUSTe / National Cyber Security Alliance consumer privacy index reports 
for the US and UK show that 44%1000 of US and 50%1001 of UK citizens share 
the opinion that Internet privacy will improve as consumer awareness 
improves. Both surveys show that the majority of people are concerned about 
informational privacy while awareness of how their information is used is in 
the minority. In addition, both surveys indicate that the majority of people will 
avoid companies that do not protect informational privacy.  
Education here leads to choice and changes to the social norms governing 
our use of the Internet. One may choose to share less information or to take 
greater care when sharing. One may choose to use privacy enhancing tools 
such as VPNs or Tor, and/or to move to using E2EE. In this way it can also 
influence the market in that software products implementing E2EE may 
become more mainstream. As people take more notice of privacy settings and 
of their use of personal information in general this has the potential to shift the 
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norm away from the Facebook model outlined above to one where people are 
less comfortable sharing personal information, thus providing greater 
informational privacy and giving us greater autonomy. 
One crucial question remains. One must ask why we should change our habits 
because of mass Internet surveillance. It could be argued that we have 
already changed our habits in order to use the Internet as we now more freely 
communicate and share information. Yet, the Internet, and more specifically 
the Web, have developed to benefit mankind as a whole. Why, then, should 
we now use it less because of surveillance? Of course, we should be able to 
use it to our benefit in whichever way we chose.  
7.3.2 Technical challenges to mass Internet surveillance 
Awareness of the threats of mass Internet surveillance can also play a part in 
major changes to the location of personal information and how it is handled 
by key companies. The move to cloud based services has resulted in data, 
including personal information being sent to data processing facilities in 
foreign jurisdictions. If such data moves between the EU and the US the data 
will pass across transatlantic cables and thus be subject to interception under 
Upstream and Tempora. To combat this providers such as Microsoft1002 and 
Amazon1003 are building data centres within the EU. These moves are 
predominantly to solve the issues of exporting personal information outside of 
the EU, but they have had an effect on law enforcement access to data. This 
can be illustrated by a 2014 case where the US Government had used the 
SCA to attempt to compel Microsoft to produce e-mails from a Hotmail account 
physically hosted in Ireland. Here, a search warrant had been issued covering 
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premises ‘owned, maintained, controlled, or operated’1004 by Microsoft, 
regardless of their location. Microsoft appealed, but the US District Court for 
the Southern District of New York agreed with the original ruling.1005 Microsoft 
then appealed to the Second Circuit and gained high level support by way of 
amicus briefs from Amazon, Apple and the Irish Government, among 
others.1006 The Court found in Microsoft’s favour, concluding that the SCA 
warrant could not be used to force Microsoft to produce the relevant e-mails 
from the Dublin server, and reversing the decision of the District Court.1007 
Microsoft has built data centres in Germany where all customer data will be 
under the control of a data trustee which is a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom. 
This means that the data will no longer be controlled by Microsoft, or any other 
US company, further excluding it from the reach of the SCA. Microsoft Cloud 
Germany ensures that personal data stored in its cloud product remains in 
Germany and is controlled by the data trustee. Microsoft themselves have no 
right of access to servers which hold customer data without the supervision of 
the data trustee.1008 
The mass surveillance revealed by Snowden could have other effects on the 
structure of the global Internet. For example, Brazil’s Internet connections are 
currently routed via Florida in the US as was illustrated in Chapter 6. In 2014, 
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Brazil and the EU began planning to deploy a submarine cable running under 
the Atlantic to Spain in order to avoid the US completely.1009 Brazil may have 
engaged in political spin because the cable was actually announced in 
September 2012 before the 2013 Snowden revelations.1010 However, the fact 
remains that this is an example of Internet infrastructure being deployed which 
bypasses both the US and the UK.1011 
The above section gives a clear indication that the location and storage of 
personal information and, potentially the structure of the Internet itself is 
changing as a result of the threat of mass Internet surveillance. 
7.3.3 Legislative challenges to mass Internet surveillance 
As investigated above increased awareness of the risks of mass Internet 
surveillance has the potential to reduce the amount of personal information 
which we share, but the architecture of the Internet itself still poses a risk. 
Software suppliers have produced products with E2EE as a default and 
awareness of the issues can increase the update of these. Encryption is an 
effective way to secure one’s content but even where encryption is used the 
metadata is still at risk. As a solution, Tor does provide a greater degree of 
privacy protection than E2EE because it masks the metadata and routes 
between systems and even continents before accessing the target system. 
However, as was discussed in Chapter 6 Tor is not a mainstream product and 
does not give the same user experience when using media rich websites. 
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accessed 27 December 2016 
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Clearly, these methods alone cannot provide security from the threats to 
autonomy and informational privacy posed by mass Internet surveillance. It is 
therefore necessary to investigate how the law can help. As was shown in 
previous chapters the law can enable mass Internet surveillance but can also 
provide stronger privacy protections. Of equal importance the law can also 
regulate the intelligence agencies. These laws have evolved through key court 
cases and, in the case of the UK from the jurisprudence of the ECHR. 
However, generally speaking the protections provided by those laws act 
inwardly or act to protect only the citizens of a given jurisdiction. This allows 
extraterritorial surveillance which paved the way for the mass Internet 
surveillance carried out by programmes such as Upstream and Tempora. 
Because of this one needs to look to International law. 
Turning to international law privacy is enshrined in ICCPR Art.17 which was 
covered in Chapter 2. Art.17 includes two tests: whether interference with 
privacy is arbitrary; or unlawful. While the legality of interference with privacy 
may be defined in domestic laws, whether that interference is arbitrary needs 
further analysis. The UN Human Rights Council held the view that in order to 
pass the arbitrary test, interference, even if lawful, must be reasonable given 
the circumstances.1012 Referring to the Weber judgment the Human Rights 
Council reiterated that the very existence of mass Internet surveillance is an 
interference with privacy and that states would need to demonstrate that this 
is neither unlawful nor arbitrary.1013 It also stressed that even where an 
interference is in accordance with national law it may still fail the tests of Art. 
17 if that law is incompatible with the ICCPR. The Committee made a number 
of recommendations regarding mass Internet surveillance which can be 
summarised as follows: 
                                            
1012 CCPR General Comment No.16: Article 17 (Right to privacy) The Right 
to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and 
Protection of Honour and Reputation, Adopted at the Thirty-second 
Session of the Human Rights Council, on 8 April 1988, 4 
1013 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The right to privacy 
in the digital age, A/HRC/27/37, 30 June 2014, 20 
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 Surveillance must necessary, carried out for a legitimate aim and must 
have some chance of meeting its goals.1014 
 It must be proportionate to that aim including the need for it to be the 
least intrusive method available.1015 
 The law must be accessible meaning it must be both published and 
detailed such that a person can know which agencies can carry out 
surveillance and can foresee the consequences of that surveillance.1016 
 There must be effective safeguards and independent oversight to 
prevent abuse of surveillance.1017 
 There must be an effective remedy for violations of Art. 17.1018 
The UN has become increasingly outspoken on the issue of mass Internet 
surveillance. Emmerson1019 pinpointed that merely stating that mass 
surveillance can assist in the fight against terrorism does not provide 
justification for its use with regard to human rights. He further stated that ‘[t]he 
fact that something is technically feasible, and that it may sometimes yield 
useful intelligence, does not by itself mean that it is either reasonable or 
lawful’.1020 He also called for all states operating mass Internet surveillance 
programmes to produce a ‘detailed and evidence-based public justification for 
the systematic interference with the privacy rights of the online community’.1021 
Both the US and the UK have received unfavorable comments from the 
                                            
1014 Ibid., 23 
1015 Ibid. 
1016 Ibid., 28 
1017 Ibid., 37 
1018 Ibid., 39-41 
1019 Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism 
1020 Ben Emmerson, Promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, UN General 
Assembly, A/69/397, 23 September 2014, 11 
1021 Ibid., 63 
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Human Rights Council which expressed concern at mass communications 
surveillance and lack of oversight and safeguards. In both cases the 
Committee called for measures to be taken to ensure that surveillance meets 
the requirements of Art. 17 ‘regardless of the nationality or location of the 
individuals whose communications are under direct surveillance’,1022 clearly 
targeting the extraterritorial nature of Upstream and Tempora. 
Putting privacy further on the UN’s agenda, the UN Human Rights Council 
appointed a Special Rapporteur in June 2015 with a mandate1023 to 
investigate best practice and obstacles to privacy and, in particular, to report 
on alleged violations of UDHR Art. 12 and ICCPR Art. 17.1024 
A common analogy put forward when one is attempting to find one person in 
the crowd is that one is looking for a needle in a haystack. However, the 
necessity test should not be whether the aim of finding a needle in a haystack 
is a legitimate one; one needs to measure the impact on the whole haystack 
caused by the finding of that needle.1025 Given the successes or failures of 
mass Internet surveillance regimes are mostly hidden from public scrutiny by 
national security laws, it is hard to see how States can still justify these 
programmes under the ICCPR. Cannataci was particularly critical of the UKs 
Investigatory Powers Act, inviting the government to stop ‘setting a bad 
example to other States’1026 by continuing to introduce legislation promoting 
mass Internet surveillance. 
                                            
1022 CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 22(a) and CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7 24(a) 
1023 UN Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Privacy/SR/Pages/SRPrivacyIndex.asp
x> accessed 12 October 2016 
1024 Ibid., (g) 
1025 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The right to privacy 
in the digital age, A/HRC/27/37, 30 June 2014, 25 
1026 Joe Cannataci, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, 
UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/31/64, 24 November 2016, 38 
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7.4 Is Internet privacy dead? The regulation of mass Internet 
surveillance 
The fundamental concern with mass Internet surveillance is that it puts 
everyone’s informational privacy at risk. Programmes such as PRISM, 
Upstream and Tempora aim to collect massive amounts of personal 
information as it is gathered by companies or flows across key Internet 
pathways. This personal information is gathered regardless of whether the 
people concerned are suspected of any wrongdoing. This is inconsistent with 
principles of autonomy, taking away our freedom to choose courses of actions 
or to choose what is known about us by others as was covered in Chapter 2. 
A key question is how surveillance laws and intelligence agencies are 
scrutinised by the courts. The effects of this has been seen at supranational 
level where the CJEU invalidated the DRD as was examined in Chapter 4. 
Subsequent legislation in the UK permitted data retention to continue. 
Changes in the law in the US terminated Section 215 telephone metadata 
collection in 2015, but Upstream collection under FAA702 persists. However, 
effective oversight combined with a method by where people can complain of 
privacy violations is crucial if states are to comply with their responsibilities 
under Art. 17 of the ICCPR.1027 It is also vital that laws are accessible such 
that people know what laws can affect them and how. A key tribunal ruling in 
the UK showed that this mechanism can be effective and this is examined 
next. 
7.4.1 Investigatory Powers Tribunal and PRISM, Upstream and 
Tempora 
 
It is clear that regional courts can have an effect on the law in the UK. ECtHR 
rulings which have resulted in new legislation in the UK were examined in 
Chapter 4. However, in 2015 the IPT reached a landmark decision. As a result 
                                            
1027 CCPR General Comment No.16 (n 1012) 6 
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of the Snowden revelations several claimants1028 brought cases against the 
security and intelligence agencies.1029 The allegations made were that 
PRISM, Upstream and Tempora1030 breached ECHR Art. 8. 
Discussing PRISM and Upstream the tribunal noted that these are lawful and 
covered by FAA702 and EO12333 which were discussed in Chapter 3. 
However, as was discussed in Chapter 6 and as argued by the claimants 
information intercepted under the PRISM / Upstream programs could contain 
communications from the UK and if this is then shared with the UK under the 
Five Eyes agreement the UK intelligence agencies could receive intercepted 
material from private individuals in the UK without the safeguards contained 
in RIPA. 
The security and intelligence agencies claimed that provisions in various Acts 
(Security Service Act 1989, Intelligence Services Act 1994, Counter-Terrorism 
Act 2008) cover for such use of material. However, although these Acts set 
limits on what the agencies are permitted to do they do not explicitly deal with 
obtaining intercept material from foreign governments. Thus, if the UK made 
use of US intercept material containing UK personal communications this has 
no adequate protection and fails the tests of ECHR Art. 8(2).1031 
The concern that faced the tribunal was that there must not be ‘unfettered 
discretion for executive action’1032 and that the rules of interference must be 
clear such that their effect on privacy can be foreseen – if not then it could be 
                                            
1028 Liberty, Privacy International and Amnesty International in the UK, 
ACLU, Bytes For All and others 
1029 Investigatory Powers Tribunal case numbers IPT/13/77/H, IPT/13/92/CH, 
IPT/13/168-173/H, IPT/13/194/CH and IPT/13/204/CH [2014] UKIPTrib 
13_77-H 
1030 Note the term Tempora is used here as revealed in the Snowden 
revelations; as the security and intelligence agencies have not 
acknowledged its existence the IPT used the term ‘s.8(4) issue’ after 
RIPA s.8(4) 
1031 Investigatory Powers Tribunal (n 1029) 21 
1032 Ibid., 37(ii) 
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judged to not be in accordance with the law and thus breach ECHR Art. 8. The 
issue was resolved when the agencies disclosed information regarding 
internal processes governing requests to foreign governments for ‘unanalysed 
intercepted communications’1033 and metadata. Such material would (a) be 
requested either subject to a RIPA warrant or, (b) if it could not be obtained in 
that way, for example for technical reasons, the Secretary of State would first 
decide whether or not that request should be made. In other cases where 
material is received it is treated as if it were obtained under RIPA.1034 Although 
it noted a possible issue with the latter case (b) that RIPA s.16 protection may 
not apply the IPT concluded on 5 December 2014 that material obtained via 
PRISM / Upstream did not breach the ECHR Art. 8 rights of UK citizens. 
However, this 2014 conclusion would be modified two months later. 
The tribunal had requested that all parties make further submissions. Further 
disclosures were made to confirm that RIPA s.16 would be considered by the 
Secretary of State should such a request be made. However, on the issue of 
PRISM / Upstream more generally reference to the disclosure made regarding 
internal procedures was necessary in order for the law to be accessible and 
safeguards to be known. As this was not public knowledge until the judgment 
of 5 December 2014 the IPT now concluded that prior to that date ‘the Prism 
and/or Upstream arrangements contravened Articles 8 or 10 ECHR, but now 
comply.’1035 For the first time in its history the IPT had found in favour of a 
claimant in a case brought against the security and intelligence agencies.1036 
Of note, the issue of secret procedures had previously aided the ECtHR to 
                                            
1033 Ibid., 47 
1034 Ibid. 
1035 Investigatory Powers Tribunal case numbers IPT/13/77/H, IPT/13/92/CH, 
IPT/13/168-173/H, IPT/13/194/CH and IPT/13/204/CH [2015] UKIPTrib 
13_77-H 32 
1036 Investigatory Powers Tribunal report 2011-2015, 3.1 <http://ipt-
uk.com/docs/IPT%20Report%202011%20-%202015.pdf> accessed 
12/Aug/2017 
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find against the UK in Liberty and Others v United Kingdom which was 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
The second part of the IPTs ruling dealt with Tempora. Operating under RIPA 
s.8(4) Tempora was described in Chapter 6 as a program to tap submarine 
cables and retrieve all information flowing across these for later analysis. The 
respondents made it clear in their submissions that in order to find the needles 
they must look through the entire haystack of data.1037 
The questions before the tribunal were whether the use of RIPA s.8(4) could 
be found to be not in accordance with the law given the issue of determining 
which communications are external and which are internal; whether the 
safeguards in RIPA s.16 are sufficient; and whether RIPA stands up against 
the tests in Weber.1038 The tribunal noted that it is impossible to differentiate 
between internal and external communications at the point of interception. The 
interception of external communications is permitted by RIPA s.8(5). RIPA 
s.5(6) permits such interception to include communications not covered by the 
warrant should this be necessary in order to carry out that warrant.1039 
Therefore, it found that RIPA s.8(4) lawful. 
On the issue of RIPA s.16 the claimants complained that there was no 
protection for metadata. However, the tribunal found that RIPA s.15 
protections would apply here and found no issue regarding the protections 
provided under RIPA generally.1040 Technically, if such metadata could not be 
used then it would not be possible to determine which communications are 
internal and which external before selecting the external ones for analysis. 
The tribunal also concluded that the safeguards and the purpose of the 
surveillance would pass the Weber test. 
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The result of these proceedings underlines the government’s view that 
interception operations under PRISM, Upstream and Tempora are lawful. 
However, the claimants filed an application with the ECHR which is yet to be 
heard.1041 Moreover, the case indicates the willingness of the IPT to rule 
against surveilling agencies if it finds errors in procedure or the law. It 
underlines the need that the law be accessible to the people governed by it, a 
requirement set by the ICCPR. However, a case heard by the CJEU would 
lead to questions regarding mass Internet surveillance from a data protection 
perspective and this is examined next. 
7.4.2 Data protection and the fall of Safe Harbor 
One notable casualty of the Snowden revelations was the Safe Harbor 
agreement between the EU and the US, the very basis of which was found to 
be flawed in Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner.1042 Safe 
Harbor was discussed in Chapter 4 as a means to continue to allow the 
transfer of personal information to the US in the face of protective data 
protection legislation that would otherwise prohibit it. 
Schrems was concerned that his personal information was being transferred 
between Facebook Ireland and the Facebook servers in the US, putting it at 
risk of surveillance due to the activities of the NSA as revealed in the Snowden 
revelations. The Irish Data Protection Commissioner rejected his complaint 
based on the fact that Safe Harbor supposedly provided an adequate level of 
protection. Schrems took his case to the High Court of Ireland which stated 
that the ‘mass and undifferentiated accessing of personal data is clearly 
contrary to the principle of proportionality’.1043 The Court would only accept 
such surveillance if it were targeted, justified and with appropriate safeguards. 
However, the Court decided to refer the issue to the CJEU on the basis that it 
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24960/15, 20 May 2015 
1042 C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (Grand 
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considered Safe Harbor inadequate. The CJEU declared the Commission’s 
Safe Harbour Decision to be invalid, finding that the Commission had merely 
examined the proposals for the Safe Harbor scheme rather than determined 
if the domestic laws in the US provided the relevant protection.1044 
Safe Harbor was replaced by the EU-US Privacy Shield on 12 July 2016. In 
one respect, the 2013 Snowden revelations made this possible as the US and 
EU had been in discussion over Safe Harbor since late 2013 because of his 
revelations.1045 This new agreement was a result of the US giving assurances 
that government access to personal information in national security cases 
would be subject to safeguards and limitations that had not been in place 
before. However, Privacy Shield is now under threat of legal action. Digital 
Rights Ireland, the pressure group involved in the downfall of the DRD have 
lodged an action with the CJEU against the EC. The claim is that the EC made 
a ‘manifest error of assessment’1046 in determining that the US provides 
adequate protection of personal information. Another case has also been 
lodged with the CJEU similarly stating the EC was ‘manifestly incorrect’1047 in 
determining that Privacy Shield assures adequate protection of personal 
information. 
7.4.3 Threats to mass Internet surveillance 
While Schrems dealt a fatal blow to Safe Harbor, in his analysis of Roman 
Zakharov v Russia1048 Cannataci, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to 
privacy suggests that this case could potentially do the same to mass Internet 
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surveillance.1049 Here, the ECtHR determined that the secret mobile phone 
interception regime in Russia violated ECHR Art 8. However, the court went 
further and underlined that the very existence of such a surveillance system 
could lead to a citizen claiming that their Art 8 rights had been violated. The 
ECtHR had dealt with a similar case before in Klass which was discussed in 
Chapter 4. Although no breach of Art 8 was found in Klass, it was in Zakharov. 
If this indicates the future direction of ECtHR rulings it presents a blow to mass 
Internet surveillance and may well be used against the UK’s Investigatory 
Powers Act as Cannataci points out.1050 
On 21 December 2016, the CJEU published a preliminary ruling in two joined 
cases. The cases were brought by the Swedish and the UK courts of 
appeal.1051 The Swedish case refers to an order from the Swedish authorities 
to Tele2 Sverige AB, a Swedish CSP, requiring it to retain metadata. The UK 
case resulted from action brought by Davis et al which resulted in the 
disapplication of DRIPA s.1 and that was depicted in Chapter 4.1052 The Court 
ruled that EU-wide legislation means that national laws cannot require the 
‘general and indiscriminate retention’1053 of metadata. Furthermore, national 
laws cannot permit access to retained data unless such access is for the 
investigation of serious crime and the access has received judicial or 
independent review.1054 The Court stressed its concerns that mass retention 
of data may give people the impression that they live under constant 
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surveillance.1055 This is a clear threat to personal autonomy and demonstrates 
the Court’s willingness to tackle the serious issues surrounding mass Internet 
surveillance. 
7.4.4 Is Internet privacy dead? 
Kupfer (Section 2.2 page 18) tells us that privacy enables personal autonomy 
and enables us to determine what is known about us. Wacks (Section 2.2 
page 21) defines personal information to be any information about us which 
we would reasonably wish to keep to ourselves and Westin (Section 2.2 page 
21) defines the control of such information as informational privacy. Our 
autonomy to protect our deepest secrets and desires is in danger of being 
stripped away by mass Internet surveillance, striking at our very 
individuality.1056 The mere existence of mass Internet surveillance 
programmes can lead to the public being constantly concerned that they are 
being surveiled.1057 If one thinks that one is always under surveillance one 
may change one’s whole routine. The totally invasive nature of mass Internet 
surveillance is the critical issue. For example, two people may choose to meet 
in a private room to ensure they are not eavesdropped upon, or may choose 
to meet in such a way as each person is unaware of the identity of the other, 
maintaining their anonymity. This represents a clear indication of their 
reasonable expectation of privacy. One may argue that the room might be 
bugged, but not all rooms everywhere will be bugged. In order to avoid the 
possibility of a room being bugged, these two people may go to some remote 
location away from civilisation. Mass Internet surveillance removes this 
possibility. Yet, it overlooks the fact that terrorists can and presumably do 
communicate with great care, choosing their locations carefully. Thus, mass 
Internet surveillance is a major threat to privacy and can never be consistent 
with personal autonomy. 
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The four cases outlined above serve to illustrate that the courts will judge mass 
Internet surveillance critically. The IPT case and Zakharov were argued on the 
issues of accessibility and foreseeability whereas Schrems and Tele2 were 
argued on necessity and proportionality. Although these cases were heard by 
the UK, Ireland, the CJEU and ECHR the criteria on which the cases were 
judged are all present in the ICCPR. As an International instrument this is the 
only one potentially fit to be used against the current global mass Internet 
surveillance regimes. 
Terrorist attacks do, of course, focus the public’s attention. One may consider 
that if MI5 had carried out far more intense and wider surveillance it may have 
discovered the plan to bomb London in 2007. However, had it done so, the 
sheer size of the surveillance operation required would have had ‘huge 
ramifications for our society and the way we live.’1058 Even with such a 
surveillance regime, as Anderson and Killock highlight, ‘[k]nowledgeable 
villains will continue to use Skype, encrypted Gmail, throwaway mobiles and 
whatever comes next.’1059 The general concern for privacy is that while 
terrorists and criminals will use such techniques, Internet users in general 
whether they are innocent or otherwise will remain under surveillance. This is 
compounded by the fact that as technologies evolve, legislation written to 
cater for such changes have not been future-proof. At the end of the day, while 
terrorists may cause us to restrict our movements or revisit our personal 
security, mass Internet surveillance strips us of our fundamental right to 
privacy and all that it protects. There is a risk that the terrorist wins simply by 
existing and not through any other action. 
Is Internet privacy dead? It is difficult to answer with a binary yes or no. If 
Internet privacy is dead, it has to be completely, and while there is still some 
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hope, it cannot be. So, the simple answer is no, Internet privacy is not dead 
even though it may appear that it was. However, the situation remains in flux. 
It is hard to be optimistic for the future in the light of the 2013 Snowden 
revelations and ongoing changes to legislation, in particular the Investigatory 
Powers Act in the UK. As has been discussed above legislative measures – 
laws and regulations – are the only effective means by where Internet privacy 
can be recovered. Technical advances will continue to improve the 
functionality of the Internet and hardware and software manufacturers will 
continue to bring new products to market with encryption built in. These are 
not the issue. The issue is that with every advance the intelligence agencies 
will also advance their collection strategies to further promote and enable 
mass Internet surveillance. The UN must take up this challenge and critically 
examine the surveillance regimes in place, in particular in the US and the UK 
and report as to whether these meet the criteria set out in Section 7.3.3 above. 
The Special Rapporteur is in post and has plans in place to carry out such an 
investigation. As stated by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ‘[i]f 
anything is anathema to the purpose of Article 17, it is the wholesale and 
deliberate collection of personal data or metadata about millions of people 
under no suspicion whatsoever.’1060 
7.5 Conclusion and further research 
Internet privacy is not dead but is in grave danger. This research has explored 
the meaning of privacy and focused on Internet privacy in the face of mass 
Internet surveillance. It has produced an in-depth analysis of the Internet from 
a technical perspective in order to better illustrate the areas where privacy is 
most at risk. Solutions were proposed that can maintain Internet privacy in the 
face of ongoing mass Internet surveillance. 
This research has found several areas ripe for further study. During the course 
of this research data protection took centre stage and had real effects on 
                                            
1060 American Civil Liberties Union, ‘Informational Privacy in the Digital Age: 
A Proposal to Update General Comment 16 [Right to Privacy] to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, February 2015 
- 229 - 
certain aspects of legislation. The fall of Safe Harbor and the potential fall of 
the replacement Privacy Shield is another area ripe for in-depth analysis. 
Furthermore, with large players now setting up data centres in countries and 
forming country-specific cloud services where data remains within a given 
jurisdiction is a developing area. How this effects the mass Internet 
surveillance activities of the US and the UK remains to be seen. 
The legal fighting over the Snowden revelations is set to continue. Cases 
brought to the ECtHR are yet to be heard. Three cases are waiting to progress 
through the Court. All three cases deal with the issues surrounding PRISM, 
Upstream and Tempora.1061 Depending on the outcome these cases may well 
yet have a major impact on mass Internet surveillance in the UK. 
Also, it is interesting to note that companies are now prepared to fight rather 
than simply turning data over. Microsoft and Apple were both named in the 
Snowden revelations as being involved in the PRISM program. In the post-
Snowden world with the EU expressing concerns over the data of its citizens 
major players such as Microsoft creating country-specific cloud services 
governed by third parties may well be clever marketing but does offer actual 
protection from US mass Internet surveillance. 
However, the political situation is still very much in flux. The US saw the end 
of the Obama administration and the beginning of the Trump administration 
on 20 January 2017, and the UK’s plans to leave the EU should be confirmed 
in March 2017 when the government proposes to sign Art. 50 of the Lisbon 
Treaty. In addition to leaving the EU and thus the decisions of the CJEU, the 
Conservatives have stated before that while they agree in principle with the 
ECHR, the directions of the ECtHR and the HRA have ‘eroded public 
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confidence’1062 in the UK’s approach to human rights. It may well be that the 
UK of the future sets itself aside from the ECHR and decisions of the ECtHR, 
the CJEU, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In the US, the incoming 
administration already has a CIA director in favour of increasing 
surveillance1063 and it has been reported as likely that the Justice department 
will be less aggressive when it comes to protecting civil rights.1064 Given this, 
and the intrusive nature of the Investigatory Powers Act we may well yet find 
that Internet privacy in the US and the UK has finally met its match.  
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